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It seems to me rather ironical that this page should come
immediately after the 'declaration of independence' which I am required
to sign for strictly administrative reasons. The production you see
before you, to coin a theatrical analogy, has a very large supporting
cast, without whom it could never have 'gone public'. Professor C.F.
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a reality. The parents and staff of the Our Lady Roman Catholic
School, especially Sister Alphonsus and Sister Margaret, are thanked
for their roles in supplying the 'cast' for Experiments 3 - 6. Their
children are a credit to them. Of course, no production could go ahead
without its Technical Staff and none come better than Gaerwyn, David
and Al an. Thanks are a I so due to the rest of the staff and
postgraduates at the Psychology Department for sitting through many a
'rehearsal'.
But, above all, there is my wife, Sally. She not only tyPed this
thesis with lightning speed, but she also maintained my sanity
throughout; I am more than aware of the sacrifices she made throughout
this production. without her support; and encouragement I very much
doubt whether this thesis would have taken to the stage at all.
SIM-1ARY
When subjects learn to match a sample stimulus to a non-identical
comparison stimulus, the stimuli may become equivalent, or
substitutable for each other. Matching-to-sample procedures have
generated stirnuI us equivalence with humans aged 3 years and upwards.
Animals, however, have thus far failed tests of symmetry, one of the
defining properties of equivalence. This human-animal difference
suggests 'that language may be related to equivalence formation. In
developmental studies by Beasty (1987), young children who failed
equivalence tests later passed when taught to name the sample-
comparison pairings during baseline matching trials. Naming, then,
appears to be necessary for stimulus equivalence. Experiments in the
present thesis further investigated equivalence formation in children
and animals.
The first two experiments yielded further evidence against
equivalence in animals. Experiment 1 found no evidence of equivalence
in the arbitrary matching performances of two chimpanzees involved in
an ape-language training programme. In Experiment 2, pigeons failed
symmetry tests despite receiving extensive symmetry exemplar training.
The final series of studies examined naming and equivalence in 30
normal 4-5 year old children. In Experirrent 3, children often gave the
same narre spontaneously to non-identical stimuli before matching them
in equivalence tests. Experiments 4(a) - 6 systematically investigated
common naming and showed it to be an extremely simple but effective way
for naming to rrediate equivalence. As well as suggesting a functional
definition of naming, the results indicated that the subjects' pre-
existing stimulus names may selectively interfere with equivalence
formation by affecting the common naming relations introduced during
the experiment.
These results support the view that language is~a maJor
determinant of human behaviour (Lowe, 1979; 1983) and they also
emphasise the need for a functional analysis of language developrrent.
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BACKGROOND
Fifty years have elapsed since Skinner published the 'Behavior of
Organisms' (Skinner, 1938), in which he urged psychology to embrace a
science of behaviour. Fifty years seems an awfully long time to the
present author and, given the Pervasiveness of Skinner's arguments, one
might have predicted that the ' exper.irrent.al analysis of behaviour'
would have grown by now into a dominant approach in psychology.
Indeed, the approach got off to a flying start, thanks mainly to the
exper.iment.aI methods of operant; conditioning. Basic research with
animals yielded powerful techniques for altering behaviour and led to
the derivation of presumably 'fundamental' conditioning principles.
Behaviourism had something which rival approaches, particularly
cognitive psychology, seemed to lack. Sidrna.n puts the case against
cognitivism most vociferously:
"There is no body of systematized
principles, no unique set of data, no
characteristic measurement techniques,
and no typical investigative procedures
to which a cognitivist can point and say,
'That is my Science' ....The basic units
of cogni tion - - representations,
intentions, plans, rules, programs, and
mental structures - - are 1inked to
actual behavior only if that becomes
necessary. When such necessity does
arise - - for example, in carrying out
eXPeriments - - the logic of the linkage
need not be compe 11 ing . For the
cognitivist, behavior is important only
as a product of mental processes, but
criteria do not exist for determining
whether different instances of behavior
represent the same mental processes.
Given an interest in some particular
process, each observer is privileged to
decide which behavior wi 11 provide the
appropriate window into the mind"
(Sidman, 1986, p.214).
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Perhaps this was why conditioning principles derived fram animal
research were eagerly and uncritically applied to problems of hunan
behaviour. Initially, behaviour modification procedures attracted
widespread attention both in clinical and educational psychology. The
future for behaviourism looked bright.
Nowadays, however, behaviourism can hardI y be called a dominant
force an psychology. Paraphrasing Branch and Malagodi (1980)," the
spark of commitment to behaviourism, which previously glowed so
brightly, is barely visible these days. Lowe (1983) goes further:
"The power to predict and control canplex
human behavior, which behaviori sm
promised, proved to be decidedly elusive.
Recently, behaviorists themselves have
soul-searched (cf. Brigham, 1980; Cullen,
1981; Michael, 1980; Branch and Malagodi,
1980; Repucci and Saunders, 1974),
outsiders have been eager to announce
behaviorism's demise (Mackenzie, 1977),
and out of the disillusionment the hydra-
headed monster of mentalism .... has
resurfaced in the form of contemporary
cognitivism" (Lowe, 1983, p. 73).°
The behaviouristic soul-searching is particularly prevalent in the
1980 and 1981 volumes of the 'Behavior Analyst' journal, which include
numerous contributions concerned with the 'flight from behaviour
analysis' (e.g. Cullen, 1981; Michael, 1980). As the title of one
paper asks, 'Where have all the behaviorists gone?' (Branch and
Malagodi, 1980).
Lowe (1983) maintains that behaviourism has lost its way precisely
because of its almost exclusive reliance on an animal model of hunan
behaviour. Operant research with human subjects has been virtually
neglected; the vast majority of basic operant research uses animals as
subjects (Buskist and Miller, 1982), often on the assumption that
animal behaviour and human behaviour have similar determinants and are
governed by the same general principles.
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But this continuity
assumption has not been substantiated by basic research (Lowe, 1983),
particularly the recent finding that human operant behaviour can differ
qualitatively fran that of anirral s (Bentall, Lowe and Beasty, 1985;
Lowe, 1979 ) . Given the evidence for qual i tative human-animal
differences (summarised later in this chapter), it is hardly surprising
that behaviourism has dwindled in applied settings. As Lowe puts it:
'If the anirral rrodeI does not hold good for human operant behaviour
under controlled experimental conditions why should it do so in the
hospital, school or stock exchange?' (p.73). Furthermore, an almost
slavish preoccupation with aniIffil behaviour may explain why there seems
to have been relatively little outside interest in basic behaviour-
analytical research. Sidman (1986) sums up the problem:
"An easy criticism has been that Behavior
Analysis deals well with uninteresting
behavior but ignores everything that
ITBkes human beings superior to all other
creatures. The concepts of stimulus and
response have seemed impoverished, unable
to capture the rich complexity of the
hUIffin intellect" (SidITBn, 1986, p.215).
However, SidITBn is well aware that not all behavior analysis can
be so easily criticised; he himself has pioneered an area of operant
research which has generated enormous interest in recent years. The
study of stimulus equivalence is of obvious relevance to human activity
because it opens the door to an experimental analysis of sYmbolic
behaviour, and, in so doing, it may help to give behaviourism a new
lease of life.
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!Matching-to-sample procedures are commonly employed in the study
of stimulus equivalence. Figure 1. 1 depicts one example of a rratching-
to-sample (MTS) task. A subject sits in front of a five-key response
panel. The trial begins with the presentation of a stimulus on the
centre key; this stimulus is the sample. The sample in this case is
the printed word ONE. The subject then touches the sample, and
additional stimuli appear on two of the four outer windows. These
stimuli are the printed digits 1 and 2, and these are the comparisons.
The subject has to touch the comparison digit which corresponds to the
printed number word sample. If the subject chooses the correct digit,
a reinforcer is delivered. If the incorrect digit is chosen then no
reinforcer is delivered. In either event the display goes blank, and a
few seconds later another sample apPears.
When the subject has learned to match each of a set of digits to
the appropriate printed number word we may Perhaps suspect; that his
behaviour is symbolic, that he is reading the words with comprehension.
But we cannot be sure. Pigeons have learned MTS tasks that are just as
arbitrary, but we might be less inclined to call their behaviour
symboli.c , How can we tell if the subject's Performance on this or any
other arbitrary matching task is symbolic, or whether it represents a
simple stimulus-response chain, or conditional relation, which has no
sYmbolic relevance?
If the stimuli an Figure 1. 1 were acting as symbols then one would
expect each to stand for the other. They would, in a sense, be
equivalent; equivalent stimuli are by definition substitutable or
interchangeable for each other (Sidman and Tailby, 1982). Stimulus
equivalence. appears to be a pre-requisite of symbolic activity (cf
Catania, 1984; Devany, Hayes and Nelson, 1986; Sidman, 1977).
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Figure 1.1 Schematic representation of an arbitrary matching-to-
sample task. At the start of the trial a sample appears in the centre
window of the five key response panel (see upper section). Touching
the sample brings on the comparisons on any two of the four outer keys
(see lower section). Reinforcers are delivered for selecting the
comparison that corresponds to the sample.
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Equivalence is itself defined by the three properties of
reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity (Sidman and Tailby, 1982). Each
property nay be tested .independent;1y . Figure 1.2 depicts a reflexivity
test. The subject was initially trained to select Set-B digits
conditional upon Set-A printed word samples. If the Set-A and Set-B
stimuli are equivalent, then the subject should be able to natch each
stimulus to itself without additional training. In other words,
generalised identity matching is the behavioural proof of reflexivity;
if A=B, then A=A and B=B.
Reflexivity is not as trivial as it might appear. The subject nay
have learned AB arbitrary matching but this does not autanatically
guarantee AA and BB identity natching. During AB training, the Set-A
stimuli always appear on the centre key as samples, and the Set-B
stimuli always appear on the outer keys as comparisons. These
invariant locations nay become defining characteristics of the samples
and cc:mparisons (see Iversen, Sidrran and Carrigan, 1986). If so, then,
for example, the sample ONE and the comparison ONE would be as
different from each other as, say, the sample ONE and the comparison
TWO. Success on a reflexivity test shows that, as far as the subject
is concerned, the stimuli remain identical when they change location
from samples to comparisons or from comparisons to samples. Testing
for reflexivity provides an empirical basis for the concept of
identity, which is itself a pre-requisite for equivalence (Sidman
1986) •
Symmetry, the second defining property of equivalence, is tested
by interchanging the former samples and comparisons (see Figure 1.3).
After training AB, the subject is tested on BA; digits now appear as
samples and printed number words as comparisons. If the subject's AB
matching exemplified equivalence then he should be capable of
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Figure 1.2
text) .
Schematic representation of a reflexivity test (see
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Figure 1.3 Schematic representation of a symmetry test (see text).
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responding appropriately to the novel BA combinations without
additional training (i.e. select the comparison ONE when the sample was
1, select TWO when the sample was 2, etc.). SYmmetry translates
behaviourally into the reversibility of sample and comparison roles; if
A=B, then B=A.
The final requirement, transitivity, can be tested only after the
subject has learned a second arbitrary relation, BC. An example is
given in Figure 1.4. The subject has learned to match printed number
words to digits (AB) and digits to numerical quantities (BC).
Transitivity is demonstrated if the subject can then match printed
words to quantities (AC) without additional training. If the training
establishes equivalence between corresponding A, Band C stimuli then
the subject should be capable of passing the transitivity test; if A=B
and B=C, then A=C.
A subject's failure on anyone of these tests would suggest that
the stimuli had not become equivalent. Instead, the subject may have
learned mere conditional or 'if-then' relations (e.g. if A then B, if B
then C) which are fixed in sequence and of no symbolic relevance.
The three defining prope~ties of equivalence can be evaluated
simultaneously. Figure 1.5 depicts one such combined test. The
subject is taught AB and AC and is then tested on BC and CB. In order
to respond correctly on BC without additional training, symmetry of the
trained AB relation is initially required, so that AB produces BA via
symrretry. Then, given the derived relation BA and the trained relation
AC, transitivity may yield BC (BA and AC, therefore BC). The CB
relation may also emerge in similar fashion (CA and AB, therefore CB).
What is perhaps less obvious is that reflexivity is also required
for BC and CB to emerge. Neither relation will errerge unless the
subject views each B and C stimulus as identical across training and
test conditions. During training, the Set-B stimuli only appear as
1 3
Figure 1.4
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equivalence.
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1 6
[2] D
TRAIN IONEI
AB D 0
TRAIN D ~
IONEIAC
D 0
TEST
~
0 D
~
D ~
GJ
D
TEST
CB
-
D
o
o
EQUIVALENCE
17
TRAIN
A-B & A-C
TEST
B-C & C-B
comparisons but during Be tests they appear, for the very first time,
as samples. BC could not possibly emerge unless each B stimulus
remains identical across this transposition. The same rationale
applies to the Set-e stimuli upon changing from comParisons during AC
training to samples during CB testing. If Be and CB emerge then the
Set-B and the Set-e stimuli are reflexive, as well as symmetrical and
transitive. The paradigm in Figure 1.5 therefore represents a simple,
convenient and economical test of stimulus equivalence.
It is worth emphasising that equivalence is defined by the
emergence of untrained relations. If equivalences form in the example
given above, then Be and CB may emerge without explicit training; there
would be no need to reinforce correct responses on the Be and CB test
trials. Equivalence, then, is defined by functional, and not formal,
properties. It would be possible to directly teach Be and CB via
differential reinforcement, but the final performance need not
represent equivalence. Responding that can be described in terms of
equivalence need not be based upon equivalence per see
THE IMPORTAOCE OF STIMUWS mtJIVALEOCE TO A BEHAVIOURAL ANALYSIS
The very process of analysing arbitrary matching performances to
determine whether they involve equivalence can yield enormous practical
benefits. The tests themselves are a vehicle for teaching (Sidman,
1977). In early experiments, Sidman and colleagues (Sidman 1971;
Sidman and Cresson, 1973) assessed the performance of retarded youths
who had been given up by others 'as hopeless prospects for any tyPe of
pre-academi,c training' (Sidman, 1977 ) . Figure 1. 6 shows the paradigm
adopted. The subjects learned (or demonstrated they were already able)
to select' picture comparisons conditionally upon any of 20
1 8
Figure 1.6 Equivalence paradigm
and Sidman and Cresson (1973).
comparisons. Solid arrows represent
and broken arrows indicate relations
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from the studies by Sidman (1971)
Arrows point from samples to
relations present prior to testing
assessed during testing.
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corresponding sample words, dictated by the experimenter. This
Performance is represented as the AB relation in Figure 1.6. Examples
of the twenty dictated words and corresponding pictures were AXE, .BED,
BEE, BOX etc. After AB was established, the subjects learned AC - to
match dictated word samples to corresponding printed word comparisons.
Finally, Be and CB equivalence tests were given (see the broken arrows
in Figure 1.6). The subjects all proved able to relate pictures to
printed words (Be) and printed words to pictures (CB) even though they
were not explicitly trained to do so. The direct teaching of 40
conditional relations (20 AB and 20 AC) resulted in the errergence of 40
rrore (20 Be and 20 CB). In addition, the subjects were able to name
each stimulus aloud. As Sidman has stated on numerous occasions,
stimulus equivalence permits an impressive econany and efficiency in
teaching and learning; you train some and you get many more for free.
The retarded youths emerged with a reading vocabulary of 20 words, 'a
substantial starting point for a teacher who would otherwise be at a
loss as to haw even to begin to teach such students to read' (Sidman,
1977, p.357). The same techniques have established equivalences not
just between words and pictures but also between words and numbers
(Friedman, 1974; Gast, Van Biervliet and Spradlin, 1979), words and
colours (Mackay and Sidman, 1984), coins of differing value (McDonagh,
McIlvane and Stoddard, 1984) and words, manual signs and pictures /
objects (Clarke, Remington and Light, 1986; Van Biervliet, 1977).
But the practical benefits of stimulus equivalence transcend the
restricted teaching environrrent , by expandi.nq the scope of what we
learn ordinarily and incidentally, without conscious teaching efforts.
Hayes· and colleagues (in Hayes, Devany, Kohlenberg, Brownstein and
Shelby, in press) draw attention to the maladaptive products of
equivalence. They argue that through equivalence:
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"Instances of generalization may occur
that have a degree of scope and precision
that could not readily occur otherwise.
For example, a phobic person may see a
graphic description of a plane crash on
television and may then avoid riding in
the fami IY car because the pictures of
the plane are in a class with the word
'plane' and the word 'plane' is (under
sane contextual conditions) in a class
called 'transportation vehicles' and this
class contains the word 'car' " (Hayes et
aI, in press).
On a more positive note, equivalence also allows a person to
behave adaptively to situations that are not directly experi.enced, For
example, let's assume a child has learned to avoid the flames of a real
fire, and that the word 'hot' is also evoked when he / she sees the
flames. If the child then learns that radiators, which look quite
unlike 'real' fires, are also 'hot' then, given equivalence between the
elements (no pun intended!), he / she will subsequently avoid the
radiator. The errergent behaviour is extrerrely adaptive - the child
does not have to eXPerience a burn from the radiator in order to know
of its potential dangers. It is interesting to speculate how many
other disasters may have been avoided by the safety net of equivalence.
Practical benefits apart, the study of equivalence has some
startling theoretical implications for behavioural analysis. In same
respects equivalence may be seen as problematical to behaviourists
because it is (to them) an unexpected phenomenon. The laws of learning
derived from animal research are unable to account for it. More
specifically, equivalence is not encompassed by the three-term
contingency (Catania, 1984), the fundamental unit of stimulus control
(Sidman, 1986 ) . In a three-term contingency, if a particular
discriminative stimulus is present and if the subject produces an
appropriate response to it then a reinforcer wi11 follow. The three
terms are related via conditionality; the contingency involves
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unidirectional relationships which do not reverse as required by
equivalence tests. Hayes (in press) . the example of priwateglves a
hiding in a thicket to avoid a nearby predator. Approaching a thicket
given a lion does not imply the reverse i.e. approaching a lion given a
thicket:
II In the natural environment, the
contingencies supporting conditional
discriminations rarely seem to be
symrretrically arranged in this sense...
Most commonly, if the functions were
reversed the consequence seemingly would
either be extinction, or, as in the
example of the lion, notable punishment II
(Hayes, in press).
Evidence reviewed later in this chapter strongly suggests that the
three term contingency's failure to predict equivalence is a direct
consequence of its derivation from research with animals. It is
apparent I y no coincidence that the equivalence paradigm evolved from
research with humans. Indeed, the very fact that equivalence has
appeared only recently on the behaviourist's agenda is a graphic
illustration of the dangers, previously expressed by Lowe (1983), of
relying exclusively on animal behaviour to the detriment of analysing
the behaviour of humans.
Behaviourists have embraced equivalence, despite the problems it
may pose them, because it promises to fill a space traditionally
occupied by cognitivists:
liThe emergence of equivalence from
conditionality permits Behavior Analysis
to account for the establishment at least
of simple semantic correspondences
without having to postulate a direct
reinforcement history for every instance.
Instead of appealing to cognitions,
representations, and stored
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correspondences to explain the initial
occurrence of appropriate new behavior,
one can find a canplete explanation in
the (equivalences) that are the
prerequisites for the emergent behavior"
(Sidman, 1986, p.236).
Of course one must still explain the equivalences themselves, but
the general point of Sidman's comment remains.
Before equivalence research began, the experimental analysis of
conceptual behaviour was restricted to stimulus classes which can be
formed and transferred on the basis of physical similarities shared
between each class member. Such concepts (often denoted as 'concrete'
(Goldstein and Scheerer, 1941) or 'non-arbitrary' (Hayes and
Brownstein, unpublished)) are readily learned even by pigeons.
Typically, the birds first learn to discriminate between photographs
according to whether the pictures do or do not show instances of the
concept, and then the birds transfer discriminative responding when
novel instances are shown. These skills have been demonstrated with a
variety of concepts including people, trees, fish, bodi.es of water,
plgeons, a specific person, leaves, man-made objects and letters of the
alphabet (see Herrnstein, 1979). However, in all these cases, transfer
may be based on nothing more remarkable than the fundamental process of
stimulus generalisation, acting on a single feature or set of features
common to all members of the concept.
But not all concepts are like this. Concepts such as 'colour',
'number' or 'noun' seem to be governed by processes other than stimulus
generalisation, because their individual exemplars cannot be logically
associated on the basis of physical similarity. Equivalence is
important partly because it now permits, for the very first time, a
behaviour analysis of these 'abstract' or 'arbitrary' concepts.
Williams (1984) chose to emphasise this point:
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"The research by Sidman and his
collaborators is virtually unique in its
investigation of haw arbitrary conceptual
categories may be created. Given that
the origin of stimulus equivalence is
perhaps the most venerable issue in the
study of cognition, the applicability of
behavior analyses to that issue, with
both human and nonhuman subjects, wi11
have major implications for the future of
research on complex stimulus control"
(Williams, 1984, p.481).
But perhaps the area in which equivalence has the greatest impact
is the behavioural analysis of language:
"In the thirty years since the
publication of 'Verbal Behavior'
(Skinner, 1957), empirical progress in
the behavior-analytic understanding of
language has been disappointing ... the
study of stimulus equivalence provides
another, possibly more fruitful, avenue
for the study of language phenomena"
(Devany et al, 1986, p.256).
Cognitive psychologists have rejected the traditional behavioural
approach to language, as defined in Skinner's book, 'Verbal Behavior'
(Skinner, 1957). They have focussed on two main areas to support their
claim that language learning 'lies beyond the conceptual limits of
behaviourist psychological theory' (Chomsky, 1972, p.72).
The first area involves the symbolic nature of words and semantic
meaning. From a Skinnerian viewpoint, symbols are nothing other than
discriminative stimuli which derive their 'meaning' from ParticiPating
in a three-term contingency. For example, the word 'food' means FOOD
inasmuch as, for instance, food-producing behaviour is occasioned by
the word. Similarly, an utterance 'refe~' to something to the extent
that a stimulus (the 'referent') exerts conditional control over the
utterance.
However, most psychologists would argue that symbols are sorrething
25
other than mere discriminative stimuli and that there must be sarething
IIDre to meaning than basic stimulus control. But what are the extra
'somethings'? According to Devany et al (1986) answers to this
question are notably lacking:
"In traditional views of language, much
is made of the symbolic nature of words,
but relatively little work has been done
to show why or how words carne-to function
as symbols. Instead, the literature has
asserted that words do act as symbols and
has traced their use. Verbal humans are
said to be able to 'mmipulate symbols'
(Clark & Clark, 1977), to 'map words onto
internal concepts' (Nelson, 1974), or to
use words to 'refer' to objects, events,
or r e l ations (Premack, 1976). ExactI y
what constitutes a symbol and what gives
rise to SYmbolic relations in verbal
humans is rarely addressed. For
instance, the textbook quoted above by
Clark and Clark repeatedly refers to the
symbolic nature of language, but fails
even to include the word 'symbol' in its
index. It is as if the origin or nature
of symbolic activity Per se need not be
explained" (Devany et aI, 1986, p.243).
Devany et al see equivalence as the behavioural key to freeing
symbolic activity from its illusory cognitive web:
"In the context of stimulus equivalence,
a 'symbol' and its 'referents' form a
class of functionally substitutable
elements. The relation between a symbol
and its referent is not a unidirectional
conditional relation (although the
rrembers of the class are conditionally
related to each other); the relation is
functionally reversible. The relations
among the members of an equivalence class
appear to approximate what
psycholinguists and others mean when they
say that a word represents or 'stands
for' its referent in a way that a
conditionally related response does not"
(Devany et aI, 1986, p.244).
They add that the relation between a symbol and a referent seems
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necessarily bi-directional. A word 'stands for' another event only if
the event 'is called' the word.
Sidman vi.ews equivalence as a pre-requisite for simple sanantic
correspondences:
"The equivalence paradigm provides
exactly the test that is needed to
determine whether or not a particular
conditional discrimination involves
semantic relations" (Sidman and Tailby,
1982, p.20).
Sidman suggests elsewhere that when, for example, numbers and
printed number words become equivalent then we may say that they have
the same mearu.nq or that each is the meaning of the other (Sidman,
1986).
The enorrrous cornplexity of language, and the sheer speed with
which it is acquired during childhood, have led many to reject the
notion that it is governed by operant; laws of learning. Chomsky led
the revolt:
"It is simply not true that children can
learn 1anguage. . . . . . through. careful
differential reinforcement. ..... It is
also not easy to find any basis to the
claim that reinforcement contingencies
are the single factor responsible for
maintaining the strength of verbal
behav.ior . The sources of the 'strength'
of this behavior are almost a total
mystery at present" (Chomsky, 1959,
pp. 42-43) .
When Chornsky wrote this, he c Iairred (not without justification)
that behaviourists had no real means of explaining the appearance of
novel grammatical utterances during language acquisition.
Behaviourists at the time attempted to account for novel behaviour by
appealing to the principle of stimulus generalisation. But, as Chomsky
pointed out, this was not sufficient:
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"Every tine an adul t reads a newspaper ,
he undoubtedly cones upon countless new
sentences which are not at all similar,
in a simple, physical sense, to any that
he has heard before..... Ta 1k of
'stimulus generalization' in such a case
simply perpet.uat.es the mystery under a
new title. These abilities indicate that
there must be fundamental processes at
work quite .i.ndependent.Iy of 'feedback'
from the environment" (Chomsky, 1959,
p. 42) •
Now, however , behaviourists no longer need to overburden stimulus
generalisation with the task of accounting for novel verbal behaviour.
Perhaps stimulus equivalence is the 'fundarrental process' which Chomsky
unkncwi.nqly referred to in the quote above. But then it would be quite
wrong to assume that the process works inde~ndently of environmental
feedback, because the equivalence paradigm exposes a source of
reinforcement for novel verbal behaviour:
"By definition, the existence of a class
of equivalent stimuli permits any
variable that affects one member of the
class to affect all members. Even when
stimuli bear no physical resemblance to
each other, their inclusion within a
class provides a route for extending the
influence of reinforcement and other
variables" (Sidman and Tai lby, 1982,
p. 20) •
The transfer of function from one member of an equivalence class
to others has already been applied to the related problems of
generative grarnrrar and syntax, In a recent study, Lazar and Kotlarchyk
(1985) first established two separate classes of five equivalent
stimuli with 5-6 year old children. Then, contextual control was
established over sequential responding. The subjects were presented
with one member from each class, red from Class A and green from Class
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B. In the presence of Tone 1 the subjects were taught to touch red
first, and then green, whereas In the presence of Tone 2, the reverse
was required - touch green first, and then red. Next, in subsequent
test phases, the subjects transferred contextually controlled
sequential responding to all four remaining members of each equivalence
class.
This result is far from trivial. Firstly, it represents the
initial step toward a functional analysis of novel syntactical
relations. Lazar (1977) gives the simple example of a young child
taught to say 'red ball' In the presence of that object . Given that
the adjective 'green' is In the same equivalence class as 'red', and
the noun 'hat' is in the same class as 'ball', then the child is also
likely to produce the grammatically correct utterance, 'green hat' the
first time he sees one. Moreover, in demonstrating contextual control
over sequential responding, Lazar and Kotlarchyk (1985) have expanded
the analysis further. The significance of this data is not lost on
Wulfert and Hayes (in press), who replicated and extended Lazar and
Kotlarchyk's findings:
"Consider the example of an English
speaker who in the presence of a red
traff ic .1ight. might utter ' red 1ight ' ,
whereas a Spanish speaker in the same
context would say 'luz roja' (literally
'light red'). In a different context, an
English speaker's utterance controlled by
the color of a gannent might be 'light
red', while a Spanish speaker under the
same stimulus conditions would emit 'raja
claro' (literally 'red light'). Whether
a bilingual speaker will order a response
sequence in terms of 'property first,
object second' (English) or the other way
around (Spanish), will depend on the
control exerted by a Particular audience.
A similar argument could be made for
active vs. passive voice and other
language phenomena which require an
inversion of word order, but conserve the
meaning of an utterance" (Wulf,ert and
Hayes, in press).
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The previous section suggests that there is much to gain from
discovering the origins of stimulus equivalence. The issue of how
physically different stimuli acquire similar controlling properties has
been a concern for many years. Beasty (1987) has conducted a thorough
review of several paradi.qms which have previously adopted the tenn
'stimulus equivalence'. However, not all of these nap directly onto
present day equivalence tests. There are, nevertheless, two Paradigms
which appear to 'fit the bill', and both have postulated similar
deterrrrrnants for equivalence.
In their theory of the acquired equivalence of stimuli, Miller and
Dollard (1941) have emphasised the hunan ability to react equival~tly
to stimuli with widely discrePant perceptual features. They considered
acquired equivalence as critical to 'higher mental processes' such as
reasoning and foresight and they postulated a plausible explanation of
how equivalence is obtained and how it nay function in canplex hunan
behaviour. Miller and Dollard proposed that stimuli becane equivalent
by controlling a cornnon mediating response, usually a cornnon verbal
label. Counting is a simple example. Although five 10 pence coins and
one 50 pence coin present ccmpletely dissimilar perceptual cues, after
counting the 10 pence pieces we accept them as equivalent to the 50
pence piece provided our count produces the comron label, 'fifty'.
Miller- and Dollard's hypothesis has received considerable
empirical support (see Beasty, 1987 and Reese and Lipsitt, 1970 for
reviews). An early study by Birge (1941) illustrates the phenomenon.
The subjects (third, fourth and fifth grade school children) each
Participated in three distinct experimental phases. In Phase 1, each
child was shown four boxes, identical except for four nonsense shapes
30
drawn on their covers. The subjects were required to call one palr of
boxes 'towk' and the other pair 'rreef'. After the subjects had learned
1abe1s for each pair of boxes, Phase 2 began; only one of the ' tCMk'
and 'meef' boxes were presented, and the subjects learned that candy
could always be found under the 'towk' box regardless of its spatial
position relative to 'rreef'. Finally, in Phase 3, the other pair of
boxes were presented, to test for transfer of the choice responses.
The children were split into four groups according to whether 'tCMk'
and 'meef' verbalisations were required during Phase 2 and/or 3
(obviously, all subjects were required to name during Phase 1). Group
One were required to name during Phases 2 and 3, Group 'Iwo during Phase
2 only, Group Three during Phase 3 only, and Group Four during neither
phase. The results indicated that it was not sufficient to simply
learn corrmon labels for the stimuli - neither Group Three nor Group
Four gave any evidence of transfer during Phase 3. Transfer only
occurred for subjects in Groups One and Two, all of whom produced
cornmon names whilst learning the choice response in Phase 2.
Furthermore, the best performance was recorded by the Group One
subjects who continued to use common labels throughout the experirrent.
The study of verbal learning via paired-associates also apPears to
correspond, at 1east procedura11y , with modern day studies of
equivalence. In a typical paired-associate experiment, pairs of
nonsense syllables are presented and the subject has to learn to
associate the first stimulus of a pair to the second. The subject 1S
shown the first stimulus and is required to say what the second
stimulus is, before it appears. After learning the AB relation (where
A is the first term of the pair and B is the second) the subject rray be
tested for backward association; the B term appears, and the subject
has to give the A term as a verbal response (BA). Alternatively, after
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learning AB and BC, a chaining test may be qrven, which tests the
subject's ability to label each A tenn with the appropriate C tenn
(AC) . Response equivalence involves teaching AB and AC and assessing
Be and CB. Finally, stimulus equivalence refers to establishing AB and
CB before testing AC and CA. The backward association paradigm
resembles the modern day procedure for testing sYmmetry, chaining
resembles transitivi ty , and response equival ence and stimulus
equivalence both resemble procedures now adopted in combined tests of
equivalence. And, just like the acquired equivalence studies, the
paired-associate experiments led to widespread acceptance of response
mediation as the mechanism for transfer during test phases (see
Jenkins, 1963, 1965; Jenkins and Palermo, 1964).
Modern day studies of stimulus equivalence have seemed less
concerned than their historical predecessors with determining the
necessary or sufficient conditions for equivalence fornation. Most
studies now appear content' with evaluating quantitative parameters
(such as the number of stimuli'that may be incorporated into a class,
or the number of classes that may emerge at anyone time), and with
adding to the complexity of the phenomenon by evaluating higher-order
contextual control of equivalence classes. Such studies are not
without significance but, thus far, they have failed to prorrote an
understanding of the origins of equivalence. Stimulus networks of
staggering complexity have been established (e.g. Matthijs, 1988) with
apparently little concern for what might be producing the simplest
reducible ccmponent . Furthermore, few studies have bothered to record
or report the subjects' verbal behaviour (in particular, stimulus
naming) during equivalence tests. This is an extraordinary omission
given the historical link between verbal rrediation and equivalence. If
the rest of this review seems somewhat brief this only reflects the
paucity of 'studies addressing the question 'where does equivalence came
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from?' The reader may find a more exhaustive review of other
equivalence studies elsewhere (see Beasty, 1987).
We begin by focussing on a series of equivalence studies conducted
by Sidman and calleagues (Sidman, Cresson and wi 11son-Morris, 1974;
Sidman and Tailby, 1982; Sidman, Kirk and Willson-Morris, 1985; Sidman,
Willson-Morris and Kirk, 1986). The results from these studies have
led Sidman et al to conclude that naming is neither necessary nor
sufficient for equivalence fonnation. They accept that differential
responses may mediate (and may possibly facilitate) the errergence of
new st~ulus relations, but they also claim that equivalence may form
ln the absence of mediational naming. This view has been reinforced
by others (I..azar, Davis-Iang and Sanchez, 1984), and its acceptance may
explain why there has been relatively little interest in the verbal
behaviour of subjects during equivalence experiments.
The following review aims to show that (i) evidence against the
critical role of naming in equivalence fonnation is not particularly
convincing when examined in detail, and that (ii) there is compelling
evidence to support the contrary view that naming is necessary for
st~ulus equivalence.
THE ROLE OF NAMTIK; IN STIMUIDS E1J{JIVALEN:E
An early study by Sidman, Cresson and Willson-Morris (1974)
provides what seems to be the best evidence for the independence of
equivalence and naming. The subjects were two severely retarded Down's
sYndrome adolescents (JC and PA). Extensive pre-tests confirmed that
both subjects were unable to name or perfonn arbitrary matching with
any of the experimental stimuli (both subjects, however, were
considerably experienced at naming and matching other stimuli). The
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subjects were taught AB and Be matching, and then they were given tests
for AC (transitivity), CB (syrmetry), and oral naming of the Set-B and
Set-e stimuli. The Set-A stimuli were dictated words corresponding
with 20 pictures (Set-B) and their printed word equivalents (Set-e) for
subject JC, and 9 upper-case printed letters (Set-B) and their lower-
case equivalents (Set-e) for subject PA. Both subjects passed the AC
and CB matching tests. However, neither subject was able to
consistently name the Set-B and Set-e stimuli, and naming of the Set-e
stimuli was particularly poor. The authors therefore concluded that
equivalence had not been mediated by stimulus names produced by the
subjects.
Now this conclusion appears reasonable, but it stands (and falls)
on the assumption that the subjects' naming test scores were
ITeaningful . But this assumpt.i.on may be incorrect. Both subjects, for
example, scored about 50% correct on the Set-e narning trials. This,
however, does not mean the subjects were unable to name the stimuli
consistently; it ITerely represents the fact that on half the trials the
subjects did not produce the name required ~ the experimenter.
Precise details were not presented for all of the subjects' naming
responses, but the few examples given were particularly telling.
Subject JC said 'hamrrer' to both the picture of an axe and the printed
word AXE, and he also said 'CON' to both the picture of the pig and the
printed word PIG. Subject PA also produced the ccmron name 'Seh' to
both upper and lower case G. All these responses counted as 'errors'
and contributed to the poor narning scores. Furthermore, Sidman et al
admitted that 'it is difficult to attribute such narning errors to any
process other than expressive ITediation' (Sidman et aI, 1974, p.272).
But there are other, more fundamental, problems with narning tests.
In a recent study, Hird and Lowe (1985) set out to examine equivalence
in mental 1y handicapped adul ts . A conventional MTS procedure was used,
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but the experiment differed fram all others in one important respect _
all training and test sessions were recorded on audio and videotape.
These tapes were analysed, and notes were made of any spontaneous
verbal behaviour produced by the subjects while performing on the
matching tasks. In addition, all subjects were q i.ven a post-
experimental naming test of the kind presented to Sidman et aI's
subjects. In the naming test, the subjects saw each stimulus one at a
time and were asked, 'What is it?' and 'Do you have a narre for it?'
Four of the five subjects passed the equivalence tests, and they
all named the stimuli at same stage during training. During the post-
experimental naming test, however, three of the subjects gave the
stimuli different names than the ones they had employed spontaneously
while performing arbitrary matching (see Table 1.1). During the naming
test, the subjects appeared to interpret the experimenter's questions
and prompts in a complex fashion, often giving complex analytical
geometric descriptions of the stimuli. For example, John's naming test
responses indicated that he was searching for the description which he
thought the experimenter was looking for. During training, John
spontaneously labelled the green hue as 'yellow', but during the naming
test he said, 'I just call it a square... square with lines down' (the
computer drew this colour as a pquare block made up of a succession of
closely spaced vertical lines). John's elaborate description of the
cross also bore no semblance to his spontaneous label for the same
shape. In David's narru.nq test, it appeared that he did not have
distinctive names for red and green because he called them both
'squares'; during training, however, he f rcel y used the conventional
names for t.he hues. Ian produced similar differences in hue naming,
and when prompted to name the vertical line he said, 'looks like an 'I'
to me', despite previousIy naming it spontaneousIy as a 'Iine' .
35
Table 1.1 Spontaneous and elicited nanung by the subjects in the Hird
and Lowe (1985) study. (semi-colons separate a subject's first and
second naming test responses; V=vertical line, G=green, R=red).
SUBJEX::T STIMULUS NAMING RESPONSE
IAN
JOHN
v
o
G
R
x
v
o
G
R
x
SPONTANEDUS
(During Training)
Line
Circle
Green
red
triangle
cross
straight one
round one
yellow
red one
triangle
other one
PRCMPrED
(During Naming Test)
looks like an 'I' to me; 'I'
circle; circle
square; square green
its a square red; square red
triangle; triangle
cross; cross
from the top to the bottom its
the same; oblong
circle ..• its round; circle
I just call it a square; square
with lines dawn
its red but, its square; square
with no lines
triangle; triangle
its two lines ... its cut into
triangles ... a triangle but no
bottom..• there are little
squares; 'triangle .•• them two
are the same'
DAVID V line line; line
0 '0' circle; circle
G green square?; square
R red Another square; square again,
huh
A triangle triangle; triangle
X cross cross; an 'X'
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The Hird and Lowe (1985) study simply confi rms what logic derrands
- a subject's verbal responses elicited in the contrived context of a
naming test need not necessarily correspond with those emitted
spontaneously, and within the distinctly different context of matching-
to-sample. The subject's naming test responses may depend upon how the
experirrent.ar 's prompt is interpreted. Questions put by others normal I y
have a purpose; they are often meant to correct errors e.g. asking
'what did you say?' upon hearing sorreone speak inappropriately. When
the experimenter asks what apPears to be a simple question during the
naming test, the subject may produce a different name than usual,
Perhaps because the question appears to indicate to the subject that
his former spontaneous utterances were incorrect. In naming tests, the
subjects may simply try to work out what is required, before responding
in the way they deem best. Al ternatively , if the subjects fail to
interpret the situation, or if they are anxious about compounding any
apparent; naming 'errors', then they may opt to say nothing at all.
The Sidman et al (1974) study produced other data that may be
understood better by appreciating the complexity of naming tests.
Firstly, why were the subjects generally better at naming the Set-B
than the Set-e stimuli? The answer may lie in the 'dynamics' of the
naming test. The Set-B stimuli had a l r eady been named by the
exPerirrenter (on AB training trials) whereas the Set-C stimuli had not.
So during naming tests, the subjects may have had less confidence in
naming the Set-e stimuli, even if they had named them correctly before.
However, as the naming test progressed the subjects may have grown ITDre
confident until they felt prePared to offer their names for the Set-e
stimuli. Both subjects did, in fact, produce a I aha I reaction during
naming trials, followed by increased production of appropriate Set-e
names ,
In camrrenting on these events, Sidman et al revealed what apPears
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to be a behavioural 'blind-spot' ln their own terminological
rePetoires:
"His [JC's] 'aha' reaction during the
oral reading [naming] test suggested that
although he had failed to read the words
aloud up to that point, he had actually
been capable of doing so, and exercised
his new capability only in the course of
this test. Nevertheless, even though he
may have been capable of naming the
printed words, he clearly had not been
doing so" (Sidman et aI, 1974, p.271).
And comrerrtinq on subject PA's ' aha' reaction, Sidman et al argued
that:
"Subject PA was apparently capable of
naming more lower-case letters than he
actually did upon initial testing, but he
had not been using those letter names to
mediate the crossmodal matching of
lower-case to dictated letters" (Sidman
et aI, 1974, p.271).
But these comments only make sense if one mistakenly equates
naming with overt naming. It seems as if Sidman et al had failed to
recognise behaviour which the reader of this text is probably engaging
in right now, and which few would wish to deny, narrely covert verbal
behaviour. Bentall, Lowe and Beasty (1985) have discussed the
seemingly inexplicable way in which many operant researchers readily
reject, or avoid acknowledging, human covert behaviour:
"That reference to covert behaviour
shoul d be considered suspect, in
principle, is indeed a strange irony
inasmuch as Skinner established the
identity of radical, as opposed to
methodological, behaviorism largely on
the basis of its recogni t i on of the
importance of covert events in human
behavior (Skinner, 1945, 1957, 1963,
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1966, 1974). For example, in defining
rule-governed behavior, a key concept in
contemporary behavior analysis, Skinner
(1966) described how an individual
constructs his own rules, and may do so
overtly or covertly: 'Any actual
formulation of the relation between a
r'esponse and its consequences (perhaps
slmply the observation 'whenever I
respond in this way such and such an
event follows') may, of course, function
a~ ~ prior co~t~olling stimulus' (p.243).
Slmllarly, Bl]OU, who has contributed
much to the study of child behavior, has
shown how the analysis of covert events
is both consistent with behaviorist
theory and is a practical necessity in
dealing with problemrsolving behavior in
children (Bijou, 1976, pp.70-74; Bijou
and Baer, 1967 ) . Of course, each
researcher is free to choose his / her
own research strategy, which mayor may
not embrace an analysis of the role of
covert behavior, but it should be clearly
recognised that the radical behaviorist
thesis, as articulated by Skinner, does
not eschew consideration of such events,
but, rather, maintains that it is folly
for science to ignore them" (Bentall,
Lowe and Beasty, 1985, p.179).
The problems associated with the Sidman et al (1974) study apPear
to have been compounded in later studies. Figure 1.7 shows the
p:lradigrn used by Sidman and Tailby (1982) in their study of equivalence
with normal children of five years and older. Four sets of unfamiliar
Greek stimuli were used to avoid lengthy pretests of the training and
test performances , Once again, Set-A were letter names dictated by the
experimenter. The subjects were taught the relationships depicted by
the solid arrows in Figure 1.7, and the broken arrows depict relations
assessed during unreinforced test trials.
All six chi ldren who passed the tests gave consistent and
appropriate cammon names to the stimuli during a 90-trial naming test.
Within each set of letters shown in Figure 1.7 (B, C and D) the six
children consistently called the one at the left, 'lambda', the centre
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Figure 1.7 Equivalence paradigm employed by Sic1rran and Tailby
(1982) . Arrows point from samples to comparisons. The stimuli are
arranged, for expository purposes, so that auditory "lamba" is matched
to the letter on the left in each box, "XI" to the centre letter and
"garnrra" to the letter on the right; in all other instances letters are
matched to each other according to their relative positions in the
boxes (see text).
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one, 'XI', and the letter at the right, 'garmna I. Furthenrore, two of
the six children were given naming tests prior to completing the
equivalence tests, thus proving capable of C~n .
'-'1llLllU narrung even before
passing the Be, CB, AD and (in one case) CD tests.
"Subject E.W. gave all the stimuli names
that were consistent with their class
membership, but his hesitations and
expressions of doubt indicated strongly
that although he was capable of naming
the Set-o letters, he had never done so
until the naming test. The new
conditional discriminations involving the
O-stimuli emerged before he had ever
applied names to those letters.
Subject E.W. was the only one of the
eight who yielded such a finding, but his
demonstration that the stimulus class
could form in the absence of naming
cannot be dismissed" (Sidm:m and Tailby,
1982, p.21).
But if the authors had demonstrated anything here it is nothing
but their complete disregard of covert naming. Subject E.W's doubts and
hesitations, over naming the Set-o stimuli do not demonstrate a prior
absence of naming, but (and consistent with the earlier analysis), they
may reflect the fact that those stimuli were the only ones not ~o be
named by the experimenter during training (cf. Sidm:m et aI, 1974).
Two of Sidman and Tailby's subjects failed the equivalence tests,
but one of these subjects (JO) was able to name the stimuli
consistently and appropriately during the naming test which followed.
After a repeat equivalence test showed no change in JO's matching
Performance, Sidman and Tailby concluded that naming was not sufficient
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for st~ulus equivalence.
But even this conclusion requ1res qualification. Sidman and
Tailby have no evidence that the subject continued to name the stimuli
during the critical equivalence tests. Perhaps JO failed equivalence
because he failed to name the stimuli spontaneously at the tine of
testing. The results from many experirrents suggest that mediation 1S
effective only if the subject continues to produce the mediating
response while performing the task in question (see Birge, 1941;
Kail,1979; Kendler and Kendler, 1975). The tenn 'production deficiency'
has been applied to instances where the subjects fail to produce a
mediating name during testing, despite being able to in other contexts.
Subject JO may have named the s'timul i, during the naming test because he
was asked to do so by the experimenter, but then failed to name during
the critical equivalence test because the necessary prompts were
absent. In. this sense, it is not altogether clear from the evidence
produced by Sidman and Tailby (1982) that naming is not sufficient for
equivalence.
In a later study, Sidman, Kirk and Willson-Morris (1985) expanded
the paradigm to include six sets of stimuli (see Figure 1.8). Eight of
the eleven subjects eventually passed all of the tests depicted by the
dotted lines, while the other three failed same, but not all, of the
tests. The three unsuccessful subjects (two normal 5-6 year. old
children and one Down's syndrome adult with a rrental age of 4) left the
study prematurely with no assessrrent; of s'timul us naming. The eight
successful subjects (seven normal children aged 5-10 years, and one 22
year old normal adult) were each given up to two 90-trial post-
experimental naming tests.
There were two main points worth noting in connection with the
successful subjects. Firstl y , in most cases the emergence of
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Figure 1.8 Equivalence paradigm from the study by Sidman, Kirk and
Willson-Morris (1985). Arrows point from samples to comparisons. The
stimuli are arranged, for eX.PJsitory pur.PJses, so that auditory "delta"
is rratched to the letter on the left in each OOX, "sigrra" to the centre
letter and "XI" to the letter on the right; in all other instances
letters are rratched according to their relative positions in the boxes
(see text).
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equivalence was far from automatic; repeated testing and / or the
temporary removal of some baseline tasks was necessary for all but one
subject, and there was some evidence that a particular baseline task
..
(EC) was somehow interfering with equivalence formation. At no stage,
however, did the experimenters consider whether these inconsistencies
might be I inked to the way in which the subjects named the stimuli.
Secondly, after passing the tests, all the successful subjects were
able to give the appropriate Set-A Greek names to each of the visual
stimul i • In other words, all the subjects had ccmrron names for the
stimuli. Despite this, Sidman et al still concluded that common naming
is not necessary for equivalence. Their 'evidence' came from two
Subjects who were able to name either all or some of the stimuli not
just with their corresponding Greek names but also with English nanes
derived from the Set-D stimuli, L, 0 and G. (see Figure 1.8).
"Subject PH applied the Set-A names
appropriately to the Class-l, -2, and -3
stimuli in the upPer triangle and to the
Class-2 stimuli in the lower triangle;
sometimes, however, he gave the Set-A
names and at other times he gave the
English names of the Set-D letters to
Class-l and -3 stimuli in the lower
triangle. For two of the classes,
therefore, he did not give the same name
to each member.....Subject F.M. gave the
English names to the Set-D letters, but
applied the Set-A names to all others in
both the upper and lower triangles.
Although in subsequent tests she proved
capable of giving either the Set-A or the
English-letter names to all stimuli, her
first naming test indicated that she had
not originally given the same name to all
members of any class" (Sidman et a l ,
1985, p.41).
These comments seem to indicate that in addition to failing to
distinguish between names produced after and during equivalence tests,
Sidman et al were now confusing common naming with consistent naming.
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But consistent naming is irrelevant; all that a mediational account
requires is that the subject gives the same name to each prospective
rrember of an equivalence class. It should hardly ma.tter if the subject
can do this with both English and Greek names for all equivalence
classes or with English names for sane equivalence classes and Greek
names for others.
The stimuli in Figure 1.8 also appeared in a later study by
Sidman, Willson-Morris and Kirk (1986), who investigated equivalence
with two normal 5 year old children and four mentally retarded
adolescents. The subjects were taught AS and AC, and DE and DF, and
then tests were given for auditory-visual ABC and visual-visual DEF
equivalence classes (the two classes rema.ined separat;e because the
subjects were not taught the Be relation in Figure 1.8). Equivalences
were formed by all 6 subjects, although three required repeated tests.
In post-experimental naming tests, the subjects appeared to give camon
names with greater consistency to stimuli in the auditory-visual than
the visual-visual classes. During the naming tests, the subjects often
responded with 'I don't know' or same such similar response.
From these results alone, Sidman et al concluded that the
emergence of equivalence did not require mediation by naming. However ,
no such thing had been demonstrated. The results, at best, only
suggested that equivalence may errerge without corrmon naming, and not
without naming per see It 1S perhaps unreasonable to assume that
common narnlng is the only way 1n which linguistic processes ma.y mediate
equivalences. Furthermore, the potentially unreliable nature of naming
tests casts doubt upon whether this study even satisfactorily
demonstrates a case against camron naming. What is sanewhat ironical
is that this point has been recognised by two of Sidma.n et aI's closest
associates. In canrrenting on the study above , Stoddard and Mcllvane
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'Cf986) asked the following question:
"Do these data lay to rest the question
of response mediation as the critical
basis for stimulus equivalence? Probably
not. • . . Some examples may serve to
illustrate the difficulty of this
research question. Suppose a given
subject characterizes all the stimuli in
the entire visual classes with a cornnon
descriptive adjectival term, like
,rounded', ' pointed' or ' pointing that
way', perhaps derived from primary
stimulus generalisation....Alternatively,
suppose a CaTUTDn descriptive term, such
as 'Set l' vs. 'Set 2' was applied, as we
do in talking about stimuli within
classes. When asked the question, 'What
is it?', in relation to a given stimulus,
perhaps the subject's verbal conditioning
history had not prepared him or her to
use descriptive terms as labels, leading
to 'I don't know' (its name) responses on
the naming tests. Would other methods of
testing have evoked descriptions?
What would it mean if additional
'questioning' did reveal some common
response, emitted in the presence of each
rrember of a class? On the one hand it
might appear that one had isolated a
potential form of response mediation. On
the other hand, one might argue that the
additional questioning had merely set the
occasion for further discriminative
behavior, capable of verbal description
by the subject. Such responses need not
have been functional in the original
formation of equivalence relations among
the stimuli. Additional research would
be required to separate these accounts -
research that would likely be extremely
difficul t to accomplish" (Stoddard and
McIlvane, 1986, p.1S7).
Difficult but (as Stoddard and McIlvane imply) not necessarily
impossible. Perhaps the first step toward progress would be to record
spontaneous naming during the matching tasks. Then perhaps we may
begin to discover ways in which the same names may be elicited from the
subject via prompting, either during naming tests or during the
matching task itself.
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Sidman et aI's dismissal of naming has been backed up by one other
study conducted by Lazar, Davis-Lang and Sanchez (1984), but this
suffers fran the same problems as the studies reviewed above. The
subjects were four normal 5-7 year old children. This time the stimuli
were all visual, comprising of Greek and Hebrew letters. All subjects
eventually passed the equivalence tests (but, once again, sorre children
required rePeated testing and baseline manipulations before doing so).
Lazar et al did not record, or report of, any spontaneous naming by the
subjects. Instead, stimulus names were elicited fran the subject in
two separate contexts - a post-experimental naming test (the subjects
were shown each stimulus in turn and were asked 'Tell me what this is'
or 'what is it?') and during nine trials of an equivalence test (here,
the instructions were ' Don't touch; just point to them and tell me what
it is'). In both conditions, subjects produced distinctive names for
each of the stimuli.
Once again, and despite only having evidence against common
naming, the conclusion fonned was that equivalences nay emerge in the
absence of mediating names, and that naming is not a pre-requisite for
equivalence formation. But, as argued earlier, even the evidence
against ccmron naming is equivocal when based upon elicited names.
Perhaps the IIDst significant finding of all served to highlight the
problems of eliciting verbal responses. In approxinately 40% of the
naming trials, different names were given to the same stimuli across
the two prompting conditions.
In sumrary , thus far there has been no convincing evidence against
the critical role of naming in the errergence of equivalence. Now we
must ask: is there any evidence that naming is necessary for
equivalence?
If equivalence r'equr.res nanunq then anirral s should be unable to
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fonn equivalences of the sort readily fOW1d in language-able humans.
Traditionally, attention has focussed on reflexivity and transitivity
in animals, but, for a variety of reasons, this data will not be
examined here. Animal studies of refIexivi.ty have been abundant in the
past, and no doubt wi11 continue to be in the future, given the current
level of debate on the topic (see Beasty, 1987). There has been sane
evidence of transitivity in non-humans (cf. D'Amato, Salrron, Loukas and
TbrrUe, 1985; McGonigle and Chalmers, 1977) but it has been noted that
transitivity may be more amenable to direct conditioning explanations
(Devany at aI, 1986). In addition, neither reflexivity nor
transitivity are sufficient for proving equivalence. Syrmetry, too, is
required. And, at present, the evidence against symretry in animals
apPears incontrovertible.
An early study by Gray (1966) investigated symrretry in pigeons.
Gray concluded that symmetry was present, but the data does not support
this conclusion. After reaching criterion on AB trials (matching red
to green, and blue to yellow), the three pigeons' scores on a 56-trial
BA. synmetry test 'were 64%, 64%, and 57% correct. These scores were
taken as evidence for symmetry because, according to statistical tests,
they were significantly above chance level (50% correct). HOW'ever,
this is clearly an inappropriate canparison; a true test of syrrrretry
compares BA performance with a fixed criterion of accuracy, usually 85%
correct or better. The above chance syrrmetry test scores. probably
reflected initial learning due to differential reinforcement; although
correct responses on test trials did not produce food reinforcers,
incorrect responses produced a ten-second blackout in the test chamber.
In another study, Rodewald (1974) trained three pigeons to match a
red sample to three vertical lines and a green sample to three
horizontal lines, before presenting a 90 trial symmetry test in which
all correct responses were reinforced. The results were very s~lar
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to Gray's; the birds' syrrunetry test scores were 63%, 63% and 73%
correct. Rodewald came to the following conclusion:
"There is little, if any, evidence that
the animals learned the invariant
symbolic relations between the color and
figure stimuli. Rather, they seerred to
have learned how to respond in the
presence of each sample stimulus. When
the sample was changed, further learning
was necessary" (Rodewald, 1974, p.990).
Holrres (1979) came to the same conclusion. His pigeons failed a
sy.rmetry test in spite of being trained on a large number of identity
matching problems, same of which included the symmetry test stimuli.
Hogan and Zentall (1977) assessed symmetry in pigeons by comparing
two groups according to their rates of learning a novel arbitrary
matching task. Group 1 pigeons were trained on a new task which was
the symretrical counterpart; of a task already learned, whereas Group 2
pigeons were given new tasks and old tasks which were not symmetrical
counterparts. Both groups learned the new tasks at the same rate, thus
indicating an absence of symmetry. The resul ts were replicated in a
second experiment, using different stimuli, and in a third, using a
zero-delay matching procedure. Using essentially the sane design,
D'Amato, Salrmn , Loukas and Tomie (1985 ) also found no evidence of
sy.rmetry in the rratching Performances of pigeons and cebus rronkeys ,
Sidman, Rauzin, Lazar, Cunningham, Tailby and Carrigan (1982)
conducted symmetry tests in three experiments with rhesus monkeys, and
one experirrent with baboons , Both SPecies failed the tests, even when
reinforcement was available on symmetry test trials. In contrast, six
normal 4-5 year old children passed exactly the same tests without
differential reinforcerrent.
Finally, two studies have presented pigeons with combined tests of
equivalence. Both experirrent.s were similar, but somewhat unorthodox.
5 1
Kendall (1983) presented pi.qeons with one of two equivalence tests,
either (i) Train AS and CB; Test AC or (ii) Train AB and AC; Test Be.
However, unlike conventional studies, all three stimulus sets were
available during training and testing. Set-A were two 'signal' lights,
Set-B were two keys on the front wall of the test chamber and Set-e
were two keys on the side wall. This arrangerrent was designed to
encourage the birds to engage in overt rrediating behaviour during the
equivalence tests. All of the birds failed the equivalence tests, even
though reinforcers were available for correct responses. The results
were later confirmed by Lipkens, Kop and Matthijs (1988), who used
essentially the same procedures.
There are, to date, only two studies that appear to have anything
like positive evidence of equivalence in animal s , One, by McIntire,
Cleary and Thompson (1987), used monkeys as subjects, whereas the
other, by Edwards, Jagielo, Zentall and Hogan (1982), used pigeons. In
both studies, however , the results are readily explained in tenns of
simple conditioning principles rather than the emergence of untrained
relations. The features distinguishing these 'studies from true tests
of equivalence are real but somewhat difficult to appreciate at first,
though they become far clearer in the context of new data from
experiments fonning part of this thesis.' Consequently, both studies
are examined in detail in Chapter 5 of this thesis.
We may conclude that, to date, and despite considerable efforts,
there has been no success in unequivocally demonstrating stimulus
equivalence in any non-human SPecies, including higher primates. These
data, of course, are entirely consistent with the view that naming is
necessary for equivalence, and so it is all the rrore remarkable that
there have been hardly any attempts to confirm the 'naming hypothesis'
with hunans , General I y speaki.nq , few have seen the need for such
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studies (but see Dixon and Spradlin, 1976; Lazar, 1977). The potential
relationship between naming and equivalence llas eluded recognition even
in the rrost; obvious circumstances. For example, Straner and Osborne
(1982) noted that out of twelve retarded adolescents, only one, M.P.,
failed a standard equivalence test. What was so different about M.P?
Stroner and Osborne noted that:
"Except for M.P., all of the present
subjects were relatively proficient in
expressive language. They frequently
engaged in spontaneous conversation with
the experirrerrter , and related detailed
accounts of past and future activities.
M.P., however, displayed· neither
spontaneous expression nor vocal
imitation" (Stromer and Osborne, 1982,
p.347) •
As far as the present author 1S aware, this was the first
published test of equivalence with a human subject completely lacking
in functional expressive language. This result does not prove the
claim that naming is necessary for equivalence, but it certainly
supports such a claim; nevertheless few have considered its potential
significance (but see Beasty, 1987).
There has in fact only been one published study attempting to
systematically investigate the role of language in equivalence.
Devany, Hayes and Nelson (1986) compared equivalence fornation in three
groups of subjects: normal 2 year old children, 2-4 year old retarded
children with functional spontaneous SPeech and signing, and 2-4 year
old retarded children with no functional verbal skills. The subjects
were trained on AB and AC matching tasks with visual stimuli, before
being tested on BC and CB equivalence. The results completely
vindicated the 'naming hypothesis'. Both the normal and retarded /
language groups Passed the equivalence tests, whereas the retarded /
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no-language group failed. Devany et al concluded that language and
stimulus equivalence are closely related in sane, hitherto unknown,
way.
The above study, however, is not without problems. Firstly, the
experdrrent.al procedures left much to be desired. For instance, the
exper.irrent.er and subject sat together, either at a table (retarded
children) or on a rug (norrral children). The exper.irrent.er presented
the stimuli by hand and she also administered a variety of reinforcers,
including 'social praise', directly to the subject. Situations like
these may allow the experimenter to unwittingly cue correct responses
from the subject. Furthermore, there appeared to be other
opportunities for adventitious reinforcement. Reinforcers were
delivered on every third or fourth test trial. Al though such schedul.es
are procedurally non-contingent they do not necessarily guarantee an
independence between reinforcer deliveries and correct responses.
The above analysis suggests that the normal and retarded /
language subjects may have passed equivalence tests simply by learning·
to .respond correctly through adventitious reinforcement. None of these
subjects passed the tests straight away; their Performances gradually
improved during testing, as if they were learning what to do. But if
reinforcement was responsible for their performances, why did the
retarded / no language group fail the tests? The answer may lie in the
training data. The retarded / no language subjects took the longest to
learn the original AB and AC baseline tasks. It would not be
surprising, then, if they also needed longer to learn the Be and CB
relations during 'testing'. So, all the groups may have been learning
PC and CB but the 'language' subjects may have given the impression of
passing the tests by learning faster than, and reaching criterion
before, their 'non-language' counterparts. Furthermore, any
differences in learning may have been enhanced by a number of
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procedural biases. At the beginning of each trial the experinenter
pointed to the sample and said, 'Touch the one that goes with this
one'. There' could be little doubt that the 'language' children
understood this instruction far better than the 'non-language'
children. When the subjects asked for feedback during testing, the
experimenter said, 'In this Part of the game, I must be very quiet. I
think· you are doing a qood job of working on this'. This, then, was a
potential source of adventitious reinforcement which would only be
available to the ' language' groups. Final I y , the stimuli were line
drawings of aninal-like figures, each coloured a different hue. These
stimuli may have encouraged differential naming in the 'language'
groups, and there is ample evidence to show that differential
responding can considerably enhance the acquisition of matching tasks
(Urcuioli, 1~85). Any of the factors listed above nay have contributed
to faster learning of the test relations by the language-able subjects.
In their paper, Devany et al speculated about the possible
relationships between language and equivalence fornation:
"It could be that the ability to form
equivalence classes is a unique and
distinct skill that itself is required
for stimuli to be used symbolically.
Conversely, language may be a distinct
skill that in turn Pennits the fornation
of equivalence classes. Finally, it is
possible that both the formation of
equivalence classes and the acquisition
of language are the result of other
common processes.
Further analyses of the Perfornances
of very young developing children might
help clarify this issue. If, for example,
performance on an equivalence test is
excellent before the child has acquired
any labels, the argument that the ability
to form equivalence classes is distinct
(e.g., Sidman, 1986) and may itself lead
to language acquisi tion would be
strengthened. Similarly, if successful
language training also establishes
equivalence-class fornation in retarded
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children, the effect of language on
equivalence classes would be implicated.
If the two areas are essentially
synonyrrous or if they both reflect comron
behavioral properties (such as the
ability to respond in terms of arbitrary
relations per se ( e.g., Hayes, 1986;
Hayes & Brownstein, 1985), training in
equivalence-class formation or its
presumed underlying behavioral process
should assist in language acquisition,
and vice versa" (Devany et a l , 1986,
p.254).
By the same reasoning, Beasty (1987) conducted a series of
equivalence experiments with chi ldren in three age groups: 2-3, 3-4 and
4-5 year olds. Figure 1.9 depicts the Paradigm he used. The stimuli
were simple geometric shaPes and colours, automatically presente4 on a
5-key response panel via a computer-controlled T. V. monitor. A screen
isolated the subject from the experimenter to reduce the possibility of
inadvertent cueing. In addition, all sessions were recorded on audio
and videotape to capture any spontaneous verbal behaviour produced by
the subject during the course of the experiment..
After the subjects had learned the AB and AC relations in Figure
1.9, the probability of reinforcement was gradually lowered to 0.2 so
that only 1 in 5 correct responses was reinforced. Then, during test
sessions, uilreinforcedtest trials were interspersed arrong the sparsely
reinforced AB and AC baseline trials. The first tests evaluated
equivalence by presenting Be and CB trials. Further tests evaluated BA
and CA symmetry. Each test lasted 4 sessions, and each session
consisted of 24 baseline and 12 test trials.
The results indicated that equivalence has a developmental
sequence. All ten 4-5 year olds Passed the tests. In contrast half of
the twelve 3 year olds and only one of the seven 2 year olds Passed.
The resul ts also suggested that equivalence is related to
language. All of the subjects, including those who failed, were able
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Figure 1.9 Equivalence paradigm adopted by Beasty (1987). ArrCMs
point from samples to corresponding comparisons. Black arrows indicate
trained relations and shaded arrows depict relations assessed during
testing. Comparison always consisted of st~uli from the same set (At
B or C) .
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to name the stimuli spontaneously at sane stage of the proceedings.
So, naming ~ se was not sufficient for equivalence fornation. It
also seerred that COIIlIDn naming was absent; each subject appeared to
give distinctive names to the stimul i . However, the lffiIlller in which
the children spontaneously named the stimuli appeared to correlate well
with their abi Li,ty to pass the tests. The successful subjects often
named the correct sample-comparison pairs in sequence during both
baseline training and equivalence test trials. In contrast, sequential
naming was absent fran the repetoires of all of the subjects who failed
equivalence tests.
Following the initial tests, the children who failed were taught
the sequential naming routine which the others had used in training.
The children were taught to name the correct sample-canparison pairs
.,
during baseline trials; they were required to say, for example, 'Up-
Green' and 'Up-Triangle' for the AB and AC relations shown in the upper
section of Figure 1.9, and 'Down-Red' and ' Down-Cross' for the AB and
AC relations in the lower section. These were descriptions like those
used spontaneously by the children who initially passed the tests.
The verbal intervention proved extremely effective. All of the
subjects who learned sequential naming went on to Pass the equivalence
tests. One of the 2 year olds failed to learn sequential ~ng and he
also failed equivalence l despite receiving repeated tests.
These data are significant for several reasons. First, they
indicate that naming ~ se is not enough to bring about equivalence;
the names are only effective if produced in an appropriate manner
during the experiment (cf , Birge, 1941). Secondly, corrm:m naming way
be one way in which stimuli can becone equivalent, but it is not, as
some have assumed, the only way (cf Lazar et aI, 1984; Sidman et aI,
1985). The studies by Beasty (1987) indicate that children may
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spontaneous ly employ other patterns of naming during arbitrary
natching; sequential naming may be but one of many such Patterns, all
of which nay be equally effective in promoting stimulus equivalence.
Lowe and Beasty (1987) have speculated, in general terms, on why naming
nay be so effective:
"It seems that aninals, and non-verbal
humans for that matter, are very much
bound by the fixed-relations of the
three-term contingency, e.g. 'In the
presence of stimulus A a response to B
will be reinforced' and this is why they
fail equivalence. But when one names
stimuli, and repeats the names to
oneself, the relation between the names
are freed of the spatial and temporal
constraints that apply to the ordering of
the stimuli in the environment" (Lowe and
Beasty 1987, p.13.)
But, mOst importantly, the data presented above should be seen
within the wider context of human operant behaviour. A considerable
amount of experimental evidence has revealed major, and seemingly
qualitative, differences between the performance of humans and animals
on schedules of reinforcement (cf. Lowe, 1979; Matthews, Shimoff,
Catania and Sagvolden, 1977). For example, on a Fixed-Interval (FI)
reinforcement schedule, reinforcement is given for the first response
after a fixed interval of time since the last reinforcer. Aninal
performance on FI schedules is characterised by a pause after
reinforcement (the post-reinforcement pause or PRP) followed by a
gradually accelerating response rate which ends when the next
reinforcement is delivered (Branch and Gollub, 1974; Dews, 1978; Lowe
and Harzem, 1977). This often produces a 'scalloped' pattern on
cumulative records of responding. Furthennore, the overall response
rate and the overall running rate (i.e. the response rate minus the
PRP's) are declining functions of FI duration, whilst PRP's and
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succeeding inter-response times (IRT's) increase as the schedule value
increases (Lowe and Harzem, 1977).
However, these orderly and replicable effects are not found when
adult humans respond under conventional FI procedures. Human adult FI
performance often takes one of two forms , either a high-rate pattern (a
steady and high rate of responding throughout the interval) or a low-
rate pattern (one or two responses at the end of the interval). These
patterns, unlike those produced by anirral s , are often insensitive to
changes in schedule value (Leander, Li.ppran and Meyer, 1968; Lo~,
1979; Weiner, 1969). Similar human-animal differences may also be
found on Differential Reinforcement of Low Rate (DRL) and Fixed Ratio
(FR) reinforcement schedules (Lowe, 1979). In addition, when adult
humans are changed from one reinforcement schedule to another, they
often show a ' rigidity' of perfonnance that is uncharacteristic of
animals (Bentall, Lowe and Beasty, 1983).
Lowe (1979; 1983) suggests that language may be the principal
factor behind these Perfonnance differences:
"Through participation in -a verbal
community humans acquire the skill of
describing their environment and
themselves, of formulating verbal rules,
and of acting in accordance with these
rules. This use of language is unique
arrong living creatures and has. profound
effects upon much of human activity,
including performance on schedules of
reinforcement" (Bentall, Lowe and Beasty,
1985) .
Lowe's hypothesis has gathered much support in recent years. In
one study, Lowe (1979) noticed that when adult humans respond on FI
schedules, they often reported counting out the interval between
reinforcers. Those who produced a high-rate pattern seemed to be
pressing the lever as they counted, whereas those who produced a low-
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rate pattern clairred that they pressed the lever only after countinq
out the interval. But when the subjects were supplied with a
response-produced clock to attenuate counting, their lever presses carne
to resemble animal FI performance, both in tenus of response patterning
and sensitivity to schedule parameters.
Differences between human and anirnaI perforrrance are also found on
more complex paradigms involving choice between two reinforcement
schedules running concurrently. When animals are placed on these
choice schedules their behaviour is so orderly that it can be readily
predicted by mathematical equations. However, when adult hurrans are
placed on such schedules, they often produce ideosyncratic and
elaborate response sequences which appear to be determined by their
verbal formulations of the contingencies (Lowe and Horne, 1985).
A number' of studies have shown that the Performance of pre-verbal
infants on FI, FR and DRL schedules is indistinguishable from that of
animals (see Bentall,Loweand Beasty, 1983, 1985; Lowe, 1983; Lowe,
Beasty and Bentall, 1983). Furthermore, there appears to be a
developrrent.aI progression in FI performance, Children aged 5 years and
older display the same high or low rate Patterns as adult humans.
However, children between 2 and 4 years ~f age, with less well
develOPed verbal skills, produce Patterns that are neither adult-like
or animal-like but are seemingly intermediate, containing elements of
both forms of responding. When the 2.5 - 4 year olds were taught to
use their verbal behaviour in conjunction with lever pressing, their
response patterns became the same as those produced by the older
children and adults.
Taken together, this evidence suggests that humans can show
conditioning effects like those observed with animals, but only during
infancy, and before acquiring language. Childrens I behaviour alters
radically as soon as they can articulate verbal descriptions of the
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contingencies. The data on human schedule performance is consistent
with .a growing body of literature on the role of language in the
regulation of behaviour (cf. Bern, 1967; Luria, 1961; Risley, 1977;
Vygotsky, 1962), and with Skinner's formulation of rule-governed
behaviour and consciousness in humans (Skinner, 1974 ) . The research
reviewed above on naming and stimulus equivalence provides yet further
support for the view that verbal behaviour plays a critical role in
human development.
The view that naming 1S necessary for the errergence of equivalence
raises a number of interesting questions. One question is best
illustrated in conjunction with a recent study by Clarke, Remington and
Light (1986). The subjects, three severely retarded children, were
presented with two sets of stimuli. The two sets consisted of pictures
which the subjects either could or could not choose conditional upon
picture n~es spoken by the experimenter (we shall refer to these
pictures as 'known' vs 'unknown' respectively). The subjects learned
manual signs for the pictures, which were shown to them and named by
the experimenter.
The children learned s i.qns for the 'known' pictures much faster
than for the 'unknown' pictures. This result suggested that ,the
relations between 'known' pictures and signs were facilitated by the
corresponding picture names spoken by the experimenter. Indeed, this
is what one might expect. The' known' picture names, spoken by the
experimenter, already functioned to control each subject's choice of
(and therefore attention to) the 'known' pictures. So perhaps the
subjects also attended to the 'known' pictures as the experimenter
named them during sign training. In contrast, the ' unknown' picture
names, spoken by the experimenter, would not have acquired this
'attention cueing' function with respect to the unknown pictures. So
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perhaps the signs were learned faster for the 'known' pictures because
the subjects attended to them better than the 'unknown' pictures.
Alternatively, the 'known' picture names may have facilitated signing
simply because those names already controlled the subjects' arbitrary
natching perfonnances in other contexts (i .e. nane-picture natching).
The second finding involved the emergence of untrained relations
in the" subjects' repetoires. After the subjects had learned to
produce signs conditional upon pictures, they were able to do the
reverse - select pictures conditional upon signs. This suggested that
the pictures and signs had become equivalent.
This finding poses certain questions. If naming is necessary for
equivalence, then how do names become equivalent to their corresponding
stimuli? One cannot argue that the names must be narred because this
nay send one into an infinite regress of narrung. Perhaps there is
something fundamental about naming which allows us to escape this
dilerrma. Chapter 4 of this thesis presents new experimental data of
relevance to this lssue. Chapter 4 also addresses other questions. In
the experiments by Beasty (1987), why was sequential naming so
effective in promoting stimulus equivalence? Could cammon naming have
the same drarratic effect on equivalence forma.tion as sequential naming?
Perhaps most imPortantly, how nay we define naming?
But we will start where the present research programne began, with
two equivalence experiments with animals. The first of these was
unique, and therefore especially exciting, because it was designed to
test the following possibility: if language is critical for equivalence
formation then perhaps animals may pass equivalence tests after
receiving extensive language training. The next chapter presents
ExPeriment 1, which involved the first reported test of equivalence
with language-trained chimpanzees.
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CHAPrER 2
A SEARCH FOR STIMULUS EQUIVALENCE IN THE MATCHING-TO-SAMPLE
PERFORMAlCES OF IAl'UJAGE TRAINED QIIMPANZEES
1. Methcx:1
2. Results and Discussion
3. General Discussion
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EXPERIMENr 1
MErHOD
SUBJOCTS
The subjects were three adult chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), two
males (Sherman and Austin) and one female (Lana). At the start of the
experiment, Sherman and Austin were 13 and 12 years old respectiveIy ,
and Lana was 16 • All three chimps were subjects in an are-language
training programrre at the Language Research Center in Atlanta, Georgia,
U. S. A. The chimps had learned to cornnunicate to others by pointing
to lexigrams, which are visual-graphic stimuli arranged on a keyboard,
each associated with an object, action or location. Details of their
language training have been described elsewhere by their princi.pal
caretakers, Professors Duane Rumbaugh and Sue Savage-Rumbaugh (see
Rumbaugh, 1977; savage-Rumbaugh, 1986). It should be noted that the
chimps did not have access to a 1exigram keyboard during any time
wi thin the period in which the present eXPeriment was conducted.
None of the chimps were food deprived in the general sense.
However, highly preferred foods (e.g. candies, exotic fruits, yoghurt
etc.) were reserved as reinforcers, and the chimps seldom had access to
these at any time other than during experirrent.al sessions.
APPARATUS
The experimental chamber was the middle roan of the chimps ' living
quarters. A wall at one end of the chamber contained a five key
stimulus-response Panel (see Figure 2. 1) . Each key was Scm square and
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Figure 2. 1 Scherratic representation of the five key stimulus-
response panel (see text for dimensions).
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made of transparent perspex. Four of the keys were located at the
corners of a 21 x 12 cm rectangle, with the fifth key a n the
rectangle's centre. The panel was mounted with the centre of the
middle key at 76 em above the floor, so that when the chimps were
seated, their eyes would be approximately level with the middle key.
A colour monitor screen was placed directly behind the stimulus-
response panel. The monitor was connected to an Apple microcanputer
which programmed the sequencing and display of the stimuli, and
recorded relevant key presses. The stimuli were two colours (red and
green, each drawn as a 4 em square) and four shapes (a 'Y' ,a 'zig-zag',
a triangle and a cross, each drawn white on a black background to
occupy a 4 em square area). These stimuli were presented directly
behind the keys, on the monitor screen.
A food chute was placed directly beneath the panel, approximately
30 em from the floor. A variety of foods were dispensed down the chute
via an automatic dispenser controlled by the Apple microcomputer.
PROCEDURE
Each chimp usually received at least one session per day for five
days a week. Prior to beginning each experimental session,
disturbances were minimised as much as possible by placing the subject
alone in the exper.iment.aI chamber and by locking the chamber doors.
During training sessions correct key presses produced a high~pitch
tone from the computer and the delivery of food, whereas incorrect key
presses produced a low-pitch tone and no food. After a correct or
incorrect choice all stimuli were removed (i.e. the screen went blank)
and a five second inter-trial interval followed, at the end of which
the next stimul us appeared. The procedure was non-correction
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throughout; errors did not cause trials to be repeated.
Preliminary Training
Each subject began with one 48-trial session of preliminary
training, which consisted of two stages. In the first stage, the
chimps were taught to press the keys. On each trial, either a cross or
a triangle appeared at randan on any of the four outer keys. Pressing
the lit key was designated correct and pressing any dark key was
incorrect. When the subject had learned to press the lit key, and only
the lit key, then the next stage commenced. Trials began with either
the cross or the triangle appearing equally often, and at random, on
the centre key. Pressing the centre key then produced an identical
shape on any of the four outer keys, again at random. The centre
stimulus remained on. Pressing the lit outer key was correct. In this
and all subsequent sessions, pressing a dark key had no scheduled
consequence. Once the subject was reliably pressing the lit centre key
followed by the lit outer key, identity matching trials were presented
(see below).
Identity Matching
In this stage, the triangle and cross appeared equally often as
samples (centre key stimuli). When the sample was pressed it remained
on and was joined by two conpari.sons (outer key stimuli). On each
trial, the ccmpari.sons were the triangle and the cross, and their
appearance was acccmpani.ed by an audible 'beep' from the canputer. When
the triangle was the sample, the triangle canParison was correct, and
when the cross was the sample, the cross canParison was correct. The
triangle and cross appeared equally often as samples in each 48-trial
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session.
In this and all subsequent matching-to-sample sessions, all trial-
types (sample-comparison canbinations) were presented at randan with
the following restrictions:
(a) No more than three trials with the same t.ri.al e-type could occur
consecutively.
(b) All four comparison keys had to be scheduled as correct before any
could be correct again.
With these exceptions, all trial-tyPes and correct keys appeared
equally often in each session.
The subjects were presented with triangle and cross identity
matching trials until they had reached a criterion of 90% correct
responses per session. Following this, the Y-shape and zi.q-zaq were
introduced and the subjects were taught to identity match with these
'novel' stimuli. On each trial, the Y-shape and zig-zag appeared as
comparisons and each shape appeared equally often as the sample.
Sessions were continued until the 90% criterion was reached.
All animals finally had sessions in which the 'feedback' on each
trial (i.e. the programmed consequence for a correct or incorrect
response) was gradually reduced from a probability of 1.0 (feedback on
every trial) to 0.2 (feedback, on average, every fifth trial). This
procedure was a preparatory step trward subsequent testing (see below).
For Sherman and Austin, sessions before testing consisted of 12 trials
each of the triangle, cross, Y-shape and zig-zag identity matching
trials. Lana, however, only received triangle and plus identity trials
during this stage. All subjects proceeded to the next stage after
maintaining criterion performance on the shapematching tasks at the 0.2
probability level.
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Reflexivity Testing
During reflexivity test seSSlons, novel colourrnatching trials were
interspersed among the baseline shapematching trials. On
colounnatching test trials the canparisons were the red hue and the
green hue, and the sample appeared equally often as red or green. For
Sherman and Austin, each 48-trial test session consisted of 8 trials
each of the four shapematching baseline trial-types and the two
colourmatching test trial-types. In each of her first five test
sessions, Lana received 32 baseline shapematching trials wit~ the
triangle and cross (16 trials each) and 16 colourmatching test trials
with the red and green hues (8 trials each). Thereafter, Lana I s test
sessions were the same as Sherman's and Austin's. On all test
sessions, feedback on baseline trials was delivered according to the
0.2 probability schedule. Test trial s , however, were unreinforced'
(i.e. correct and incorrect responses prcrluced the inter-trial interval
only, and neither food nor tones were delivered). At the end of
testing, further identity matching sessions were presented, but this
time with feedback on every trial.
AB Training (arbitrary matching)
The subjects were next presented with AB arbitrary matching
trials. The Y-shape and zig-zag were Set-A samples and the green hue
and red hue were Set-B canparisons. When the sample was a Y-shape,
reinforcers were contingent upon choosing the green canparison, and
when the zig-zag was the sample reinforcers were contingent upon
choosing red (see Figure 2.2). These two trial-types appeared equally
often in each 48-trial session.
In addition, a number' of intervention procedures attempted to
72
Figure 2.2 stimulus relations presented during AB training trials.
Arrows point from sample stimuli (only one presented at a time) to
corresponding comparison stimuli.
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accelerate learning of the AS task. Each 'intervention' is described
below (further details (e.g. number of AS trials per intervention)
appear in the Results section).
(a) Enlarging the baseline All of the chimps developed strong
comparison preferences during early training sessions; they tended to
choose one particular comparison colour on every trial. These
comparison preferences may have arisen from, and may have been
maintained by, the matching-to-sample contingencies on AS trials. Fach
AB session consisted of equal numbers of trials in which the red
comparison and green comparison were scheduled as correct, but this did
not prevent localised parts of a session from comprising of a greater
proportion of trials with the same correct comparison. A subject may,
for example, learn to repeatedly select the red comparison after being
exposed to a number of neighbouring trials in which the red comparison
is mostly correct. If the same contingencies were sufficiently
recurrent then the preference, once learned, might be maintained.
Although these possibilities were not subjected to a detailed analysis,
they seemed likely enough to warrant 'evasive' action. If the baseline
is expanded to include additional trial-types (i.e. additional
comparison stimuli) then this necessarily reduces the probability of
getting localised concentrations of trials with the same correct
comparison. Consequently, a number of sessions were run, each
consisting of an equal proport.i.on of the two AB trial-types and two
additional arbitrary matching trial-types (the latter consisted of set-
A samples and triangle and cross comparisons; sample-correct cam~ison
combinations were Y-shape - triangle and zig-zag - cross). Enlarging
the baseline did not, however, prorrot;e acquisition of the AS task.
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(b) Interspersed identity matching trials It was possible that the
chimps were not attending sufficiently to the stimuli on AB trials, and
that this may have been why they were not acquiring the relation.
Consequently, the chimps were given a number of sessions in which the
AB t.ri.al-rtypes were .i.nt.ersper-sed arronq identity matching trials with
the Set-A and Set-B stimuli. The chimps were all able to identity
match with the Set-A shaPes and Set-B colours, thus demonstrating that
they were at least attending to the same stimuli which also appeared on
AB trials. Despite this, their Performances on AB renained at or
around chance level.
(c) Compound stimulus presentations Sherman received trials in
which each Set-A sample shape was coloured the same as its
corresponding Set-B ccmpari.son (i.e. the Y-shape was coloured green,
and the zig-zag was coloured red). After 9 such sessions, Sherman was
making no errors. Obviously, his correct choices may have been
governed by the colour of the sample (he had already learned to match
the colours), but it was hoped that this control would transfer, in an
incidental fashion, to the shaPe of the sample. However, as soon as
the colours were removed from the samples (i.e. as soon as normal, AB
trials were presented), Sherman's Performance fell to chance level.
(d) Fading Intervention (c) may have been successful if the colour
had been gradually faded from the sample shape, but this was
technically very difficult to achieve with the Apple microcomputer.
Nevertheless, a different fading prograrrure was eventually devised in
order to capitalise on the chimpanzees' pre-existing colounnatching
skills. Each sample shape was initially drawn on a background colour
which matched the colour of the corresponding coroparrson , So the Y
sample was drawn on a green background, and this was to be matched to
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the green comparison, whereas the zi.q-zaq sample was drawn on a red
background, and this was to be ma.tched to the red ccmpar i son. At the
start of the session, the sample background colour-cue was identical in
size and shape to each canparison colour (i. e. 4cm square). As the
session progressed, correct responses produced a gradual reduction in
the size of the sample colour-cue, whereas incorrect responses
increased it in size (up to a ma.xirnurn of 4 em square) . For each trial-
type, six consecutive correct responses resulted in the temporary
di.sappearance of the colour-cue from the sample shape , The fading
therefore proceeded from colourma.tching to AB arbitrary matching, and
fading was implemented to a degree determined entirely by the subject's
Performa.nce.
Sherma.n and Lana eventually learned AB matching via the fading
procedure (see Results). Austin, however, did not; he therefore
received a number of additional interventions, described bel.cw,
(e) Interspersed zero-delay identity ma.tching trials Here, sessions
were the same as in (b) above, except that all identity natching trials
were zero-delay L,e , when the sample was pressed it d i.sappeared and was
followed immediately by the presentation of the comparisons. The zero-
delay procedure was meant to encourage Austin to attend more to the
Set-A and Set-B stimuli. However, it did not affect his AB
performance , which rana.ined at or around chance level.
(f) Delayed cuelng In AB sessions involving delayed cueing, the
incorrect comparison was r'erroved :inmediately after it was presented.
This forced the subject to select the correct canparison. Then, the
time between comparison onset and removal of the incorrect canparlson
was gradually increased across trials. This contingency Permitted two
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possible outcomes; either the subject made a choice prior to the
removal of the incorrect comparison (and thus the choice could be
correct or incorrect) or the subject waited for the incorrect
comparison to disappear, and then made a correct choice by default.
Other studies (e.g. McDonagh, McIlvane and Stoddard, 1985; McIlvane,
Withstandley and Stoddard, 1985) have succeeded in teaching matching-
to-sample via similar delayed cueing techniques. However, delayed
cueing did not improve Austin's AB performance. On the ma jority of
trials he waited for the incorrect comparlson to disappear before
responding, and on the few trials in which he did not wait, he
responded equally often to the correct and incorrect comparison.
(g) Differential sample schedules In order to produce the comparlsons,
Austin was required to press the zig-zag sample five times or to wait
three seconds after the Y sample appeared before pressing it (presses
before three seconds reset the interval). Teaching the subject to
respond differentially to the samples has often resulted in faster
acquisition of matching tasks (e.g. Cohen, Looney, Brady and Aucella,
1976; Sidman et aI, 1982; Urcuioli, 1985). However, sample schedules
were not effective with Austin; in fact, he often managed to satisfy
the schedule contingencies even when he was clearly not looking at the
sample. On these occasions, he began by pressing the sample
repeatedly; if this did not produce the comparisons (and the audible
beep which accompanied their presentation) then he stopped responding,
paused for longer than three seconds, and then resumed pressing. This
tactic guaranteed production of the ccmpari.sons irrespective of the
sample presented.
Sumnary Lack of time precluded further attempts to teach Austin AB
natching. Sherman and Lana, however, learned the AB relation, so they
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received additional sessions in which the reinforcement probability was
gradually lowered from 1.0 to 0.2 in preparation for the subsequent
test phase (see below). During probability reduction, each AB session
still began with sample colour-cues, even though both chimps were now
capable of choosing correct comparisons wi thout these cues. After
reaching the 0.2 level, additional sessions were presented, all of
which began with no sample colour-cue (although the cue re-appeared on
the first trial following an incorrect choice). Finally, AB sessaons
were run at the 0.2 level with the colour-cues totally absent.
Synmetry Testing
Symmetry test sessions always included AB baseline trials and BA
syrrnnetry test trials (see Figure 2.3). On synmetry test trials, the
stimuli which were formerly samples and comParisons were interchanged
i.e. a green or red sample was presented with Y and zig-zag
ccmpari.sons , To Pass the test, the chimps would have to select the Y-
shape when the sample was green,·and the zig-zag when the sample was
red, although they had never been explicitly trained to do so. Other
trial-types were also included in the baseline at various stages of
testing, and details of these are presented in the Results section,
along with other relevant information regarding the number of trials
per t.r.i.al.e-type , and the reinforcement contingencies on baseline and
test trials.
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Figure 2.3 Stimulus relations presented during symmetry test
sessions (see text).
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Identity Matching
Table 2. 1 shows the number of trials each subject required in
order to reach criterion on the first two identity matching tasks. All
three chimps learned each identity matching task as quickly as (and
often faster than) the children from the experirrent.s by Beasty (1987)
(and these children were in fact trained on colourrnatching tasks which
generally take less t~ to learn than shapematching tasks like those
presented to the chimps; see Carter and Werner, 1978). Sherman took
approximately twice as long to learn the second task than the first,
whereas Austin and Lana needed exactI y the same number of trials to
learn each task. So, although each chimp had initially learned to
identity match with one set of shapes (the triangle and cross), their
matching performances did not transfer immediately to a novel set of
shapes (the Y and zig-zag). These results, however, do not necessarily
indicate an absence of reflexivity in the chimpanzees' identity
rratching performances. Many of the chi ldren in Beasty' s exper.irrent.s
matched same novel shaPeS to criterion but failed to match others, in
reinforced trials which followed colourmatching training (see Beasty,
1987). Perhaps then, it would be unwise to draw firm conclusions from
a subject's Performance on a single novel identity matching task.
Following acquisition, the probability of reinforcerrent on the
baseline shapemat.chinq trials was gradually lowered to 0.2 in
preparation for testing (see Procedure). This reduction was
accomplished in three sessions with Sherman, and in five sessions with
both Austin and Lana. All three chimps maintained their shapematching
Performances during this time.
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Table 2.1 The number of trials each subject required to reach
criterion on the first two identity matching tasks of Experiment 1 (A=
triangle, + = cross, Y = Y-shape,Z = zig-zag).
SUl3J"OCT IDENTITY MATCHIN3 TASK
AUSTIN
LANA
SHERMAN
I
(1:1, +)
144
432
288
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II
(Y, Z)
144
432
528
Reflexivity Testing
Figure 2.4 shows each subject I s overa11 perfonnance on reflexivity
tests. The figure depicts the percentage of correct responses for each
trial-type, averaged over the test sessions. The stimuli for each
trial-type are identified at the bottom of the bars. Sample stimuli
are placed above comparisons, and a line connects each sample to its
corresponding comparison. The bars to the left show that the subjects'
performances on the sparsely reinforced baseline shapematching trials
were at or around 90% correct during testing. Despite this, their
overall scores on the unreinforced colournatching test trials were
relatively poor, typically at or around chance level or (50% correct),
which is depicted by the dotted line. Figures 2.5 - 2. 7 shaw each
chimp's scores on unreinforced colounnatching test trials for each
individual test session. Shennan responded below chance on the red-red
trial-type for the first six test sessions, but on the 7th and 9th
sessions accuracies on both colournatching trial-types rose above 80%
correct (see Figure 2.5). A simi lar pattern emerged in Austin's test
sessions (Figure 2.6). Austin's test trial scores reached a peak of
around 80% correct on his 6th and 7th test session. In lana's first
five test sessions, her baseline did not include identity matchinq
trials with the Y-shape and zig-zag, and her scores on the unreinforced
colourrratching trials typically remained at or below chance level (see
Figure 2.7). Then, from the 6th test session onwards, the Y-shape and
zig-zag identity trial-types were added to the baseline, and one
session later (session number 7), her colournatching perfonnance peaked
above 80% correct, declining thereafter.
At the end of testing, the subjects received an additional
identity matching session which differed from the preceding sessions
84
Figure 2.4 Overall results (percentage of correct responses)
produced by the three chimPanzees during their reflexivity tests (T =
triangle, + = cross, Y = Y-shape , Z = zig-zag, G = green, R = red; see
text for further details).
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Figure 2.5 Sherman I s performance on unreinforced colounnatching
test trials during each individual reflexivity test session.
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Figure 2.6 Austin's performance on unreinforced colourmatching test
trials during each individual reflexivity test session.
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Figure 2.7 Lana's performance on unreinforced colourmatching test
trials during each individual reflexivity test session.
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only in that reinforcers were available for correct responses on all
identity rratching trials. The chimps rrade only one error each in 48
reinforced trials.
There are two reasons why these results are difficult to
interpret. Firstly, the results do not necessarily indicate an absence
of reflexivity in the chimpanzees' matching performances , All three
chimps failed the tests overall, but their scores on unreinforced test
trials did reach a peak toward the latter stages of testing. This may
be important given that novel relations do not always emerge
immediately in unreinforced test sessions; sometimes several such
seSSlons are required before a subject begins to respond correctly to
the test trials (see Devany, Hayes and Nelson, 1986; Sidman, Kirk and
Willson-Morris, 1985; Spradlin, Cotter and Baxley, 1973).
However, it is important to note that while these results do not
necessarily indicate an absence of reflexivity, they do not necessarily
indicate its presence either. Reflexivity, or generalised identity
matching, is only demonstrated when a subject is able to match
completely novel stimuli (i.e. stimuli the subject has not already
learned to pair via identity matching trial s ) . But, just prior to
testing, it became obvious that these chimps were already able to
identity match not just with the red and green stimuli used in the
present experiment, but with a whole host of colours. The chimps
demonstrated this ability not by pressing keys on a Panel but by moving
a cursor, under the control of a joystick, to screen positions occupied
by a sample colour and its identical comparison. This task was devised
by others not involved with the present experiment, and was
occasionally offered to the chimps as a 'time filling' task (N.B.
although the chimps were presented with other such tasks, none of these
tasks used the same stimuli as in the present experiment).
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~ Although the experiment had thus far provided no substantial
evidence for or against equivalence in these language-trained
chimpanzees, it had at least ensured that they could identity match
with the same stimul i , and r.n the same experirrental context, as would
be used in later testing. As one shall see, these identity rratching
skills becarre particularly significant in the subsequent phases of the
experiIrent.
AB Training
Table 2.2 lists the number of trials each chimpanzee received on
each intervention procedure during AB training. Sherman and Lana
eventual I y reached criterion via the fading proqramre , The same fading
procedure, however, did not work with Austin, despite the fact that he
received approxirrately three times more fading trials then Lana, and
about four times more than Sherman. In fact, Austin never reached
criterion on AB, even after more than 6,000 AB trials spread over a
number of intervention procedures. He took no further part in the
experiment. Sherman and Lana, however, were next taken through a
series of stages in preparation for symmetry testing. These stages are
outlined in Table 2.3, along with the number of trials per stage. Lana
received 8 more fading sessions (384 trials) in which the reinforcement
probability was gradually lowered from 1.0 to 0.2. This was followed
by two further fading sessions at the 0.2 probability level, each
beginning with no sample colour-cue (see Procedure). Finally, Lana
received tv.x:> standard AB sessions at the 0.2 level. At no stage did
Lana's AB performance deteriorate, so she therefore proceeded to
syrnret.ry testing. Sherman went through the same three preparatory
stages as Lana, but his AB performance deteriorated in the final stage.
In two additional sessions, Sherrran's AB perforrrance was reinstated by
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Table 2.2 Number of trials per AB intervention for each subject in
Experirrent 1. Interventions are listed in the order in which they
appeared in the experiment. The 'nonnal' category refers to standard
AB watching trials; all other categories are explained in the procedure
section. Each asterisk denotes the point at which a chimp achieved
criterion on the AB task (Austin never reached criterion).
SUBJEX:T INTERVENTION NUMBER OF AB TRIALS
- -
PER INI'ERVENrION
SHERMAN Normal 480
Compound stimuli 432
Normal 768
Enlarged baseline 144
Interspersed identity trials 96
Fading 1104 *
'I'OI'AL 3024
LANA Normal 192
Enlarged baseline 192
Interspersed identity trials 96
Fading 1440 *
'I'OI'AL 1920
AUSTIN Normal 768
Enlarged baseline 240
Interspersed identity trials 144
Fading 3963
Nonnal 528
Delayed cueing 240
Zero-delay identity trials 192
Sample schedules 336
'I'OI'AL 6384
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Table 2.3 The number of trials required by Lana and Sherman in each
stage between AB acquisition and symretry testing (see text for further
detail) •
SUBJOCT NUMBER OF TRIAlS PER PHASE 'IOrAL
LANA
SHERMAN
I
384
288
II
96
240
III
96
96
IV
96
576
720
KEY
CATEGORY SESSION TYPE REINFORCEMENI'
PROBABILITY
I AB with fading Gradually reduced
(sessions begin with from 1.0 to 0.2
maximum colour-cue)
II AB with fading 0.2
(sessions begin with
no colour-cue)
III AB (normal) 0.2
IV AB (normal) 1.0
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changing the reinforcement probability to 1.0, so that every correct
response was reinforced. Sherman then proceeded directly to symmetry
testing because, by now, Lana had received several test sessions, the
results of which indicated that it would not be necessary to reduce the
reinforcement probability on Sherman's AS baseline trials.
Symmetry Testing
Lana had three distinct test phases. In her first test phase,
correct responses on BA symmetry test trials were not reinforced.
These unreinforced BA test trials were interspersed amongst the
SParsely reinforced AB baseline trials. Since test trials were not
reinforced, the reinforcenent probability on AS baseline trials was
increased sufficiently to rraintain the overall probability at 0.2.
Each test session consisted of 32 AS baseline trials (16 Per trial-
tYPe) and 16 BA syrrmetry test trials (8 Per trial-typ=). Lana was
given 12 test sessions, her overall performance on which is represented
in Figure 2.8. Lana's AS baseline Performance was around 90% correct
but, despite this, her Perforrrance on the critical symretry test trials
was at or around 50% correct, or chance level. Figure 2.9 depicts
Lana's Performance on each individual test session, and shows that her
BA scores remained at chance level for all 12 test sessions.
So, in her first test phase, Lana had apparently failed the
symrretry test. She gave no evidence that her training had established
equivalence between samples and corresponding comparisons.
Now it could be argued that Lana failed the syrrnetry test for
reasons other than a lack of synmetry in her baseline relations. There
are two justifications for this argument. Firstly, Lana's correct
responses on test trials were never reinforced, whereas those on
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Figure 2.8 Lana's overall performance during her first symmetry
test phase (symmetry test sessions 1-12). The two left-hand bars
depict the AB baseline trial-types and the two right-hand bars depict
the unreinforced BA symmetry test trial-types. Each baseline bar
represents 192 trials and each test bar represents 96 trials.
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Figure 2.9 Lana's perf'orrrance on the unreinforced BA syrnretry
trial-types during each session of her first symmetry test phase. Each
bar represents 8 trials.
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SYMMETRY TEST
baseline trials were reinforced, albeit only occasionally. So maybe
she had learned not to attend to the stimuli on symmetry test trials.
Secondly, on symmetry test trials Lana was presented with the colours
as samples and the shapes as comp:rrisons for the very first time.
Perhaps this novelty may have somehow disrupted her test perfonnance.
So two changes were made before Lana's second test phase. First,
reinforcement became available for all correct responses not only on
baseline but also on test trials. secondly, identity matching trials
were added to the baseline. Prior to the resumption of testing, Lana
was required to match not only Set-A samples to Set-B comparisons but
also each Set-B colour and each Set-A shape to itself. Two 72-trial
sessions were presented, each consisting of 24 trials each of the AB
t.ri.al-rtypes and 6 trials each of the identity matching trial-types.
The identity trials ensured that Lana had experienced sample colours
and comparison shapes before they were presented on BA syrrnetry test
trials. Lana made only one error on the identity natching trials, and
her overall score on AB was 92.7% correct.
Subsequent test sessions (test numbers 13-20) consisted of 12
trials each of the AB baseline trial-types, 6 trials each of the
identity natching trial-tYPeS and 6 trials each of the BA symmetry test
trial-tYPeS .. Lana's performance, averaged over all 8 test sessions, is
depicted in Figure 2. 10. The left-hand group of bars once again depict
her baseline perfornance. The asterisks denote the AB t.ri.al-rtypes
which were tested for syrrmetry and the other four baseline bars denote
the additional identity t.ri.al-rtypes . All the baselines were above 90%
correct. In contrast, Lana's perfornance on one of the syrrnetry test
trial-tYPeS was still at chance level, namely the one with green as a
sample. Figure 2. 11 shows her BA scores for each individual test
session. As testing progressed, Lana generally became more likely to
choose the zig-zag comparison on each test trial. In the last two
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Figure 2.10 Lana's overall performance during her second symmetry
test phase (symmetry test sessions 13-20). The bars containing
asterisks depict her perforrrance on the AB baseline trial-types, and
the other four baseline bars represent her scores on the identity
rrat.chi.nq trial-types which were added to the baseline. All correct
baseline and test trials were reinforced. The bars with asterisks
represent 96 trials each, and all other bars represent 48 trials each.
103
lana - symmetry
reinforced test trials
+ identity baseline
t-
U
UJ
a:
a:
o
o
t-
Z
UJ
U
a:
UJ
Q.
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
1 0
o
"PO
"
.
- - - - - - - - - - - -
.
* *
"
y z y Z G R
I \ I \ I \
GR GR YZ YZ GR GR
~-- BASELINE---
104
- - - - - -
G R
I \
YZYZ
TEST
Figure 2.11 Lana's performance on the reinforced BA symmetry trial-
types during each session of her second symmetry test phase. Each bar
represents 6 trials.
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sessions (19 and 20), Lana chose the zig-zag on all but two of the 24
BA trials. So, Lana had failed the symrretry test even with reinforced
test trials and identity matching controls.
Nevertheless, to be absolutely sure, Lana received further
symrretry test sessions in a third and final test phase. Once again the
baseline was modified; this final modification was dictated by a
combination of factors, described below.
On symmetry test trials, samples were red or green, and
comparisons were the Y-shape and zi.q-zaq , So, arrong the pre-requisites
for symrretry were a successive discrimination between red and green
samples and a simultaneous discrimination between Y and zig-zag
compar.rsons , If these basic discriminations were absent from Lana's
repetoire then she would be unable to pass the symrretry test, even if
her training had established stimulus equivalence. In Lana's first two
test phases, the procedures were such that they did not guarantee the
presence of these pre-requisite discriminations. It thus became
important to re-examine Lana's response patterns on BA test trials,
because this might help to determine whether the discriminations were
ill place.
In her first series of tests (test numbers 1-12), Lana's
performance was at chance level on the two BA trial-types (see Figures
2.8 and 2.9). This pattern unfortunately tells us nothing about the
status of the pre-requisite discriminations; the same pattern could be
produced equally easily with or without discriminations between sample
colours and/or comparison shapes. Lana's response patterns from her
second test phase (test numbers 13-20) were, however, much more
informative. Figure 2.10 shows that Lana was behaving discriminatively
to the test trial stimuli; when the sample was red she almost
invariably chose the zig-zag comparison, and when the sample was green
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· - - ------ --··L~~~:::-Jn shape equally often. This pattern strongly
indicates the presence of the pre-requisite discriminations for
symrretry. It is highly unlikely that such a pattern could be produced
without a successive discrimination between red and green samples and a
simultaneous discrimination between Y and zig-zag comparisons.
It is worth emphasising that although one can safely infer the
presence of the pre-requisite discriminations fran Lana's response
patterns during her second test phase, one cannot do so from her
concomitant baseline identity matching performance. For example, Lana
could match each colour to itself on baseline identity trials, but this
only required a simultaneous discrimination between the colours. on
baseline identity trials, the red or green sample could be viewed
together with the red and green comparisons i. e. green and red could be
compared directly. However, this could not be done on symmetry test
trials, because green and red were never presented together; they
always appeared successively as samples. For this reason, the
colourmatching task did not necessarily require the subject to learn
the particular successive discrimination r equi.red on symmetry test
trials. Similarly, although Lana could match each shape to itself on
baseline identity trials, this performance need not necessarily involve
the same discriminations as are rB:Iuired on symmetry test trials. on
identity matching trials, the subject could respond correctly by
discriminating between the shape on the sample key and the shape on
each canparison key. This discrimination would not be available on
symmetry test trials; rather, the test trials required discriminations
between shapes located only on the comparison keys.
In summary, thus far no steps had been taken procedurally to
establish the presence of the pre-requisite discriminations for
symmetry. However' , a retrospective examination of Lana's test trial
response patterns showed that these pre-requisites were at least intact
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during her second test phase. Nevertheless, it is not a good tactic to
rely on response patterns as the only evidence for pre-requisite
discriminations. What if the response pattern changes? Sane patterns,
as we have seen, tell us nothing about the status of sample or
comparison discriminations. For example, an exclusive preference for
one of the comparisons ITBy tell us that the subject can discriminate
between the comparisons, but it tells us nothing about discrimination
of the samples. Figure 2. 11 shows that, in her second test phase,
Lana's preference for the zig-zag comparison was incrementally
strengthening across symmetry test sessions. If this trend continued,
one could no longer be confident that all of the pre-requisite
discriminations were in place. Consequently, Lana's final test series
included baseline trials to provide an independent assessrrent of the
pre-requisite discriminations for symmetry.
This time the baseline included zero-delay idehtity matching
trials. Up until this point, all trials had involved simultaneous
rratching; when the sample was pressed it stayed on and was accompanied
by the comparisons. But on zero-delay trials the sample disappears
when it is pressed, and then the comparisons appear. When the subject
chooses between the comparisons, the sample is no longer present. So,
on zero-delay identity ITBtching trials, the subject is no longer able
to respond correctly by directly comparing samples with canparisons.
Zero-delay identity trials therefore demand the same discriminations as
symmetry test· trials. If Lana responds correctly on the zero-delay
colourmatching trials then we would know she was still discriminating
between temporally successive instances of green and red stimuli (the
samples) • The same successive discrimination between red and green
samples is one of the pre-requisites for correct responding on syrrnetry
test trials. And if Lana responds correctly on the zero-delay
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.n we would know she was still discriminating
between the Y-shape and zig-zag when they could only be seen
simultaneously as comparisons. The same simultaneous discrimination
between Y and zig-zag comparisons is the other pre-requisite for
symrretry.
So, Lana's final test serles included zero-delay identity trials,
to provide an ongoing assessment of the pre-requisite discriminations
for symrretry. These final test sessions (15 in all) were identical in
composition to the last series, except for the zero-delay on identity
trials; on all other trials, the sample remained on when it was
pressed. Once again, all correct responses were reinforced. Figure
2.12 shows that Lana scored well above chance on each baseline trial-
type , Her good performance on the zero-delay identity trials showed
that the pre-requisite discriminations for symmetry were still intact.
Despite this, Lana's symmetry test performance remained virtually the
same as before; overall, the green-Y BA trial-type was still only
rrarginally above chance level. Furthermore, the test trial averages
depicted in Figure 2.12 were generally representative of Lana's
performance in each individual session. As Figure 2. 13 shows, Lana
produced the same Pattern of chance level perforrrance on green - Y test
trials in the majority of her test sess.ions, Lana, in fact, never
achieved the within-session criterion of 90% correct on each test
trial-tyPe. By the end of testing, her scores on each BA trial-tyPe
had risen to 83.3% correct, and there is little doubt that they would
have risen further with additional reinforced test trials. However,
this of course cannot be taken as evidence of syrrunetry; we have no
reason to appeal to syrmretry if the performance involved can readily be
shown to occur due to sirrpler processes of stimulus control. It seemed
that Lana was responding correctly to the BA trials not because the
Set-A and Set-B stimuli were equivalent, but because she had gradually
110
Figure 2.12 Lana's overall perfonrance during her third and final
symmetry test phase (symmetry test sessions 21-35). The bars
containing asterisks represent 180 trials each. All other bars
represent 90 trials each.
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Figure 2.13 Lana's performance on the reinforced BA symmetry trial-
types during each session of her third and final symmetry test phase.
Each bar represents 6 trials. The capital-B's on the horizontal axis
depict points at which baseline sessions intervened between synnetry
test sessions (see text).
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learned to do so simply as a consequence of the differential
reinforcement on test trials.
One should note that the test sessions in Lana's final series were
not all presented consecutively. The capital - B's on the horizontal
axis of Figure 2.13 depict points ln which additional baseline
seSSlons intervened between symmetry test sessions. The interruptions
to testing provided additional evidence against symmetry, as will be
revealed later. For the time being we may conclude that Lana had given
no evidence of symmetry despite receiving 35 test sessions and a grand
total of 468 test trials.
Now we cone to Sherrmn , Sherman received 12 test sessa.ons , all of
which were the same as the last series presented to Lana. All correct
responses, were reinforced. Figures 2. 14 and 2. 15 show that Shenran
also failed the symmetry test. Although his baseline scores were well
above chance level, his performance on the critical sYmmetry test
trials rema.ined at or near chance level throughout. Sherrran, just like
lana, had failed the test, despite also being exposed to conditions
which maximised his chances of success.
Once again, the capital B' s in Figure 2. 15 denote the points at
which symmetry tests were interrupted with the presentation of baseline
trials only. These additional baseline sessions were administered in
order to counteract Perfornance decrements which aPPeared on Particular
baseline t.ri.al-rtypes during the course of the symmetry tests. Baseline
deterioration occurred not only in Shernan's test sessions but also in
Lana's final test series.
Figure 2. 16 once again shows Lana's scores fran her final test
series, and Sherman's scores from his single test serles. Figure 2.16
is actually a conglorrerate of Figures 2.12 and 2.14 shown earlier,
except that this time the shading highlights those baseline trial-tYPeS
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Figure 2. 14 Shennan I s avera11 performance during his 12 symretry
test sessions. The bars containing asterisks represent 144 trials
each; all other bars represent 72 trials each.
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Figure 2.15 Sherman's performance on reinforced BA symmetry trial-
types during each individual test session (see text).
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~ testing~ The figure shows that Lana averaged
only 80% correct on the green - green identity natching trial-tyt:e, and
Shernan averaged only 70% correct on the zig-zag - red arbitrary trial-
type , during the aforementioned test phases.
tbw it could be argued that symrretry failed to emerge because of
these somewhat diminished baselines i.e. one could claim that the
baseline trials affected the test trials. However, a functional
-,
analysis of the baseline deterioration suggested quite the opposite -
that is, the test trials somehow affected the baselines. The points on
Figure 2.17 represent Lana's Perfornance on the green - green identity
rratching t.ri.alvt.ype which was disrupted during her final test phase.
Each instance of disruption is included. The graph is divided into
phases by the vertical dotted lines. These phases are marked as either
Plus-T or Minus-T. Plus-T phases are those r.n which symnetry test
trials were presented alongside the baseline trials i.e each Plus-T
session denotes a sYmmetry test session. In Minus-T phases, the
symrretry test trials were terminated. Minus-T phases correspond with
the capital - B's in Figure 2.12 i.e each Minus-T session consisted of
basel ine trials only. The advantage of Figure 2.17 is that it enables
one to clearly see what hapPened to Lana's Performance on the green -
green baseline as a function of the presence or absence of synrret.ry
test trials. Between the 21st and 24th symmetry test session, Lana's
performance on the green - green trials gradually broke down. After
the 24th test session, and before the 25th, the symrretry test trials
were rerroved and the green - green baseline irnrrediately recovered.
This pat.cern of baseline deterioration in the presence of symmetry test
trials and baseline recovery in the absence of symrretry test trials was
repeated over the sessions that followed.
In similar fashion, the points on Figure 2.18 represent Shernan's
Perfonra.nce on the zig-zag - red baseline which deteriorated during his
120
Figure 2. 16 Shennan's and Lana IS perfonnances during symret.ry test
phases in which same baseline trial-types (i.e. those depicted by the
shaded bars) were disrupted.
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Figure 2.17 Lana's performance on the green-green identity matching
baseline as a function of the presence (+T) and absence (-T) of
symmetry test trials (see text).
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Figure 2.18 Shennan's perfornance on the zig-zag - red arbitrary
natching baseline as a function of the presence (+T) and absence (-T)
of symmetry test trials (see text).
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rsherman
symmetry tests (this time, the Minus-T phases correspond with the
capital - B' s in Figure 2. 15) . Again, when symrretry test trials were
present (Plus-T) the baseline deteriorated, and when they were raroved
(Minus-T) the baseline recovered.
It is important to note that the patterns depicted in Figures 2.17
and 2. 18 occurred even though correct responses on symrretry test trials
were reinforced. It seems reasonable to assune that reinforcement on
symrretry test trials would not have disrupted the baselines if the set-
A and 5et-B stimuli were equivalent. If the stimuli were equivalent,
then reinforcement on symmetry test trials should, if anything,
strengthen the baseline relations, and certainly should not weaken
them. If one reinforces choosing Y in the presence of green, and if
green and Y are equivalent, then choosing green in the presence' of
green should also be strengthened. Similarly, if zrq-zaq and red are
equivalent then reinforcing correct responses on red - zig-zag trials
should result in improved Performance on zig-zag - red trials. But the
first of these baselines (green - green) deteriorated during Lana's
test sessions and the second (zig-zag - red) . deteriorated during
Shenran' s, in spite of the test trial reinforcement. For all their
language training, Sherman and Lana behaved the same as many of the
'ordinary' alinguistic rhesus monkeys and baboons that were tested for
symmetry by Sidman et al (1982). Like Sherrmn and Lana, these animals
not only failed the symmetry tests but also suffered baseline
disruption correlated with test trial reinforcement. In the present
context, the data on 'baseline disruption' is Perhaps the strongest
evidence against stimulus equivalence in the arbitrar¥ matching
performance of these language-trained chimpanzees.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this experiment, symmetry tests were applied to a single
arbitrary matching problem. Within this context, and within the time
available, everything possible was done to bias the results in the
chimpanzees' favour. Despite this, these language-trained chimpanzees
failed the symmetry tests. Because symmetry is a necessary property of
stimulus equivalence, its absence is sufficient to show that each
sample and its corresponding comparison had not formed a class of
equivalent stimuli. In as much as equivalence may be taken as a pre-
requisite of symbolic behaviour (see Devany et aI, 1986; Sidman, 1977),
the chirnpanzeea ' behaviour on matching-to-sample trials could not be
classed as symbolic.
Experiments reviewed 1n Chapter 1 of this thesis provided strong
evidence for, and no convincing evidence against, the role of language
in stimulus equivalence. The chimp data therefore leaves one
wondering: if these chimps are linguistically accomplished then why did
they fail a standard syrrrretry test? At this stage, no attempt shall be
made to address this question. Rather, the issue shall be deferred on
the grounds of expediency; we may be better able to discuss the
specific implications of the chimp data at a later stage of this
thesis, when additional experirrents have further examined the behaviour
of children on equivalence tests.
But what are the general implications of the chimp data? Firstly,
the results from this experiment contribute significantly to the corpus
of data on stimul us equi valence. Previous reports of the failure of
animals on symmetry tests have been confirmed and extended to yet
another animal species, namely chimpanzees. If one of man's closest
relatives in the animal kingdom is unable to pass these tests, then
128
what chance is there for man's other, more distant, relatives?
MJre significant still, the chimpmzees tested here are unique
among all animals, in that they have had a rich and complex history of
training. I doubt that any animals are as 'test-wise' as these
chimpanzees. Before this experinent they must surely have ranked among
the favourites for the first anirra l.s to pass a standard syrnretry test.
Yet they did not pass the tests.
When Sidnan et al (1982) were unable to demonstrate symnetry with
rhesus rronkeys and baboons, they had this to say:
"It is of course impossible to prove by
failures alone that conditional
discrimination procedures are incapable
of establishing symrretric relations for
any organism." (Sidman et al, 1982,
p. 42) •
Now this statement may appear rather damning, although it is not
(and I doubt if it was intended to be). Although undeniably true, the
statement lacks any real relevance. Obviously, failures alone cannot
prove that a subject is canpletely unable to pass equivalence tests,
because a modification to the training and/or test procedure might
poss.ibly turn the failure into success. But this is not the real
lssue. Failures do not prove anything, but they do support the
hytX?thesis that the subject is unable to pass equivalence tests. While
failures alone are not proof of an absence of equivalence they are
sufficient as evidence of such an absence; but then they would have to
be, because presunably one cannot present anything other than failures as
evidence against equivalence. Furthermore, the quotation above misses
the most important point of all; that although it is .irrposs.ib.le to
prove a hunan-animal difference in equivalence forrmt.i.on , thus far
nobody has proven otherwise. There is, to date, no convincing evidence
that anirra l s (not even those as 'sophisticated' as Sherman and Lana)
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are capable of stimulus equivalence.
In their paper , Sidman et al also list a nwnber of procedural
modifications which might yield positive evidence of synunetry in
animals. This list is undoubtedly valuable - suggestions for future
research are an essential first step t.owar'd progress in any area of
science. No doubt others will add to the list of suggestions which, in
principle, could be supplerrented ad infinitum. But, in so doing, it is
important not to let the list assume more than its true value. The
data from Exper.irnent; 1 have been presented, r.n part, at a number of
conferences (Dugdale, 1988; Dugdale and Lowe, 1987 (a); 1987 (b)). Of
those in the audience, some (albeit only a few) have appeared reluctant
to accept the chimp data, not because of any methodological flaws in
the experiment or unsound reasoning on the author's part, but because
of the mere possibility that procedural modifications might yield
'positive' results. These people appear to find their own suggestions
sufficient for postponing judgment on the issue, or, worse still, for
convincing thernselves that an.imaIs can pass the tests. But suggestions
alone are empirically worthless unless, that is, they are 'cashed in'
as actual experimental data. One can always think of more experirrents
to do, but this should not excuse one from acknowledging what has
already been done.
Given more time with the chimps, Experiment 1 may have been
extended in accordance with one of Sidman et aI's suggestions:
"Perhaps the mos t re I evant
experience to provide would be additional
symmetry tests, with initial ~e~t
failures being followed by expllclt
reinforcement of the desired performance
...... if the animals were taught
consecutive pairs of conditional
discriminations, with the second of each
pair always the syrrrnetric version of the
first, would the subjects eventually
perform a symret.ry test accurate1y the
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.L ..1.1.0 L 'CLTrE:' they encount.ered it?
they learn the general principle,
and correct comparison
interchangeable'?" (Sidnan et al ,
pp42-43).
Would
'Sample
are
1982,
The hypothes.i.s is that, unl ike humans, animals do not ordinarily
experience enough exemplars for symmetry to emerge. Experiment 2
tested this hypothesis. The language-trained chimps were no longer
available, so pigeons were used instead. Pigeons might be seen as a
poor substitute for chimpanzees, but their use as subjects in, the
present context could be advantageous. If pigeons respond positively
to the exemplar training outlined above, then one woul.d anticipate' the
sane result from other aninal SPecies higher up the phylogenetic scale.
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EXPERIMENI' 2
MBrHOD
SUBJECI'S
The subjects were four adul t wale homing pigeons (Columbia livia).
'lW:> of the birds (Exocet and Fa 1con) were experirrentally naive, whereas
the other two (Ben and Eric) had served as subjects in a previous
experiment on concurrent schedules . Throughout the present experiment,
all four birds were individually housed and maintained at 85% - 90% of
their free-feeding weights, with water freely available in their home
cages.
APPARATUS
The experiment was conducted in a standard Lehigh Valley pigeon
test chamber, equipPed with a three key response panel. Pecks to the
keys with a force of at least O. 15 N registered as responses. Each key
was made of transparent plastic mounted behind a 2.5. em diameter hole
in the front panel of the chamber. The keys were horizontally aligned
8 ans apart from centre to centre, and were 25 em above the chamber
floor. Each key was illuminated from behind via an lEE in-line
multiple stimulus projector.
A special set of stimuli were custom designed and prepared as
suggested by McConnell (1966). Forms were drawn white on a black
background to occupy a 2 em square area. In addition, the keys could
be full Y 1it with two hues, red and green, produced by pro jecting
light through Kodak wratten filters 26 and 61 respectively.
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Above the centre key was a 2.5 W housel ight providing dim
illumination in the chamber, and below the key was a food magazine or
hopper which was illuminated when food (mixed grain) was dispensed.
The pigeon chamber was located in a sound-attenuating roam to isolate
subjects from extraneous noises, and additional masking was provided by
white noise played through a speaker on the front panel. The
programming of exper.irrent.al events and data collection were handled by
a Gemini rrdni-computer.
PROCEDURE
Preliminary Training
All birds were initiall y given one sess i.on of prel iminary
training, which taught them to respond to the stimuli that would later
appear during the first arbitrary matching task. In the first stage,
the birds received magazine training. The housel ight remained off
throughout, and the hopper was raised. (and lit) at irregular intervals.
Once the birds had learned to feed quickly and reliably from the lit
hopper, they were taught, via autoshaping, to peck at illuminated
keys. On each trial the houselight remained off, and a cross or a
circle appeared on the left or right key. Each canbination of stimuli
and side keys occurred equally often and at random. Pecks to the lit
key were designated correct and pecks to either dark key were
incorrect. In these and all subsequent trials (unless otherwise
noted), correct responses turned off the stimuli and produced 2 seconds
access to the lit grain hopper, followed by a 5 second inter-trial
interval. Incorrect responses turned off the stimuli and produced the
inter-trial interval only. The next stage began once the pigeon had
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learned to peck the lit key, and only the lit key. The houselight
sti11 rerrained off , and each trial began with a dot or a wavy 1ine
appearing equally often, and at random, on the centre key. A peck to
the lit centre key produced a stimulus on one of the side keys, again
at randcm. The centre key stayed on. If the dot was the centre key
stimulus (sample) then the circle appeared as the side key stimulus
(cornparison) . Conversely, if the sample was a wavy line, then the
cross appeared as the comparison. Pecks to the comparison were
correct, whereas pecks to the dark key were incorrect. Training
continued until the birds learned to peck the sample and comparison in
sequence for six consecutive trials per trial-type (sample-canparison
pairing). Finally, the houselight was switched on, and the birds
continued to peck the sample and corresponding canparison without error
for a further 12 trial s (6 per trial-type). Preliminary training then
ended, and the subjects proceeded to the next phase.
Exemplar Training (arbitrary matching)
Following pre-training, all birds were taught a succeasi.on of
arbitrary matching problems (see Figures 3. 1 and 3.2). All sessions
began with the illumination of the houselight, which remained on until
the session ended. The birds initially received AB training, as
represented in Figure 3. 1• Each trial began with a Set-A sample,
either the dot or the wavy line. A peck to the sample produced the
set-B canparisons, the circle and the cross. Once the canparisons
appeared, further pecks to the sample (which remained on) had no
scheduled effect. When the dot was the sample, pecks to the circle
were correct, and when the wavy line was the sample, pecks to the cross
were correct. The stimuli were presented at random, with the
restriction that all 4 sample-canparison configurations had to occur
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Figure 3.1 stimulus relations taught in the first four stages of
Experiment 2. The dotted lines separate the stimuli in each stage, and
the training sequence is determined by reading from left to right and
down the page. Arrows point from samples to corresponding
compari sons ,
136
SAMPLES COMPARISONS SAMPLES COMPARISONS
0--." ·
X--." (\J\J
------------------------------------------
------------------------------------------
•••
--... ...
•••
137
J-G
CONTROL
~x~
•••
... ~
• ••
Figure 3.2
Experiment 2.
Stimulus relations taught in the last five stages of
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before any could repeat.
In the first AB session, a single Peck to the sample produced the
comparisons.
comparisons.
In the second session, three sample Pecks produced the
Then, an the third session, the sample response
requirement was raised to five Pecks, where it remained throughout the
experiment. Previous studies have shown that more than one required
response to the sample may yield accelerated acquisition and improved
accuracies on matching-to-sample tasks (see, for example, Sacks, Karrdl
and Mack, 1972).
Initial AB sessions consisted of 96 non~corrected trials (48 Per
trial-type). However, after 5 sessions with Exocet, 6 with Falcon, 9
with Eric and 10 with Ben, a correction procedure was implerrented.
Errors caused trials to rePeat, and each session ended when the bird
had responded correctly to 48 trials (24 per t.r.iar-Lype) . Several
factors led to the implementation of correction. Firstly, introducing
correction meant; that although the number of trials Per session varied,
the number of reinforced trials remained a constant 48 Per session.
Becau$e each bird's food intake was more or less constant across
sessions, it becarre far easier to keep their weights within 85% - 90%
of their free-feeding levels. Secondly, all four birds developed
strong preferences for either the left or right key during non-
corrected trials. Changing the procedure to correction meant that on
half the trials the birds were forced to respond to their non-preferred
side key in order to secure reinforcers. Presumably, correction would
eventually weaken the position preference and would also help attenuate
other comparison-based response tendencies, thus enabling faster
acquisition of arbitrary matching. Finally, correction may be
beneficial not only in the acquisition of matching, but also in its
subsequent transfer to novel test situations (Catania, personal
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canmunication; Zentall, Edwards and Hogan, 1984). The general approach
to the current experiment was the same as in Experiment 1; the
procedures were designed to maximise the subjects I chances of success
.,r
during transfer phases, without invalidating the tests.
AS training was continued until the subjects reached a criterion
of 85% correct responses per trial-type for two consecutive sessions.
Then, in the next stage, sessions consisted of 48 reinforced trials (24
per t.r.i.al-rtype ) of the BA task depicted in Figure 3. 1. The BA task was
the syrrmetrical counterpart of the trained AB relation. Reinforcers
were contingent upon choosing the dot comparison in the presence of the
circle, and the wavy line comparison in the presence of the cross. BA
training was continued until the subject reached the 85% learning
criterion, at which point the fonner procedures were repeated with a
new pair of tasks, namely CD and DC. The CD task was trained to
criterion, followed by its syrmetrical counterpart, DC (see Figure
3.1) .. Then the EF and FE relations were trained.
So, in the first three stages, the subjects were trained on
consecutive pairs of arbitrary matching tasks, the second task of each
pair being the synmetric version of the first. The question was would
this exemplar training result in the formation of a general principle
of interchangeability, or equivalence, with respect to the samples and
comparisons from each pair of related tasks? If so, one would expect
the second task of each pair to be learned much faster than the first,
and that such savings in learning would perhaps increase proportionally
with each successive pair trained. The difficulty with this is that
one would expect the same pattern of results even if the birds had not
learned to respond according to equivalence. Savings were anticipated
on the second task of each related pair simply because the stirnulil~at
this stage were no longer completely novel - they had all been
encountered before, albeit in different locations, during training of
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the first task of the pair. Others have cc:mrented on the notorious
'novelty aversion' of pigeons (Lombardi, Fachinelli and Delius, 1984;
Zentall, Edwards and Hogan, 1984) and have noted how it may account for
the less than optimal transfer of pigeons' performances on reflexivity
tests using completely novel stimuli. In the present context,
however, any 'novelty aversion' would serve to increase rather than
decrease savings in learning. Furthenrore, there are a number of other
reasons why a subject's performance may improve with each successive
matching problem e.g. general habituation to the apparatus and
procedures~ suppression of control by incidental or irrelevant stimulus
features, such as the position of correct ccmpari.sons ~ learning to
attend to the stimul i on the keys; and so on. These factors are ccmron
to all matching problems and can be learned independently of stimulus
equivalence.
In conclusion, a novelty averSlon, coupled with general 'learning
to learn', may produce exact1y the same incrEffiental savings in learning
as one might expect from an errergent tendency to respond according to
stimulus equivalence. What is needed, then, is S0m2 control procedure
for establishing whether savings are equivalence related or not. The
fourth pai.r of tasks provided this necessary control condition (see
Figure 3.1). After training GH to criterion, HG control sessions were
presented, ln which the former samples and comparisons were
interchanged so as not to form a symrretrical count-erpart; ~ rather, the
opposite relationships held. If one denotes the initial sample -
comparison associations as G1 - H1 and G2 - H2, then the new
associations taught after establishing GH were H1 - G2 and H2 - G1. If
any previous savings were based on general factors unrelated to
equivalence then the subject would presumably show a similar (if not a
larger) degree of savings on the control task. If, however, previous
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savings were equivalence related, then the control trials probably
would retard the subject's matching performance. If so, then any
savings probably would be less than one might ant.i.c.i.pat.e from preceding
trends, and the subject might even take l onqer to learn the second task
than the first. The sarre design has been used before by D'Amato,
salrron , Loukas and Tomie (1985) and Hogan and Zentall (1977), and it
apparently provides an extremely sensitive measure of equivalence
within the context of exemplar training with pigeons.
After acquisition of the HG control task, the training sequence
was repeated with a new series of stimul i (see Figure 3.2). The
subjects were to be taught three rrore pairs of syrmetrical counterparts
(IJ and JI; KL and LK; MN and NM), followed by one rrore control set (OP
and PO control). The final pai.r to be trained were the synmet.r.i.cal
counterparts, QR and RQ.
In addition to the mam training seas.ions outI ined above, the
birds were presented with basel ine maintenance seas.ions , Baseline
maintenance sessions were presented prior to each main training session
and included trials fran tasks already learned. For example, when
subjects were learning BA matching, each main BA session was preceded
with a maintenance session in which the AB Performances were reviewed.
Similarly, when CD was being learned, the maintenance sessions reviewed
the subjects' AB and BA per-formances , The review procedure consisted
in presenting blocks of 12 reinforced trials (6 Per trial-type) of each
basel ine , or previously learned task, f ol Iowed by a repeat block of
any baseline that fell below the 85% criterion during the first block.
Thus, while birds learned a new task, criterion performances were
maintained on tasks already learned. Initially, all previously learned
tasks were to be included in the maintenance sessions, but this
strategy could not be sustained. Each time the bird learned a task, at
least one more block of reinforced trial s had to be added to the
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maintenance sessions. This meant; that the pigeon's daily food intake
increased with each successive task learned, and thus it became
increasingly likely that the bird might eventually exceed 90% of its
free-feeding weight (the upper limit for this experiment).
Conditioned reinforcers were occasionally used in an attempt to prevent
the birds' weights from rising excessively (i.e. on sane trials the
hopper 1ight carre on after a correct response but the hopper was not
raised). Conditioned reinforcement was only ever given during baseline
rra.intenance sessions, never during rrain training sessions. This helped
to suppress body weights, but only temporarily. Eventually, each
bird's weight carre consistently close to exceeding its upper limit, and
at that point the rraintenance sessions were altered. Subsequently,
rra.intenance sessions were presented only whil e the subject learned the
second task of a given pair, and then they only included trials from
the first task of that pair. This meant; that the review sessions were
constant throughout the experiment with respect to maintaining the
first task of each pair while the second task was being learned.
Further details of the maintenance sessions, such as their exact
composition at particular stages of the experirrent, can be found in the
Results section below.
RESULTS
Baseline Maintenance
Each row of bars in Figures 3.3 and 3.4 depict one pigeon's
overall perfonnance during successive baseline maintenance phases.
Each column heading (Be, CD, DC etc.) refers to the main task on which
the subjects were trained, while the bars grouped below each heading
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represent the subjects' performances on the accompanying baseline
tasks. Each baseline is identified by the letters within the bars, and
the numbers within the bars show how many trials the subject received
per baseline. The shaded bars highlight related baselines i.e. those
using the sane stimul i as their acccmpanying main training task. The
unshaded bars depict wrrelated baselines i.e. those that used different
stimuli than the main training tasks which they accompanied. If
conditioned reinforcers were used on baseline tasks, then this 1S
noted by the numbers along the horizontal axes. These numbers refer to
the probability of receiving primary reinforcers; for example, a value
of 0.6 means that primary reinforcers were scheduled for 60% of the
trials, and conditioned reinforcers for 40%.
several points are illustrated by Figures 3.3 and 3.4. Firstly,
each bird reached a different stage of the experirrent . Exocet was the
only bird to complete all stages, . learning tasks AB through to RQ. In
contrast, Eric learned all but the last pair of tasks (QR and RQj, Ben
learned up to and including task JI, and Falcon learned up to and
including the HG control task. These differences reflected the speed
with which each bird learned the arbitrary matching tasks; generally,
Exocet was the fastest learner, followed by Eric, Ben and Falcon in
decreasing order.
The birds also differed according to the point at which unrelated
(unshaded) baselines were dropped from the maintenance phases. With
Ben and Falcon (Figure 3.3) the unrelated baselines were dropped after
they had learned the OC task, whereas with Exocet and Eric (Figure 3.4)
the unrelated baselines were dropped much later, after they had learned
theHG control task. The unrelated baselines were removed when a bird
came consistently close to exceeding 90% of its free-feeding weight.
Beyond this point, continuation of the unrelated basel ines probabl y
YvDuld have pushed weights over the prescribed 1irnit; these baselines
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Figure 3.3 Ben and Falcon's overall performances during succeSSlve
baseline maintenance phases (see text for further details).
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Figure 3.4 Exocet and Eric's overall performances during succeSSlve
baseline maintenance phases (see text for further details).
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represented a significant proportion of the birds' dietary intakes.
Ben and Falcon's unrelated baselines were rerroved much sooner than Eric
and Exocet' s simply because the former Pair threatened to exceed the
critical weights much sooner than the latter.
The number of trials Per baseline task varied according to two
main factors. Firstly, since baselines always accompanied main
training tasks it followed that the longer a bird took to learn the
. rrain task then the rrore trials it received on each baseline within that
particular phase. Second1y, wi thin each phase, some basel ines required
fewer daily trials than others, simply because a bird's performances on
the former were of a consistently high and stable level that additional
trials seemed unnecessary. The variation in trial numbers therefore
partly reflected the experimenter's insistence in maintaining
accuracies without detrirrent to the birds' overall weights.
But most important of all, Figures 3.3 and 3.4 clearly show that
each bird's baselines were remarkably stable throughout the eXPerirrent.
All of the related baselines stayed at or above the 85% criterion
level, and only one unrelated baseline fell significantly below
criterion (i.e. Eric's FE baseline (69% correct) when learning the HG
control task; see Figure 3 . 4 ) . Al though basel ine disruption was a
noticeable feature of Experiment 1, it was virtually absent in the
present experirrent . The reason for this disparity is not clear at
present, but one possibility is that disruption was enhanced ln
Experiment 1 because baseline trials were interspersed with test
trials, whereas in the present experiment all tasks were presented in
successively separate blocks. Whatever the reason, if, in the present
experiment, stimulus equivalence is shown to be absent from the
pigeons' arbitrary matching performances, then this \\Duld be in spite
of their exce11ent base1ines , and not because of any basel ine
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disruption.
Analysis of Savings
Savings in learning the second task of each consecutive pair were
calculated using the following formula:
Percentage savings
x y
x
x 100
where X = trials to criterion for the first task and Y = trials to
criterion for the second.
Tables 3.1 - 3.3 show the trials to criterion for each task
learned and the percentage savanqs achieved on each task pair. In
addition, the percentage s av i nqs for each bird are represented
pictorially in Figure 3.5.
There are two main issues to address. Firstly , were there any
savings in learning on task pairs consisting of symmetrical
counterparts i.e. symmetrical pairs? Secondly, if so, haw did these
savings ccmpare with those achieved on control pairs, in which the
second task was not a symmetrical counterpart of the first?
Firstly, savings fram symmetrical pairs were far fram systematic
for each bird. For example, Falcon's savings on the first two
symmetrical pairs increased from 46 to 58%, but then decreased to 10%
on the third symmetrical pai.r , Furthermore, Falcon's savings then
increased to 29% on the subsequent control pair. Ben produced a
similar pattern. His savings on the first three synmetrical pairs
initially increased fram 43 to 69%, but then dropped to 3%. Ben then
produced increased savings of 38% on the subsequent control pair,
followed by a decrease to 22% on his final symmetrical pair.
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HDJ.LC J. I -Lffi:he Cleplctlng the number of trial s to criterion for each
task learned by Falcon and Ben, and the percentage savings they
achieved on each successive Pair of tasks.
PIGEDN TASK TRIALS 'ill
CRITERION
PERCENT
SAVINGS
FAICON AB 5956
BA 3189 46%
CD 5881
DC 2451 58%
EF 2222
FE 2007 10%
GH 977
HG control 696 29%
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
BEN AB 2683
BA 1528 43%
CD 4017
DC 1228 69%
EF 2853
FE 2757 3%
GH 831
HG control 512 38%
IJ 1814
JI 1418 22%
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~~~= J.L ~aule aeplcL1ng the number of trials to criterion for each
task learned by Eric, and the percentage savings he achieved on each
successive pair of tasks.
PIGEDN TASK TRIALS ill
CRITERION
PERCENT
SAVINGS
ERIC AB 1773
BA 1233 30%
CD 2103
DC 580 72%
EF 2235
FE 632 72%
GH 1211
HG control 1187 2%
IJ 882
JI 980 -10%
KL 1725
LK 1392 19%
MN 2336
NM 381 84%
OP 1540
PO control 407 74%
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~~~~~- - ~au~e de~l~tlhg the number of trials to criterion for each
task learned by Exocet, and the percentage savings he achieved on each
successive pair of tasks.
PIGEDN TASK TRIALS 'ill
CRITERION
PERCENr
SAVINGS
·t
EXOCET AB 2037
BA 1907 6%
CD 1674
DC 1249 25%
EF . 1898
FE 823 57%
GH 981
HG control 445 55%
IJ 789
JI 359 55%
KL 795
LK 791 0%
MN 2541
NM 1448 57%
OP 1091
PO control 369 66%
QR 1102
RQ 1118 -1%
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Figure 3.5 Percentage savings achieved on each success.ive task
pair, for all four subjects in Experiment 2.
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Both Ben and Falcon had therefore produced control-Pair savings
which were well within the range of savings produced on synnetrical
pairs. This is hardly what one would expect; if the birds were learning
that the samples and corresponding comparisons were interchangeable, or
equivalent. If equivalences were emerging as a result of the exemplar
training, then one would at least expect, greater overall savings on
symrretrical than control Pairs.
In the first hal f of the experirrent , Eric's pattern of savings
seemed indicative of equivalence (see Figure 3.5). Eric began by
achieving 30% savings on the first symmetrical pair, after which
savings rose to 72% on the next two synmetrical Pairs, before dropping
to 2% on the following control pair. However, al though the Pattern
-,
thus far suggested equivalence, subsequent events suggested otherwise.
Although the next Pair of tasks (Pair 5) were symretrical counterparts,
Eric produced 'savings' of -10% i.e. he took 10% longer to learn the
second task than the first. Once again, this is not what one would
predict if equivalence were emerging. Although savings increased over
the next two symmetrical Pairs (rising first to 19% and then to 84%),
Eric ended by achieving 75% savings on a control Pair (Pair 8). He,
like Ben and Falcon, had therefore produced control Pair savings which
~re well within the range produced on symretrical Pairs.
In spite of the exemplar training, Exocet, too, gave no evidence
of equivalence. His savings gradually increased to 57% over the first
three synmetrical Pairs, but this figure was matched by the subsequent
control pair (55%). Thereafter, Exocet's performance on the
symretr.tcat Pairs became somewhat erratic - savings went from 55 to 0
to 57% over the next three symretrical Pairs, and then increased to 66%
on a control Pair, before falling to -1% on the final symmetrical Pair
(pair 9). Overall, then, Exocet' s Performance was variable, but his
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Tabte-3.-4 The Il\e~rcentage savings achieved on syrmetrical and
control pairs for each subject in Experirrent 2 .
SUB.:J"ff:T MEAN PERCENTAGE SAVINGS
S~""TRICAL CONrROL
PAIRS PAIRS
BEN 34 38
ERIC 44 38
EXOCEI' 28 60
FALCON 38 29
Overall Means 36
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4 1
savings from the two control pairs were .in one case better than, and in
the other approxinBtely equal to, his asymptotic level of savings from
the symmetrical pairings.
Finally, the mean Percentage savings from symmetrical and control
pai.rs were calculated for each bird (see Table 3.4). A two-tailed
correlated samples t-test (Robson, 1973) showed no significant
difference in savings obtained on syrnmetrical and control pairs (t(3) =
0.66, P < 0.05).
DISCUSSION
In this exPeriment, all four birds received extensive amounts of
syrmetry exempl ar training. The number of trial s each bird received on
syrmetry exemplar training may be calculated by adding the number of
trials to criterion for the second task of each symmetrical pair to the
number of trials received on symnet.ri ca I pai r s during baseline
maintenance sessions. (N.B. - the number of trials to criterion for
the first task of each symmetrical pair Perhaps should not be included;
when one is teaching the initial task of each pair it is not
necessarily obvious that one is reinforcing responding in accordance
with a symmetrical relation). Calculating thus, Exocet received 15,064
,
trials of exemplar training, Eric received 13,745, Falcon 12,798, and
Ben 11, 780. There were occasional periods of control pair training
(which Perhaps could be best described as the opposite of syrmetry
exemplar training), but these periods were minimal; the ratio of
'symmetry' training trials to control training trials was approximately
16:1 for Exocet, 7:1 for Eric, 14:1 for Falcon and 18:1 for Ben.
Despite the extensive exemplar training, none of the birds gave
any convincing evidence for the emergence of a general principle of
sample-comparison interchangeability, or symmetry. The birds instead
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appeared to learn a set of simple conditional or 'if-then I relations
(L.e , unidirectional sample-comparison response chains), and in this
respect the present resul ts agree with the corpus of data on pigeon
matching-to-sample (see Carter and Werner (1978), and Wilson,
Mackintosh and Boakes (1985), for reviews). Although there were
savings in learning on symretrical pairings, these savings did not
appear to be related in any simple systematic way with length of
exemplar training. Rather, savings on symrretrical pairs fluctuated
throughout the experiment, and savings on control pairs fell squarely
wi thin the range of these fl uctuations. The birds I perfornances during
symmetrical and control palrlngs were, 'savings-wise',
indistinguishable, and all savings were most likely due to general
learning factors, unrelated to stimulus equivalence (see Procedure).
The search for equivalence in the arbitrary matching behaviour of
animals will undoubtedly continue, but the present results, taken
together with previous failures to generate syrnrretry with non-humans,
warn against relying exclusively on studies of animals if one wishes
to learn where stirnul us equivalence comes from. The present research
prograrnrre consequently took to another, potential Iy more infonnative,
path. Although few in number, studies of children have already
provided some interesting data on the role of language in general, and
of naming in particular, in the fornation of stimulus equivalence (see
Chapter 1). The next series of studies further examined naming and
stirnu1us equivalence in chi1dren, with the aim of 1earning sanething
rrore about the mechani.sms through which equivalence may emerge.
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CHAPrER 4
THE ROLE OF (ll.M)N NAMI~ IN THE FORMATION OF STIMUllJS IQJIVALEOCE:
STUDIES OF 4-5 YEAR OID CHIIDREN
1. Introduction
2. General Method
3. Experiment 3
4. Experiment 4A
5. Experiment 4B
6. Experiment 5
7. Experiment 6
8. General Discussion
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This final series of experiments involved 4-5 year old children
and focused on the role of common naming in the formation of stimulus
equivalence. The experiments, however, were not all designed at the
same time, to be executed in some pre-detennined sequence; rather they
all evolved from each other. Each successive experiment was' suggested
by the results of the experiment which preceded it.
This 'evolutionary progression' stemmed from a common origin, the
raw material of which was a 'pool' of thirty children. All thirty were
initially presented with the same AB matching task as was earlier
presented to the chimps (see Experiment 1). Eight of the chi ldren
learned the AB task relatively quickly, with the possible help of
standard intervention procedures (e.g. fading). Their data 1S
presented .as Experiment 3. In this experiment the AB relation was
tested for s~nmetry, and further training and testing eventually led to
an evaluation of equivalence. The remaining 22 children did not learn
AS matching through standard procedures, but the results of Experiment
3 suggested alternative methods for establishing the relation. These
children were distributed between four more experiments (4(a), 4(b), 5
and 6) each of which involved an attempt to establish the AB relation
(and its SYmmetrical counterpart, BA) indirectly, through common
labelling of' the Set-A and Set-B stimuli.
Before presenting each experiment in detail, a General Method
section outlines the common features shared by all.
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GENERAL MErHOD
The general subject, apparatus and procedure specifications apply
to all of the following experfnents unless exceptions are noted.
SUBJEX::TS
Thirty 4-5 year old norrra l children were selected at random from
those attending the nursery section of the Our Lady Ronan Catholic
School, Bangor. None of the children had previously participated in
any psychology experiments.
APPARA'IUS
The experirrents were conducted in a specially adapted room at the
school. While experiments were in progress, the room was used for no
other purpose. At one end of the room a table held an Apple
rnicrocanputer connected to a colour t..v, monitor. .A five key stimulus
response panel, identical to the one used in Experirrent 1, was held in
front of the monitor by mounting the panel in the centre of a larger
wooden screen. This wooden screen was itself attached to the front
edge of the table on which the equiprrent sat. The Apple canputer
prograrrmed the sequencing and display of the stimuli, which appeared on
the monitor screen behind any of the five clear perspex response keys.
Any of eight possible stimuli could be presented, two colours (red and
green, each drawn as a 4cm square) and six shapes (each drawn white on
a black background to occupy a 4cm square area; preClse details of the
shapes are given in each experiment).
An additional wooden panel was attached to the left-hand side of
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the maln wooden screen. This additional panel separated the
experimenter from the child and also held a plastic matrix down which
plastic 'coins' (token reinforcers) could be dropped. The matrix held
and displayed up to 42 'coins' in seven columns of six. Also, at the
top of the main wooden screen and directly above the response Panel
there was a glass fronted channel behind which small gift boxes could
be displayed to the child. Figure 4. 1 is a photograph of the apparatus
as seen from the subject's viewpoint.
Although the experimenter was hidden from the subject's view
during all but the first fevv trials of the introductory session, he
could observe the child via a remote t.v. monitor situated behind the
wooden partition. This monitor was itself connected to a video
recorder and camera mounted at the opposite 'end of the room to the
response panel. During test sessions the video link was disconnected
and the experirrenter' s rronitor was instead connected to the ccmprter ,
This minimised the chances of the experiment.er unwittingly affecting
the subject's performance during testing. Although the experimenter
could see the stimuli which were being displayed, he could not see the
subjects or their responses during test sessions.
Finally, in one corner of the room there was a large box
containing various gift~apped presents.
Procedure
The exper.irrent.er spent; at least one day in the nursery with each
of the subjects before introducing them individually to the
experirrental roan. Once in the rocm, the subjects were sat in front of
the response panel with their eyes level with the centre window. The
experirrenter (E) sat next to the subject for the first few trials of
164
Figure 4. 1 A subject chooses a cornparlson during an arbitrary matching
trial.
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tne-~ncroauCtory session and explained the general procedure. The
children were told they were going to play a game, and the following
instructions were given:
'In a little while you will see sorrething cane on here (E points
to the middle window of the response panel; a few seconds elapse and
the sample appears). When it comes on you must press it, like this (E
presses the sample, and comparisons appear on two of the four outer
windows) . See, I pressed it and two more things have cane on (E
points to the two canparisons). If you press the right one, this will
happen (E presses the correct comparison and drops a yellow token into
the left-rrost column of the token display matrix). See, I got it
right, so I got one of these tokens (E points to the token). You only
get a token if you press the right one. If you press the wrong one you
will not get a token. But if you keep getting it right, you will keep
getting these tokens, like this (E drops four more yellow tokens into
the left-most column of the natrix, leaving one blank space at the top
of the column). Now, when you get to the top you will get a special
token, like this (E drops a red token into the top space of the
colwnn). Every time you get one of these (E points to the red token) a
box will corne in here (E puts one gift box into the glass fronted
channel above the response panel). There 1S a little present for you
inside that box. When you have finished you can see what it is. You
do some now. Try to get them right so you can get sane more tokens and
boxes. '
For the next few trials, the experimenter guided the child
through the sequence of pressing the sample and correct canparison.
Then, the experirrenter said:
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'You carry on now. I'm going to sit behind here.' (The E then sat
behind the side panel, out of the subject's view, and watched the
proceedings via the remote monitor).
For the remainder of the first session (and only the first
session) the experirrent.er gave verbal feedback following each trial
e.g. 'Yes, that was right, you get a token' or 'No, that was wrong, try
again. '
Training Procedure
During training sessions, pressing the correct comparison produced
a high-pitch tone from the computer and the delivery of a token.
Incorrect comparison presses produced a low-pitch tone and no token.
once comparisons had apPeared, all other key presses had no scheduled
consequence. After a correct or incorrect choice the stimuli were
removed (i.e. the screen went blank) and a five second inter-trial
interval followed, at the end of which the next sample appeared, The
computer selected trials on a random basis with the following
restrictions:
(a) No more than three trials with the same sample could occur
consecutively.
(b) The window occupied by the correct comparison on any given trial
was left blank on the following trial.
with these exceptions all trial-types (sample-comparison
combinations) and a 11 correct windows were equally probable on
successive trials.
Most trials were non-corrected l.e. errors did not cause trials to
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However, correction was occasiona11y introduced in an
attempt to break comparison preferences. If the subject began to
select the same comparison on every trial, then incorrect responses
repeated the trial. This contingency forced the subject to eventually
switch to the non-preferred comparison in order to secure a reinforcer.
Correction was only ever used during training.
At the end of each training session (nonnally 48 trials), the
tokens dropped out of the rratrix into a tray beneath. The subject was
required to take the red tokens, which were then swapped for the boxes.
The subject was allowed to open each box, which either contained a
small toy (which the child could keep) or a small coloured star. The
stars were glued into an exercise book and when the subject had filled
the page with stars (approxirrately twelve stars to a page), the big toy
box was opened and the subject was allowed to select a wrapped present.
The children opened these presents and were allowed to play with them
for a little while, but did not take them hane until the end of the
experirrent or the end of school term, whichever carte first.
Training was continued on each task until the subject was correct
on at least six consecutive trials per trial-type. Once criterion was
reached and maintained on each task, the subjects were taken through
the next stage to prepare them for testing.
Reducing the reinforcement probability
In preparation for testing, the innediately preceding training
trials were presented in the absence of reinforcement i.e. correct and
incorrect responses were followed by the inter-trial interval only, and
neither tokens nor tones were delivered. The subjects were given the
following instructions prior to reducing the reinforcement probability
to zero:
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'This t.irre the ccmputer won't make any noises to tell you if
you're right or wrong, and you won't see any tokens cane dawn here (E
points to the token matrix) . Instead, I will keep your tokens behind
the screen and you will get them all when you have finished. Just keep
doing your best, and keep trying to get them right. '
At the end of this and all subsequent unreinforced sessions, the
subjects were given a fixed number of red tokens (usually five) which
they could then swap for the gift boxes. At no stage did the
experimenter give feedback of any kind regarding the subject's
performance on unreinforced trials.
All subjects maintained high levels of accuracy during this final
stage before testing, so once reinforcement was terminated it.did not
need to be re-introduced in order to re-establish a subject's
performance.
Test Procedure
All testing was conducted in the absence of reinforcement, and
trial presentations were totally random. Details of specific stimulus
presentations appear in the procedure sections of each axperirrente.I
report.
Naming Tests
Each subject received at least one naming test during the course
of the exper.irrent.. The stimuli were presented one at a time in the
centre window and the child was asked a variety of questions aimed to
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evoke a verbal response e.g. 'What is it?', 'What is it called?', 'What
is its name?', 'What do you call that?' et
., c. Normally, only one or
two question forms are used but, given that responses to naming tests
can often be idiosyncratic (see Hird and Lowe, 1985), it was felt that
a larger variety of questions would give a more accurate impression of
the subject's ability to name the stimuli. After each response the
experirrenter, seated behind the wooden screen, pressed a switch to
initiate the inter-trial interval and the next presentation. The
subjects were not required to press the windows, and no tokens or tones
were delivered during the test.
Procedures for analysing the children's spontaneous verbal behaviour
During each sessaon , the subject's behaviour (both verbal and non-
verbal) was recorded on videotape. Although a great deal of
spontaneous verbal behaviour was recorded, not all is presented in this
thesis. The analysis was necessarily restricted to those aspects of
verbal behaviour which were directly related to the subject's matching
performance e.g. the childrens' comments regarding either the stimuli
presented or the relations between those stimuli.
Post-experimental language test
At the end of the eXPeriment the subjects were tested on the
ReYnell oeveloprrental language Scale (Reynell, 1977) which provided a
measure of their language comprehension and production skills. Their
scores on the test were expressed as 'age equivalents' (i.e. the age at
which the majority of subjects from a standardised population achieved
a given test score). The Reynell was administered at the end of the
experirrent so that the subjects would be more likely to perfonn to the
170
best of their abil i ties, unimpeded by shyness or other characteristics
which might be accentuated by a lack of familiarity with the
experinenter.
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$SUBJOCTS
EXPERIMENr 3
Four wale and four female children took pa.rt. Table 4. 1 lists the
subjects by their chronological age at the t.irre of testing, and by
their equivalent language age from the Reynell Developnental language
Scale.
APPARA'IUS
PROCEDURE
(See Genera I Method)
The general sequence of training and testing is represented in
Table 4.2. Each, stage is explained more fully below (see the General
Method section for additional details).
Train AB
The AB training trials were the same as those presented in
Experiment 1 (see the left-hand side of Figure 4.2). Reinforcers were
contingent upon choosing the green compa.rison in the presence of the Y
sample, and the red carnpa.rison in the presence of the zig-zag sample.
All subjects began with the same fading prograrnrre which appa.rently
he lped establish AB watching for two of the chimps in ExperiIrent 1. If
fading did not appear to work with the children, then any of three
other intervention procedures were implerrented. These were:
(a) Delayed cueing (see Experirrent; 1 for details)
(b) Instructions Sane subjects were given the following instructions
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Table 4.1 Chronol.cq.i.cal. age (in years-nonths ) and equivalent language
age (from the Reynell Developmental Language Scale) for the eight
subjects in ExperiIrent 3.
SUBJEX::T CHRONOL03ICAL
AGE
EQUIVALENT LANGUAGE AGE
VERBAL
CCMPREHENSION
EXPRESSIVE
LANGUAGE
ANTONY 4 - 6 5 - 6 7 - 0
AWl 4 - 1 7 - 0 7 - 0
BECKY 4 - 4 5 - 6 4 - 11
GEMMA 4 - 2 5 - 8 7 - 0
HELEN 4 - 8 5 - 6 5 - 2
MATTHEW 4 - 10 5 - 6 6 - 6
MICHAEL \'1. 4 10 7 - 0 4 - 1
NICHOIAS 4 - 6 5 - 3 5 - 6
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1table -4.2 Sequence of training and testing in Experiment 3.
1 Train AB
2 Reduce reinforcement probability
3 Test BA (symretry) in basel ine of AB
4 Train CA
5 Camine CA and AB
6 Reduce reinforcement probability
7 Test Be (equivalence) in baseline of CA and AB
8 Test CB (transitivity) in baseline of CA and AB
9 Test AC (syrrrretry) in baseline of CA
10 Test A, B, and C naming
174
Figure 4.2 stimulus relations presented during AB training and BA test
trials (see text).
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both prior to and during standard AB sessions:
'The shape tells you which colour to choose'.
(c) Increased inter-trial interval (ITI) It was possible that sane
subjects were getting confused simply because the rate of trial
presentations was too fast for them. So, where necessary, this rate
was slowed down by increasing the ITI from 5 to 10 seconds.
E.'ventually, all subjects reached criterion on the AB task and
proceeded to the next stage.
Reduce reinforcement probability
Having learned AB, the reinforcerrent probability was reduced to
zero on AB trials (see General Method) to prepare the subjects for
their first phase of testing.
Test BA (symrrEtry)
In this phase, the AB relation formed a baseline which was
assessed for symmetry by the inclusion of BA test trials. On BA test
trials, the original samples and ccmpar.i.sons were interchanged (i.e. a
green or red sample was presented withy and zig-zag ccmpar.isons , as
depicted on the right of Figure 4.2). 'IW:> test sessions were given,
each consisting of 32 AB baseline trials (16 Per trial-type) and 16 BA
symmetry test trials (8 Per trial-tyPe). All trials were unreinforced.
Train CA
After symmetry testing, the subjects were taught CA matching (see
177
Figure 4.3 Relations taught during CA training.
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Figure 4. 3) . Reinforcers were contingent upon choosing the Y-shape
comparison in the presence of the triangle sample, and the zig-zag
comparison in the presence of the cross sample. All trials were
standard; intervention procedures were not needed during CA training.
Canbine CA and AB
During this phase, the CA and AB arbitrary natching trials were
combined within the same 48-trial session (24 trials per task).
Combined sessions continued until the subject met or exceeded criterion
on both tasks.
Reduce reinforcement probability
The reinforcement probability was reduced to zero prlor to
presenting the final combined session of AB and CA trials. The
subjects were required to maintain their AB and CA matching
perfonnances at criterion levels, and in the absence of differential
reinforcement, before proceeding to the next stage.
Test Be (equivalence)
Each of two equivalence test sessions consisted of 32 baseline
trials (16 AB and 16 CA) and 16 Be equivalence test trials. The test
trials assessed equivalence because all three properties of
reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity were required if BC was to
emerge from the AB and CA baseline trials. The emergence of Be first
required synID2try of the trained relations (AB and CA producing BA and
AC) . Then, provided the Set-B and Set-e stimuli could function in
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their new positions as samples and comparisons respectively (thus
demonstrating reflexivity), the derived BA and AC relations could yield
PC via transitivity -(BA and AC produci.nq Be).
Test CB (transitivity)
After equivalence was tested, two transitivity test sessions were
administered. Each session consisted of 32 baseline trials (16 CA and
16 AS) and 16 CB transitivity test trials.
Test AC (syrrtm2try)
Final conditional discrimination tests assessed symrretry of the
trained CA relation. Once again two tests were given, each consisting
,
of 32 CA baseline trials and 16 AC syrmetry test trials.
Surrmary
/
Figure 4.4 depicts all of the conditional relations which were
trained and tested during the experimerrt . The solid arrows depict
relations taught by explicit reinforcement whereas the shaded arrows
represent relations which might emerge during unreinforced test
sessions.
Naming Tests
After completing all of the above tests, each subject was asked to
overtly name the visual stimuli. Each 24-trial naming test consisted
of four presentations of each of the A, B, and C stimuli (see General
M=thod for further detai I ) .
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Figure 4.4 The equivalence paradigm adopted in Experirrent 3. The black
arrows represent relations that were explicitly taught to the subject,
and the shaded arrows represent relations that were tested after others
had been explicitly taught.
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HESUL'l'S
Al3 Training
All the subjects learned the AB relation. 'table 4.3 lists the
number of trials each subject received for each AB intervention. Only
fading and instructions seemed to be effective in pranoting learning of
the AB task. 'I'he success of the fading programme depended upon whether
the subject could initially match the sample colour-cue to its
identical comparison colour. If so, and with further correct
responses, the colour-cue would gradually shrink in size from around
the sillnple shape until only the shape itself would be left to indicate
which comparison colour was correct. Fading therefore proceeded from
col ourmat.clrinq to arbitrary (Jill) nnt.chinq, 'Iwo of the subjects, GErnrra
and Nicholas, were unable to benefit from the fading schedule because
they did not even learn to col ourmat.ch , despite receiving 168 and 251
trials respectively. At that stage the two children were transferred
to another intervention procedure. The six other children all learned
to colounnatch. Becky and Helen began colourmatching inmediately, as
did Antony, who made only one error 1n the first 12 trials. Matthew
and Amy required only 48 trials to colounnatch, whereas Michael W.
needed 147 trials. Of these six subjects, only" Amy did not proceed to
learn AB matching V1a the fading programrre. Amy continued to match
correctly up to and including the penultimate fClding step, on which the
sillnple colour cue was at its snBllest. However, her responding fell to
chance level on the final step of fading, on which no sillnple colour cue
appeared.
Al though fading did not prove effective for Amy, Gemma and
Nicholas, all three quickly learned the AB relation after instructions
were administered. (i.e. after the experimenter told them: 'The shape
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'faDie 'I • .j Numt>er ot t.ri.als per AB intervention for each subject in
Experirrent 3.
SUBJECT WTAL NO. AB TRIALS TRIALS / INrERVENrION
MATTHEW 103 103 Fading
ANTONY 126 126 Fading
MICHAEL w. 203 203 Fading
BOCKY 194 194 Fading
HELEN 218 218 Fading
NVr!. 255 230 Fading
25 Instructions
242 168 Fading
36 Increased ITI
38 Instructions
NICHOlAS 585 251 Fading
192 Delayed cueing
67 Nornal
48 Increased ITI
27 Instructions
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tells you which colour to choose').
Having learned the AB relation, all eight children received one AB
session without reinforcement. All of the subjects continued to
respond correctI y in the absence of dif ferential reinforcanent, thus
demonstrating that they were ready for their first test phase.
Test BA (symrretry)
Figure 4.5 shows the subjects' performances during symrretry tests.
All subjects passed the symrretry test; they perfonned well above chance
on both AB baseline and BA symrretry test trials. Overall, few errors
were made.
Train CA
Following their success on sYmmetry tests, the subjects were
taught CA rrat.chi.nq, All eight children learned CA extremely quickly;
Becky required two 48-trial sessions, but all the other subjects
learned CA matching within one session. Clearly, the nwnber of trials
needed to learn this second arbitrary matching problem was far less
than the number required to learn the first.
Combine AB and CA
All subjects continued to respond correctly when the AB am CA
trial-types were canbined within the same session. Procedures were
then implemented to reduce the reinforCEment probabi l i.ty to zero, and
one more combined session followed. The absence of differential
reinforcement did not affect any of the subjects' AB and CA
186
Figure 4.5 Overall results (percentage of correct r esponses ) on AB
baseline and BA syrrrrnetry trial-types for the eight subjects in
Experi.rrent 3 (each baseline bar represents 32 trials, and each test
bar represents 16 trials).
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performances, and so they all proceeded to the final test phases.
Table 4.4 ShONS the number of trials each subject received in each
phase leading to final testing.
Test Be (equivalence), CB (transitivity) and AC (sym;retry)
Figures 4.6 and 4.7 depict the subjects' performances on BC
(equivalence), CB (transitivity) and AC (symmetry) tests. Each
subject's scores on unreinforced baseline and test trials were
excellent throughout. These results may be translated into the number
of errors each subject rrade , Out of a total of 96 test trials, Michael
w. nade only 2 errors, Pmy and Becky each made only 3, Nicholas made 4,
Matthew 6, Antony 10, Gernrra 11 and Helen 17.
The results clearly shaw that two classes of equivalent stimuli
had formed for each child tested; one class consisted of the Y-shape,
green, and triangle stimuli and the other of the zig-zag, red, and
cross.
Analysis of the children's verbal behaviour
- -
Measures were taken of each child's verbal behaviour, both when it
occurred sporrtaneously on matching trials and when it was prcxnpted
during a post-experimental naming test. The children all proved
capable of labelling the stimuli at same point during the proceedings.
However, the children's success on equivalence tests did not correlate
with any single 'global' labelling strategy. Rather, a variety of
labelling patterns were produced, some of which were perhaps more
I informative I than others.
Spontaneous labelling of the stimuli was virtually absent from
sorre of the chi ldren 's rePetoires. Table 4.5 shows that Becky, for
189
Table 4.4 The number of trial s presented to each subject in
Experirrent 3, for each phase prior to final testing. (Red.Rft. = reduce
reinforcement probability)
SUBJOCT NUMBER OF TRIAlS PER PHASE
Train Red Test Train Camine Red Total
AB Rft BA CA AB & CA Rft
MATTHEW 103 48 96 24 48 48 367
ANTONY 126 48 96 24 48 48 390
MICHAEL w. 203 48 96 36 48 48 479
HELEN 218 48 96 24 48 48 482
GEMMA 242 48 96 28 48 48 510
BECKY 194 48 96 96 48 48 530
AJ.Vff. 255 48 96 48 48 48 543
NICHOIAS 585 48 96 24 48 48 849
190
Figure 4.6 Overall results fran Be (equivalence), CB (transitivity)
and AC (symret.ry) tests for four of the subjects from Experirrent 3.
Each test bar represents 16 trials.
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and AC (syrnrretry) tests for four of the subjects from Experi.rrent 3.
Each test bar represents 16 trial s .
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Table 4. ~ Becky's verbal responses to the stimuli presented during
natching trials and during her post-experimental naming test (y=y-
shape, Z=zig-zag, G=green, R=red, A=triangle, +=cross; S=sample,
CC--correct canparison, IC=incorrect canparison).
SPONTANEOUS VERBALISATIONS DURING MATCHIN; TASK
PHASE
CA
S CC IC
+-Z Y
VERBAL BEHAVlOOR
'Cross'
CONTEXT
When + appeared
(no other stimuli
present) .
STIMULUS
y
VERBALISATIONS DURIN; NAMING TEST
RESPONSE
No response (x2)
'Lines' (x2)
A 'Triangle' (x4 )
G 'A square. .• garage door... green'
'Green' (x3)
Z
+
'Snake'
'Noughts'
(x4)
R
'Cross' (x3)
'Square garage ....red '
'Red' (x3 )
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instance, only produced one spontaneous label (she said 'Cross' in the
presence of the corresponding shape). Becky did, however, give
distinct labels to each of the stimuli during her naming test. Some of
these prompted responses were, however, somewhat idiosyncratic. When
the cross was first presented Becky said 'Noughts', but on subsequent
presentations she gave it the same conventional label ('Cross') which
she had previously produced spontaneously. The triangle, green and red
stbnuli were also given conventional names, although the colours were
both initially labelled as square garages! Becky also labelled the
zig-zag as 'Snake' and the Y-shape as 'Lines', although she was silent
on the first two trials with the Y-shape.
Matthew did not overtly label any of the stimuli on matching
trials. On the narru.nq test, however, he consistently labelled the
triangle, green and red stimuli with their conventional narres (see
Table 4.6). He also consistently named the zig-zag as 'Muh' (for
Matthew or me). But his responses to the Y-shape and cross were
perhaps the most significant. Although Matthew always gave the
conventional name for the cross, on one occasion he additionally
called it 'Red'. He also said 'Green' to the Y-shape after initially
attempting to describe what it looked like. On these occasions, then,
Matthew apParently labelled the cross and the Y-shape with the names of
their-corresponding colours.
Helen labelled the triangle, the cross, and the colours with their
conventional names both spontaneously during matching trials (see Table
4.7) and when prompted on the naming test (see Table 4.8). She also
gave the conventional name for the zig-zag, but only during the naming
test. Helen never once overtly labelled the Y-shape spontaneously, but
on the naming test her response to it was similar to Matthew's. She
beqan by attempting to describe what the Y-shape looked like and then
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Table 4.6 Matthew's verbal responses from his post-experimental
naming test.
STIMULUS
y
RESPONSE
'A straight stick with some things
corning out' (x2 ) •
'It's green ... I don't know the
names of them, though'.
'A stick, and it's got things coming
out, and it's green' •
'Triangle' (x4)
G 'Green' (x4)
z
+
'I don't know what that one 1S ••
....Moo. Muh for ~atthew'
'Moo'
'Muh for Matthew'
'Muh for me'
'I don't know what its narre is .•.
Cross'
'Cross' (x2)
'That one's red and it's cross'
R 'Red' (x4 )
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.&......., ........ -.... .n...A.""".. V v!:-,untaneous verbal ',responses to the stimuli
presented during matching trials.
PHASE TRIAL
TYPE
S CC IC VERBAL BEHAVIOUR CONTEXT
Test BA R-Z Y 'It's red. Red in When R appears
BA the middle. Oh, in sample position
sorrethings happened' for first time.
BA G-Y Z 'The green's in the When G appears in
middle' sample position.
Train CA A-Y Z 'What's that one?. When Ii. appears
CA A triangle one' for first time.
CA +-z Y 'A cross in the When + appears
middle' for first time.
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'lCWJ.e If. 0 ne.l\=ll·:S ve.roa.i responses from her post.rexper.imentaI nanung
test.
STIMULUS
y
A
G
Z
+
R
RESPONSE
'It's a thing what goes down.....
(tries to draw it in the air with
her finger) ... It's one of the greens'
, It's a thing that goes up and
another thing that goes up. I don't
know what this shape is, but it's
one of the greens'
'Green' (x2)
'Triangle' (x4)
'Green' (x4)
'Zig-zag' (x4)
'Cross' (x4)
'Red' (x4)
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said IIt IS one of the greens I, a phrase which she repeated when the
shape next appeared. Helen then went on to label the Y-shape as
IGreen I on its final two presentations.
This ability to call a shape by its corresponding colourname was
also exhibited by Michael W. Michael never once overtly labelled the
stimuli on matching trials, but during his naming test he labelled the
Y-shape, triangle and green stimuli as 'Green' and the zig-zag, cross
and red stimuli as 'Red I (see Table 4.9). This, then, was a clear
example of corrmon naming. Equivalence tests had earlier revealed the
presence of two classes of equivalent stimuli (Class 1 = Y-shape,
triangle and green; Class 2 = zig-zag, cross and red). Michael's
naming test responses were consistent with these stimulus classes; he
applied his label for one of the class members (the colour) to each
other class merrber (the shapes). The question was did Michael apply
common labels to the stimuli prior to the equivalence test? Although
he did not do so overt1y, he may have done so covert1y . If so, then
common naming may have mediated the formation of stimulus equivalence
Le. the stimuli may have become equivalent precisely because they were
given the same name (I green' or Ired ' ) .
Although Michael only produced canrron labels overtly during the
naming test, others did so spontaneously, during the matching trials.
One such subject was Antony (see Table 4. 10) . During AB training,
Antony labelled the Y-shape as 'Green', even though no comparison
colours were present at the time. In the absence of the colours,
Antony also labelled the zig-zag as Ired-green' which was the same
label he occasionally applied to red objects in his classroom (it had
been noted prior to the experiment that Antony often used the terms
Ired I and "red-qr'een I interchangeably to denote the colour red, whereas
he always appeared to use the word I green I to 1abe1 green things).
Antony also applied his colour labels spontaneously on CA trials, in
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Table 4.~ Mlcnael W.' s verbal responses from his post-experirrental
naming test.
STIMULUS RESPONSE
y 'can't think of the naroe '
'Green' (x3)
Ii
G
z
+
R
'Green'
'Green'
'Red'
'Red'
'Red'
(x4)
(x4)
(x4)
(x4)
(x4)
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Table 4.10 Antony's spontaneous verbal responses to the stimuli
presented during matching trials.
PHASE TRIAL
TYPE
Train AB
AB
AB
Train CA
AB
CA
CA
AB/CA CA
CA
Test' CA
OC
AB
rc
S CC IC
Y-G R
Z-R G
+-ZY
A-Y Z
A-Y Z
+-ZY
A-Y Z
A-Y Z
Y-G R
G-A+
VERBAL BEHAVIOOR
'I know•. this one's
green'
'I bet it's going
to be red-qreen
this time.... '
' ..• see, I was right,
it is red-green'
,Don't want green'
'Green'
'Green'
'Gree-ee-een'
'It is green'
'I nearly pressOO
the green'
'I nearly pressed
the roo'
'I nearly touched
the red-green'
'Green that one'
'Whoops-a-daisy,
I did that wrong .. '
' ..When this green,
yeh (point.s to blank
centre window), I
pressed the rOO-green
(points to blank .
comparison window which
had just held the +).
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CONTEXT
When Y appears,
(no other stimuli
are present)
Before Z appears ••.
In between pressing
+ and Z. .
When A appears.
Before pressing Y.
\-vhen A appears.
Before pressing Y.
After nearly
pressing the Y.
After nearly
pressing the Z.
After nearly
pressing the Z.
When Y appears, and
no other stimuli are
present.
During intertrial
interval after
having just pressed
the incorrect
canparison (+)
Table 4.10 (cont'd)
PHASE TRIAL S CC IC VERBAL BEHAVIOOR CONTEXT
-- -TYPE
Test CA /i.-Y Z 'No not red' As he goes to press
CB the Z, which he
subsequently avoids.
CB /i.-G R 'The red up there, During intertrial
the green down interval after
there, it was the having just pressed
green' the correct
canparison (G).
Test CA /i.-Y Z 'What is it now••. Before pressing Y.
AC green'
AC Y-/i. + 'Oooh, I know this In between pressing
is green' Y and A.
AC Y-/i. + 'Got green, green, After pressing A.
green' (sings)
CA /i.-Y Z 'Press the green In between pressing
ones' Y and c:
CA +-z Y 'That one's red- Just before pressing
green' z.
CA /i.-Y Z 'Green' During intertrial
interval, after he
just pressed the
correct canparison
(Y) .
203
which shapes alone were presented. For example, on one CA trial he
said 'Green' to the triangle sample and then, after pressing it to
produce the comparisons, he said 'Green' again just before pressing the
Y-shaPe. On a later CA trial (one presented during an equivalence test
session) he nearly pressed the zig-zag comparison by mistake (the zig-
zag was the incorrect comparison) and afterwards said 'I nearly touched
the red-green'. ,During the same session he appeared to use the same
label (' red-green') to denote the cross. This occurred on a Be test
trial, in which the green sample was presented with the triangle
(correct comparison) and the cross (incorrect comparison). Antony made
a rare error by choosing the cross, but then, when all the stimuli had
disappeared from the screen, he said:
'Whoops-a-daisy, I did that wrong . When this green, yeh
(poi.ntinq to the blank centre window which had just held the green
stimulus ) I pressed the red-green' (pointing to the blank canparison
windcw which had just held the cross).
The examples qaven above were by no means the only ones Antony
produced, Inspection of Table 4. 10 leaves little doubt that Antony was
spontaneously labelling the Y-shape, triangle and green stimuli as
'green' and the zig-zag, cross and red stimuli as 'red-green' (or
occas.ional I y , red' ) . In addition, most of his naming test responses
were consistent with the Labe l s he had earlier produced spontaneously.
During the naming test he said 'green' to the two shapes which had
\....~. . 1 and' red-green' to the otherLecome equlvalent to the green StlffiU us,
tv-.D shapes which had becane equivalent to red (see Table 4. 11) •
GemrrB. also seemed to give canrron names spontaneously to each of
the stimuli (see Table 4. 12) • After learning AB matching, she labelled
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Table 4.11 Antony's verbal responses from his post-exPerimental
naming test.
STIMULUS RESPONSE
Y 'I don't know what its narre is'.
'Green' (x3)
'Green' (x4)
G 'Green' (x4)
z
+
'I don't know what the nanes are.
I think it is a picture' .
'We did that one! I think it is ..
I don't know what it is .. I don't
know what its narre is, but I
think it's red-green'.
'Red-green' (x2)
'I don't know what its narre is'.
'Red-green' (x3 )
R 'Red' (x4 )
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Table 4.12 Gemma's spontaneous verbal responses to the stimuli
presented during rratching trials.
PHASE TRIAL S CC IC VERBAL BERAvrcon CONTEXT
-- -
TYPE
Train AB Z-R G 'I think it's going When Z appear's
AB to be red' (no other stimuli
are present).
AB Z-R G 'Red again' When Z appears(no other stimuli
are present).
AB Y-G R 'Green! ' When Y appears(no other stimuli
are present).
CA/AB CA A-Y Z 'I know which Before pressing Y.
colour to do'
Test CA A-Y Z 'Green again' When A appears.
PC
CA +-Z Y 'What colour now? Before pressing Z.
Press red'
OC R-+ 'That's red' When R appears
'Reds! ' ·Before pressing Z.
Be R-+ . 'That's red' Before pressing +.
CA +-Z Y 'It's the red After pressing Z.
things'
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:he zaq-zaq as 'red' and the Y-shape as 'green' even though the colours
~re not present at the time. later on, during a CA trial (in which
shapes alone w=re presented) she said 'I know which colour to do', and
then proceeded to select the correct corrparison shape. later still,
during equivalence testing, she was presented with a CA baseline trial
and she said 'It I S the red things' after pressing the cross sample and
the zig-zag comParison.
Although Gemma clearly applied comrron labels to the stimuli during
t
.
rratching trial s, she did not continue to do so when she was later given
a naming test. Gemma in fact spent most of the naming test giggling to
herself and, whilst she labelled the Set-B colours appropriately, she
labelled the shapes somewhat indiscriminately with what appeared to be
novel 'nonsense' words (see Table 4.13).
Comrron labelling appeared to be absent from Amy's verbal repetoire
(see Table 4. 14), but her verbal behaviour suggested another way in
which language nay prorrote stimulus equivalence. Amy not only labelled
each of the stimuli with distinct names but, in addition, she also
overtly labelled the relations between the stimuli. After learning AB
rratching, and before her last AB session prlor to symrretry testing, she
said:
'The squiggly line is for the red and the other one's for the green'
(the other one, presumably, was a reference to the Y-shape).
Amy's statement was consistent with the possibility that the
stimuli had already become equivalent prior to any formal equivalence
test (cf , Sidman et al , 1985). Furthermore, at one stage Amy seemed to
be trying to relate some of the stimuli verbally, even before she had
been given an opportunity to match them on the screen. When presented
with a CA trial for the first time, and prior to selecting a
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rTable 4. 13 Ganrra's verbal responses from her pcs't-experinent.al nanung
test.
STIMULUS RESPONSE
y 'stripey' (x2)
Ii
'Liney' (x2)
'stairs'
'Stairsey'
(Giggling) (x2)
G 'Green' (x4)
Z 'stairs'
'Stripey'
(Giggling) (x2)
+ 'Stripey' (x2)
(Giggling) (x2)
R 'Red' (x4)
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~Table 4.14 Amy's spontaneous verbal responses to the stimuli
presented during matching trials.
PHASE TRIAL
TYPE
S CC IC VERBAL BEHAVIOOR CONTEXT
Train 'The squiggly line Comment made before
AB is for the red and session began (the
the other one's for last AB session
the green' prior to BA symrretry
test) •
Train CA +-z Y 'There is a cross. First time +
CA I wonder' what does appears.
the cross rrean?'
'That seems funny Before pressing z.
to my mind...what
does the cross
mean?'
CA A-Y Z 'There's a triangle Before pressing Z.
in the middle with
two shapes at the
side as well'
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comparison, she said:
There is a cross' (referring to the sample). 'I wonder what does
the cross mean?'
and then, after pressing the cross sample to produce the Y and
zig-zag comparisons, she added:
'That seems funny to my mind.....what does the cross mean>'
Presumably she then found out what the cross rreant, because she
pressed the zig-zag comparison, which happened to be correct, and then
proceeded to rrake only three errors in the next 48 CA trials.
On the naming test, Amy continued to give distinct names to each
of the stimuli, but not always in accordance with the narres she had
previously produced spontaneously. Table 4. 15 shows that she called
the zig-zag a 'ziggy line' and a 'ziggy-zaggy line' during the naming
test (whereas she had previously labelled it spontaneously as a
,squigg1y 1ine ' ), and despite referring to the Y-shape as 'the other
one' during matching trials, she consistently called it a 'Y' during
the naming test.
The final subject to consider is Nicholas. Nicholas's spontaneous
labelling was particularly interesting because it appeared to consist
of a combination of both comron labelling and relational labelling.
Examples are given in Table 4. 16.
During the course of learning CA matching, the triangle sample
appeared and Nicholas said:
'Is it green now? That one says green, the triangle, yeh?'
This was a remarkable staterrent because not only was Nicholas
apparently attempting to relate the stimuli verbally (through the
relational term, 'says') but he was also producing the label for a
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"-Table 4.15
test.
STIMULUS
y
Amy's verbal responses from her post-experimental naming
RESPONSE
'That looks a bit like a letter Y'
'Y'
'Triangle'
(x3 )
(x4)
G
z
'A green square' (x4)
'It looks a bit ... I don't know what
it is ..• l can just call it a ziggy line'
'A ziggy-zaggy line (x3)
+
R
'Cross'
'A red square'
(x4)
(x4 )
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J;A;J,@.l~ 4. 16 Nicholas's spontaneous verbal behaviour to the stimuli
presented during matching trials.
PHASE TRIAL S CC IC VERBAL BEHAVIOOR CONTEXT
-- -TYPE
Train AB Z-R G 'There's two reds' Points to Z and R
AB before pressing R.
AB Y-G R 'These are both Before pressing G.
green'
Train CA +-ZY 'What's that doing + appears for the
CA there for?' first time.
'Is it green?' Before pressing Y.
CA +-ZY 'Red, yeh' In between pressing
+ and Z.
CA A-Y Z 'Is it green now? When A appears.
That one says green,
the triangle, yah?'
+-Z Y 'That looks like When + appears.
Jesus's cross yeh?'
CA +-Z Y 'I thought it was After nearly
the green, then I pressing Y.
found redl!
CA +-Z Y 'I get the reds, After pressing
yeh' + and Z.
AB/CA E: 'They're now caning on.
Let's see if you can
rerrember?
S: 'Yeh, greens to greens
and reds to reds'
Verbal behaviour
recorded prior to
Nicholas's first
session following a
one rronth break.
CA +-Z Y 'Green'
212
Inbetween pressing
+ and Y (incorrect).
Table 4.16 (cont'd)
PHASE TRIAL S CC IC VERBAL BEHAVIClJR CONTEXT
-- -
TYPE
CA +-z Y 'If that was green During intertrial
([Dints to blank interval, after
comparison windcw having just pressed
which had just held the incorrect
Y), that was red' canparison (Y).
([Dints to blank
sample windcw which
had just held +)
lill/CA CA f:,.-Y Z 'When I see the During intertrial
triangle that interval, after
rreans green' having just pressed
the correct
canparison (Y).
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--- -
colour which was not present at the time. and to which the triangle had
never been paired directly via matching. This kind of relational
labelling was recorded on one other occasion, on one of the CA trials
which appeared during a combined AB and CA session (see the final entry
in Table 4.16). After correctly matching the triangle sample to the Y
compa.rison, and during the intertrial interval which followed, he said:
'When I see the triangle, that means green' .
(Once again, no colours were present at the tine).
This relational labelling appeared to co-exist with common
labelling, the latter being the more predominant of the two patterns.
For example, on the last AB training session prior to symmetry testing,
Nicholas pointed to the zig-zag sample and corresponding red compa.rison
and said 'There's two reds'. He also said 'These are both green' in
the presence of the Y-shape sample and corresponding green compa.rison.
The impression given was that Nicholas, too, had somehow learned to
labe1 each Set-A shape with the name of its corresponding Set-B
colour. This notion is consistent with his spontaneous labelling
during subsequent CA trials. It also seemed that in the process of
learning CA matching, the colournanes which were initially applied to
the Set-A shapes were somehow passed on to the Set-e shapes. For
example, after pressing the cross sample and corresponding zig-zag
comparison, Nicholas said 'I get the reds yeh?'. This in fact
occurred on Nicholas's last session before a one-month break (the
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labels which Nicholas produced spontaneously
.---~..~~
Furthermore, the
\
corresponded well with those he produced during the namin9 test
(although a few of his naming test responses were somewhat
idiosyncratic; see Table 4.17).
DISCUSSION
In this experirrent, eight 4-5 year old children passed standard
tests of. stimulus equivalence. If each subject's non-verbal matching
performance had been the only behaviour of interest, then one would
have perhaps been none the wiser about why equivalence emerged. But
this study did not just confine itself to monitoring the subject's non-
verbal behaviour on matching trials; provision was also made for the
detailed monitoring of each subject's verbal behaviour. To the
author's knowledge, only one other study has given equal weight to the
verbal and non-verbal behaviour of children during trials leading up
to, and including, equivalence testing. Beasty (1988) found that the
way in which his subjects labelled the stimuli had a direct bearing on
their subsequent equivalence test perforwance. Only those children who
labelled the sample and correspond.inq comparison in sequence then went
on to pass the tests.
Although extremely inforrrative, Beasty's study (like all good
exper.imsnt.s ) raises many interesting questions. Perhaps the forenost
of these is what is it about sequential naming which makes for the
effective formation of stimulus equivalence?
None of the subjects in the present experiment were heard to
prcXluce sequential naming of the sort described by Beasty. However ,
soms (e.g. Becky, Matthew and Helen) did overtly label each stimulus
i.b.i l i t fwith a distinct name, so one cannot rule out the POSSl 1 1 Y 0
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TaDIe· 4.17 Nicholas's verbal responses from his post-experinEntal
naming test.
STIMULUS RESPONSE
Y 'That hasn't got any names'
'Don't know....green'
'Green' (x2)
Ii. 'Bunk bed' (Nicholas told the
experi.ITenter about his new bunk
bed just before the test began)
'Triangle' (x2)
'It's a triangle and it's green'
G 'Green' (x3)
z
'Another square and it's green'
'Like in a hospital'
'I don't know...Red'
'Red' (x2)
+ 'Cross'
'Cross ... red again'
'Red' (x2)
R 'It's a square and it's red'
'Red' (x3 )
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He also
s~uential naming at the covert level in these children. Others, while
not producing straightforward sequential naming, did prcxluce other
patterns which may be related to (and indeed may give scrre insights
into the effectiveness of) the sequential naming which Beasty reported.
Pmy, for example, not only gave distinct narres to each individual
stimulus but she also labelled the relation between the stimuli.
Nicholas also gave sorre evidence of relational Iabel l inq, Relational
labelling is significant precisely because it rrakes explicit one way in
which stimuli may become equivalent. If, for example, a subject
rratches A to B and C to A according to an arbitrary relation such as
'is for', then one should not be too surprised if that subject proceeds
to pass equivalence tests. If A 'is for' B and C 'is for' A then the
subject may well conclude that B 'is for' C and C 'is for' B.
The interest in arbitrary relational r espond.inq has recently been
championed by steven Hayes (see Hayes, in press
) . Hayes's theory of 'relational frames' is quite canplex,
and judging from successive paper's on the topic it still appears to be
under developrent, so a detailed examination of the theory will not be
presented here. But briefly, when Hayes talks of relational frames he
refers to arbitrary relations like t.bose mentioned above.
suggests that ~~ arbitrary relation may itself emerge after reinforcing
a subject's appropriate responses to many exemplars of the relation
(but see Experiment 2 of this thesis). Furthennore, this 'training
history' is said to occur in a particular context, and in all of the
examples which Hayes provides, this context is a linguistic one. Hayes
appears to draw short of saying that arbitrary relations are
necessarily linguistic in origin, but this would not seem an
unwarranted claim given the current weight of empirical evidence In
support of a relationship between language proficiency and success on
equivalence tests.
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Although beyond the scope of the present thesis, future research
nay well focus on the origins of relational verbal behaviour am the
conditions under which it nay pranote stimulus equivalence. Indeed,
such research already appears to be underway (see Sofroniou, 1988).
Certainly, verbal behaviour from subjects like Amy and Nicholas would
seem to indicate the importance of such an undertaking. Furthenrore,
the sequential naming produced by Beasty' s subjects may have involved
an element of arbitrary relational control. Certainly the phrase 'Up-
Green', for example, could conceivably operate as an abbreviated
verslon of 'Up is the same as Green'. Indeed, some of Beasty's
subjects did produce relational labels spontaneously during their
natching trials.
However, the results from the present experiment suggested other
ways in which naming nay prorrote stimulus equivalence. Four of the
subjects produced cornnon names for the stimuli. Three of the subjects,
namely Antony, Germra and Nicholas, produced comron labels spontaneously
during the matching trials. One other, Michael W., only produced
comron labels overtly during his naming test, although he may have been
producing them covertly prior to this. It was possible, then, that all
four subjects passed the equivalence tests as a consequence of applying
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choice of green canparison but also over his label for that colour.
Then, on CA training trial s, the word 'Green', produced by the subject
in the presence of the Y-shape comparison, could by similar means come
under the control of the triangle sample. The same mechanism could
bring about naming of the zig-zag, cross and red stimuli with the
comrron label, 'Red'. Once established in this way, COIlllTDn naming could
mediate correct matching responses during unreinforced tests of
stimulus Equivalence.
But this need not be the only way in which COITlIlDn labelling could
develop. There is an alternative possibility which involves turning
all of the previous argument completely on its head. Common labelling
may have produced stimulus equivalence. But, alternatively, stimulus
equivalence may have produced common labelling. Prior to the
experirnent, each subject could name the Set-B colours. If the narres
are denoted as Set-X responses then the colour naming relation can be
denoted as BX. During the experiment, each subject was taught AB.
Now, given AB and BX it is possible that lV{ could emerge through
transitivity (AB and BX producing AX). Then, when the subject
subsequently learns CA, CX too could emerge through transitivity (CA,
and lV{ producing CX). The end result would be cOITlITDn labelling; Set-A,
Set-B and Set-e stimuli would all be labelled appropriately with the
Set-X colour words, 'Green' and 'Red'.
So, did common labelling produce equivalence, or was cornmon
labelling merely a by-product of extant Equivalence processes? There
seems to be nothing in the present data which could answer this
question. Neverthel ess, the present exp=rirrent had served a purpose;
it confirmed that common labelling was worthy of further investigation,
and thus it suggested a forrrat for further experiments, reports of
which now follow.
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EXPERIMENr 4 (a)
In the previous experiment, sane subjects sfX)ntaneously applied
the same label to unidentical stimuli prior to matching those
stimuli on equivalence test trials. Although suggestive, this finding
does not clearly define the role of common labelling in the formation
of equivalence. The comrron labelling may have been responsible for the
Emergence of equivalence, but it is also possible that equivalence'
Emerged indePendently of comrron labelling, the latter in turn being a
product; of extant equivalence processes.
Subsequent attempts to teach AS matching met with little success.
Although this posed difficulties for the experirrent.al progranrne, it
also presented an opportunity to circumvent the problems of
interpretation mentioned above. The subjects could be taught to apply
common labels to the very stimuli they had failed to relate via the AS
matching task. If the AB relation emerged, together with its
symmetrical counterpart BA, without differential reinforcement and
immediately after comron labels had been established, then one would
have clear evidence for the facilitative effect of common labels on the
formation of stimulus equivalence.
MErHOD
The general plan was:
(1) Identify a group of subjects who fail to learn AS matching.
(2) Teach the subjects to label the Set-A stimuli with the Set-x words
'Ornni' and 'Delta'.
(3) Return the subjects to the AS baseline to establish whether their
new labelling skills would help them acquire the matching task. If
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not, then:
(4) Teach the subjects to label the Set-B stimul i with the Set-x
\<.Drds.
(5 ) Test the effects of COITllTDn labelling by the subjects on both
AB and BA rra tchi.nq (for further details see ProcEdure).
One subject, however, was not taught to produce cannon
labels but rather to select Set-A and Set-B comparisons conditional
upon common labels dictated by the experimenter. This subject's
initial test performance was such that further test sessions were
required, and at that stage the subject was pranpted to produce
conmon labels. other than this, all subjects followed the general plan,
although exact routes to testing were determined by each subject's
perforrrance at particular stages of the experirrent (see below).
SUBJECTS
Four maLe and four female children took part. Table 4.18 lists
subjects by their chronological age and by their equivalent language
age according to the Reynell Developrrental Language Scale.
APPARA'IUS
Details of apparatus rray be found ill the General Method section.
PROCEDURE
The general sequence of training and testing is schematically
represented in Figure 4.8. Each stage is explained rrore fully below.
The tasks presented in each stage were judged to have been learned when
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Table 4.18 Chronological age (in years-months) and equivalent
language age (from the Reynell Developrrental Language Scale) for the
eight subjects in Experirrent 4(a).
SUBJEr:T CHRONOI.J:'CI CAL
AGE
EQUIVALENT LANGUAGE AGE
VERBAL EXPRESSIVE
CCMPREHENSION LANGUAGE
ALEX
FRANCIS
JESSICA
LINDA
MICHAEL P.
NICHOIA
SARA R.
STEPHEN
4 - 11
4 - 7
4 - 8
5 - 0
4 - 11
4 - 3
4 - 9
4 - 8
4 - 10
4 - 6
7 - 0
4 - 3
4 - 9
5 - 7
7 - 0
5 - 7
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5 - 0
5 - 3
7 - 0
7 - 0
7 - 0
7 - 0
7 - 0
7 - 0
Figure 4.8
text) .
Sequence of training and testing ln Experiment 4(a) (see
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the subject had satisfied a criterion of at least SlX consecutive
correct responses per trial-type.
Training Procedure
AS Training All subjects began wi th AB arbitrary matching
trials. On each trial the sample was either the Y-shape or the zig-zag,
and the ccmpari.sons were the green hue and t.he rEd hue. Reinforcers
were contingent upcn choosing the green corrpari.son in the presence of
the Y sample, and the red ccmpari.son in the presence of the zig-zag
sample (see Figure 4.9).
In an attempt to prcmote learning of the AB relation, several
intervention procedures were superirrposed upon the basic AB matching
trials. Details of some of these interventions can be found elsewhere
(see Experiment 3). Other interventions, narrely sample schedules and
reward reduction, were introduced for the first time during this
experiIrent. When sample schedules were in effect, the subjects were
required to press the sample five times to produce the canp:lrisons.
It was hoped that this would increase the likelihood that the subject
would attend to the sample. When re.vard rEduction was in effect,
incorrect comparison choices resulted in the rerroval of a token. This
was .implerrent.ed because scme subjects seerred to be satisfied with the
number of tokens obtained from chance level perfonnance. When sessions
incorporated reward reduction, the subject had to score better than
chance in order to earn any tokens.
Having failed to learn the AB relation, all subjects
proceeded to testing via one of two };X)ssible routes, depicted in Figure
4 .8. The route represented down the left side of the figure was
eventually taken by all but one subject (Jessica), and 1S therefore
called the rrain route. The alternative route depicted on the right
225
Figure 4.9 stimulus relations presented during AB training trials.
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side of the figure was initially taken by three subjects but, due to a
lack of progress, two of these (Linda and Sara R.) were eventually
transferred to the main route, leaving only one subject (Jessica) to
continue along the alternative path, There were important theoretical
reasons for the inclusion of this alternative route to testing, even if
it was followed by only one subject, and these .reasons will becane
clear in the Discussion section. Both routes are explained below.
Main Route
(1) Train A'X' On each trial either the Y-shape or the zlg-zag
appeared in the centre window. Subjects were required to say 'Ormi' in
the presence of the Y-shaPe and 'Delta' in the presence of the zig-zag
(see Figure 4.10). Pressing the sample then produced reinforcers. If
the ,subject said the wrong word then sample presses produced the
incorrect tone followed by the intertrial interval. A sample press
produced a consequence only if preceded by the spoken word 'Qnni' or
'Delta '. All other presses had no scheduled consequence. Just before
the first session of A'X' training, the subjects were given the
following instructions:
'In a while you will see
point.s to the centre window) .
what it is.'
something cane on here' (experimenter
'When it COllES on I want you to tell Ire
Then, when the first sample appeared, e.g. the Y-shape, the
experirrenter said:
'That 1S an Onni. You say it and then press it.'
If the subject hesitated, the latter instruction was repeated
228
•Figure 4. 10 Relations taught during AI XI training. Arrows point
from sample shapes to corresponding labels spoken by the subjects .
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until the subject said the word.
The experirrenter was not concerned if the subject's pronunciation
of "Cmni ' or 'Delta' was less than perfect. Any approximation to the
desired sound was .accepted, provided it was easy to distinguish and
remained consistent across trials.
If the children had initial difficulty remembering the unfamiliar
words they wer'e asked 'Is it Cmni or Delta?'
OCcasionally, subjects were reminded to press the centre window
after saying the word. As their labelling improved prompting was
gradually reduced until it was no longer necessary. By the end of this
phase, all subjects were able to label the Set-A shapes appropriately
without any intervention from the experirrenter.
(2 ) AB Training (resurred ) All subjects were returned to the AB
baseline for a maximum of two 48-trial sessions, to see if they would
continue to label the Set-A shapes on natching-to-sample trials and, if
so, whether this would help them acquire the AB relation. If the
sample shapes were not labelled spontaneously , then pranpting was given
during additional sessaonsj the subject was asked 'Is it Ornni or
Delta?' when the sample appeared, and the canparisons were witheld
until the subject said either word and then pressed the sample.
If the AB relation was learned then the child proceeded to stage 5
(see below). All other subjects proceeded to the next stage.
(3 ) Train B' X' The procedure here was identical to A' X' training
(see above), except the green hue replaced the Y-shape and red replaced
the zig-zag. So on each trial the green or red hue appeared an the
centre window and the subjects were r'equi.red to say "Onrri ' in the
presence of green and 'Delta' in the presence of red (see Figure 4. 11 ) .
231
Figure 4.11 Relations taught during B'X' training. Arrows J.X>int from
sample colours to corr-espond.inq labels spoken by the subjects.
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Figure 4.12 Relations maintained In sessions comprising of combined
A'X' and B'X' trials.
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(4) Combine A'X' and B'X' During this stage the Y-shape, zig-zag,
green and red appeared equally often in the centre window and the
subject was required to label the stimuli appropriately by saying
'Omni' or ' Delta' before pressing the wi.ndcw (see Figure 4. 12) • No
pranpting was given. If the subjects continued to label both Set-A
shapes and Set-B colours correctly within the same session then they
advanced to stage 5.
(5) Reduce reinforcement probability Reinforcement probability was
reduced in accordance with the procedures outlined in the General
Method section. Subjects were required to maintain criterion
r:erfonnance before prCXJressing further.
Alternative Route
( 1) 'X' A Training On' X I A trials, subjects were required to select
8et-A shapes conditional upon Set-X words spoken by the experimenter
(see Figure 4. 13) • When the experirrent.er said I Crm.i' reinforcers were
cnntingent upon choosing the Y-shape, and when the experinenter said
'Delta' reinforcers were contingent upon choosing the zig-zag.
Subjects were given the following instructions prior to their first
session of 'X'A training:
'This time you will not see anything come on here' (experimenter
po.int.s to centre window). I Instead, I will tell you which one to
choose. When you hear the beep, get ready and listen carefully. I
wi11 say a word. When I have said the word I want you to press this
windON (experiIrenter points to centre window) and then choose the right
one. I
236
Figure 4.13 Relations taught during 'X' A training. Arrows point
from sample words, dictated by the experimenter, to corresponding
compari.son shapes.
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Shortly after the beep indicated the start of the trial, the
experimenter said either 'Omni' or 'Delta' according to a pre-
detennined random sequence recorded in advance on a printed sheet.
Nothing happened if the subject pressed the centre window before the
experirrenter said the word. If the subject failed to respond after the
word was dictated then the word was repeated. If a response was still
not forthcoming then the experimenter repeated the word again and then
told the subject to press the centre window. A single press to the
blank sample produced the set-A comparisons. If the subject failed to
choose a comparison the experirrenter said, 'Now choose the right one.'
From tine to tine during the intertrial interval, the experimenter
said:
'Rerre.mber to listen to what I say. I will tell you which one to
choose. '
As the subjects became familiar with the procedure, prompting was
reduced until it was no longer necessary. Eventually, all three
subjects waited for the experirrenter to say 'anni' or ' Del ta' before
first pressing the blank sample and then choosing the comparison.
Jessica quickly learned the 'X'A relation, but Linda and Sara R. did
not. The latter pair were therefore transferred to the main route (see
above) while Jessica continued to the next stage.
(2) AS Training (resurred) Jessica was returned to the AS baseline
for t\\D sessions, but her performance did not improve as a function of
learning the 'X'A relation.
(3 ) Train' X' B This was identical to 'X' A training except the Y-
shape was replaced with a green comparison and the zig-zag was replaced
with red. So, the subject was required to select green when the
239
Figure 4. 14 Relations taught during' X'B training. Arrows point
from sample words, dictated by the experimenter, to corresponding
comparlson colours.
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Figure 4.15 Relations maintained in sessions comprising of combined
'X'A and 'X'B trials.
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experimenter said 'Omni' and red when he said 'Delta' (see Figure
4.14).
(4) Combine 'X'A and 'X'B Either Set-A shapes or Set-B colours
appeared equally often as comparisons, and the Subject was required to
select the comparison which corresponded to the word "Onni ' or 'Delta'
dictated by the experimenter (see Figure 4. 15) . If criterion
performance was maintained then the subject advanced to the next stage.
(5) Reduce reinforcement probability (see above).
Test Procedure
AB and BA Tests After completing training, all subjects received
both AB and BA test trials. Testing was conducted in extinction i
correct and incorrect responses were followed by the intertrial
interval only, and neither tokens nor tones were delivered (see General
Methcrl section).
The BA trials, which had never been presented prior to testing,
were the symmetrical counterparts of the AB trials. On BA trials, red
or green appeared as samples and the Y-shape and zig-zag were
comparisons.
In general, the subjects were given equal numbers of AB and BA
trials. However, in some cases the subject's performance warranted
ITDre BA. than AB trials (see Results).
In addition, subjects were pranpted to label the sample if they
did not do so spontaneous1y . The initial prompts were general i when
the sample appeared the experimenter asked the subject to 'say what it
is' . If this failed to induce commn labelling of the samples then a
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nore specific prompt; was given; an further test sessions the subject
was asked, 'Is it Cmni. or Delta?' when the sample appeared.
Testing was continued until the subject was correct on at least
six consecutive trials per trial-type (sample - comparison
oombination) .
Naming Tests Each subject received at least one naming test during
the course of the exper.irrent.. Set-A shapes and Set-B colours were
presented one at a tirre in the centre window and verbal responses were
elicited fran the child in accordance with the procedures outlined in
the General Method section.
RESULTS
TRAINING RESULTS
AB Training All subjects failed to learn the AB relation. Table
4.19 lists the number of trials each subject received for each
intervention during AB training, and, where necessary, further detail
appears below.
(a) Fading
The fading proqranme was administered to all subjects but
with no effect. Five of the subjects (Francis, Linda, Michael P.,
Nicola and Stephen ) never even learned the presumably simple skill of
colourmatching, upon which the success of the fading progranune
depended. In contrast, both Jessica and Sara R. matched the colours
fram the start of their first fading session, and Alex began to do so
in his third session. All three children continued to match correctly
up to and including the Penultimate fading step, on which the sample
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Table 4.19 Number of trials per AB intervention for each subject
in Experiment 4(a) •
AB INTERVENTION
I II III IV V VI VII 'IDrAL CP
ALEX 245 33 27 48 353 133
FRANCIS 96 96 0
JESSICA 421 96 101 120 738 260
LINDA 254 240 96 96 686 151
MICHAEL P. 252 48 48 48 396 75
NICOLA 207 207 159
SARA R. 258 48 99 168 573 187
STEPHEN 283 93 144 134 654 303
KEY I = Fading
II = Increased intertrial interval
III = Sample schedules
IV = Delayed cueing
V = Reward reduction
VI = Instructions
VII = Standard AB trials
CP = Number of trials from total which
were subject to correction procedures.
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colour cue was at its smallest. However, on the final step of fading
no sample colour cue appear-ed (i.e. the trial was a normal AB matching
trial), and the subjects' responding fell to chance level. The
breakdown of Performance at the final step of a fading program 1S a
ubiquitous problem which has been noted elsewhere (see Tennant, Cullen
and Hattersley (1981) for a review).
(b) Delayed cueing
The delayed cueing trial s were thwarted by three of the four
subjects who received them. On the majority of trials Alex, Michael P.
and Stephen managed to secure reinforcers simply by waiting for the
incorrect canparison to disappear before selecting the one remaining
(correct) comparison. Michael P. did this on all 48 trials in which
the cueing interval (i.e. the time between comparison presentation and
rerroval of the incorrect choice) was 1 second. Over the course of 48
trials with cueing intervals of 1 and 2 seconds, Alex had only three
trials on which he responded prior to the rerroval of the incorrect
comparison, and he got all three wrong! Stephen had 93 delayed cueing
trials with intervals ranging from 0 to 10 seconds. He waited for the
incorrect canparison to disappear on all but three of the trials, and
got two of these wrong.
In contrast to the others, Linda received 240 delayed cueing
trials with cueing intervals fran 0 to 1.2 seconds, and on 95 of these
she responded before the incorrect compar1son was scheduled to
disappear. UnfortunateI y, her perfonnance on these normal AB matching
trials remained at or around chance level.
(c) Reward reduction
Removing tokens for incorrect responses did not affect either
Michael's or Stephen's matching Performance, although they did
become generally reluctant to participate further. This problem
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disappeared when reward reduction was subsequently dropped.
(d) Sample schedules
Both Alex and Michael were required to press the sample five
tirres to produce the comparisons, but this tended to decrease rather
than increase the degree to which they looked at the sample. Both
subjects tended to start pressing and then continued to press while
looking at other things in the room. As a consequence, they often
pressed the sample longer than was necessary before realising that the
compari.sons had appeared.
(e) Correction
All subjects except Francis received correction at some stage
of AB training. During correction, incorrect responses produced repeat,
trials untii the subject was correct. Correction was introduced in an
attempt to disrupt strong preferences for one or other comparison. For
example, Linda began her first AS matching session· by choosing the red
comparison 16 times in the first 18 trials. Correction was then
introduced, which forced her to eventually select the green canparison
in order to secure a reinforcer. Al though effective in disrupting
comparison preference~, correction did not promote acquisition of ·the
AB relation. The problem was that whilst weakening straightforward
comparison preferences, correction simultaneously reinforced other
equally undesirable comparison-based response tendencies. For example,
Linda shifted fran exclusively choosing the red comParison to adopting
a win-staY/lose-shift strategy i.e. she selected one comparison until
incorrect arid then shifted to the other conpari.son , Linda also spent
distinct periods choosing red on one trial and then green on the next,
al ternating thereafter. Both win-stayIlose-shift and altemation are
actually encouraged by the reinforcerrent contingencies imposed during
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correction.
To recap, all subjects failed to learn AB matching within the
number of trials allotted (Francis received 96 trials, Nicola 207, Alex
353, Michael P. 396, Sara R. 573, Stephen 654, Linda 686, and Jessica
738). Subsequently, all subjects except Jessica followed the main
route to testing (see Procedure). Linda and Sara also began the
alternative route along with Jessica, but were later transferred to the
rnain route. For ease of exposition, the results fran each route are
presented separately.
Main Training Route
( 1) Train A' X' In generaI, the A' X' relation was learned extremeI y
quickly. Four subjects needed only 48 trials or less to learn to
label the shapes to criterion (Sara required 27 trials, Stephen 36,
Linda 44, and Alex 48). 'J.W) others needed just over one session to
learn (Nicola needed 56 trials and Michael 76). In contrast, Francis
required 210 trials to learn this relation. He appeared to have
particular difficulty remembering what words to say, and he therefore
required a great deal of prompting from the experinenter. When Francis
was not forthcoming with a label for the shape, the experimenter
assisted by asking 'Is it Cmni. or Delta?' By the final session of A'X'
training Francis no longer needed pranpting.
Despite Francis's difficulty, it seems clear that these children
find sorre conditional relations harder to learn than others. None of
the children learned the AB relation involving purely visual stimuli,
but all of them learned A'X', which related visual stimuli to verbal
responses.
(2 ) AB Training (reswred ) Having learned to label the Set-A shapes,
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the subjects were returned to the AB matching task. This raised two
questions. Firstly, would they continue to label the Set-A shapes when
presented as samples on matching trials? Secondly, if so, would this
help them to learn the AB relation? Several experiments have shown
that responding differentially to the samples can facilitate learning
of matching tasks (e.g. Urcuioli, 1985).
All of the subjects except Linda and Sara spontaneously labelled
the sample shapes with the Set-X words 'Ornni' and ' Delta' . However,
only Nicola apparently benefited from this differential labelling; she
reached criterion after only 48 AB trials with sample labelling. The
four others were each given 96 AB trials,· but their scores did not
improve as a function of spontaneously labelling the samples.
Only Sara and Linda failed to label the samples upon return to the
AB matching trials. This absence of labelling was not caused by a
failure to remember the words, because both subjects labelled the
shapes correctly when their A'X' performance was subsequently reviewed
(Sara's A'X' review came immediately after the first of two AB
sessions, whereas Linda's was given after the second AB session).
Since both \'Jere caPable of labelling the samples, but were not doing so
spontaneously, they were given further AB trials during which they were
pranpted to label the samples (see Procedure). The pranpting proved
successful; both children correctly labelled the samples fran this
po.int; on. The labelling produced no change an Linda's AB perfonnance,
but Sara's behaviour changed dramatically. Her AB score rose to 77%
after the first short 26 trial session with pranpting, and to above 80%
on the second session with pranpting rerroved. Sara's verbal behaviour
during the prompted session was revealing, and the session itself
illustrated some peculiar difficulties with respect to the
reinforCEment contingencies. These points are best seen in relation to
250
the transcript of the prompted session, which is presented in Table
4.20. Sara began the session by making no errors on the first 8
trials, and she also labelled the sample correctly before choosing the
correct comparison. Furthermore, on trial 7 she expressed a rule
linking colour to shape by saying, 'The Red's the Delta, isn't it?'
However, one trial later, on trial 9, Sara showed slgns of
becoming confused. The Y-shape appeared and she incorrectly called it
'Delta'; she then proceeded to choose the .red comparison in accordance
with the rule she had expressed on the preceding trial. Her choice was
incorrect, and at the end of the trial she said she was getting
confused. In ret.rospect , her confusion should . have come as no
surprise because on incorrect trials there were two ways in which she
could interpret the outcome. Firstly, she could think she was wrong
because she had perhaps labelled the sample incorrectly.
Alternatively, she could attribute her error not to an incorrect sample
label but to an incorrect choice of comparison. Sara apparently
believed her error on trial 9 was caused by an incorrect choice of
compari.son , On trial 9 she adopted her rule - the Red is the Delta -
and got the trial wrong, so on the next tv..u trial s she chose green
after calling the sample 'Delta' and also said, 'The Green is the
Del ta' and 'The Red is the Cmn.i ". Failure on trial 9 had apparently
led Sara to m::xiify her verbal rule.
Since Sara's confusion appeared to stem from not knowing the
source of her error on any given trial, then it seemed likely that one
could resolve her confusion by indicating the source. So, from trial
12 onwards, the procedure was deliberately modified so that if the
sample was labelled incorrectly then sample presses had no effect.
Sara had to label the sample correctly in order to produce the
comparisons , This change apparently he.lped, because for the next seven
trials, and despite several labelling errors, Sara stuck to the correct
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Table 4.20 Sara R's responses from the AB training sesslon in which
she was pranptErl to label the sample shapes with the words 'anni' or
'Delta'. Trials are listed consecutively, and for each trial the
sample is listed along with the verbalisations of the subject (8) and
the experimenter (E). In addition, sample and comparison presses are
indicated in relation to the subject's verbalisations, along with the
outcome of each trial (correct or incorrect comparison choice).
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Table 4.20
Trial
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Sample
y
z
z
y
y
z
z
y
y
z
Responses
E: 'Is it Omni or Delta?'
S: 'TI1at's the Omni, isn't it?
(presses sample and green
coITlpCirison)
E: 'Is it Omni or Delta?'
S: 'Delta'
(presses sample and red
coITlpCirison)
S: 'This is the Delta, isn't it?'
(presses sample and red
ooITlpCirison)
E: 'Is it Omni or Delta?'
S: 'Omni'
(presses sample and green
coITlpCirison)
S: 'I nearly said Delta!'
S: 'Omni'
(presses sample)
S: 'which is the Omni?'
(presses green ooITlpCirison)
S: 'Delta'
(presses sample and red
ooITlpCirison)
S: 'Omni isn't it? - No it's
not! Delta'
(presses sample and red
comparison
S: 'The red's the Delta, isn't it?'
S: 'Omni'
(presses sample and green
comparison)
S: 'Delta'
(presses sample and red
comparison)
S: 'I keep getting confused'
S: 'Delta'
(presses sample and green
comparison)
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Outcane
Corr
Corr
Corr
Corr
Corr
Corr
Corr
Corr
Inc
Inc
Table 4.20 (cont'd)
Trial· Sample
11 Z
Response
s: 'This one's the Delta. The
other one's the Cmni.,
(presses sample)
s: 'The green is the Delta,
isn't it?'
(presses green comparison)
s: 'The red is the Orrmi,
isn't it?'
NB: Procedure modified so that sample
press produces the comparisons only
if sample is labelled correctly.
outcane
Inc
12
13
14
15
16
y
y
Z
Z
y
s: 'Delta, this is, isn't it?'
(presses sample, but no effect)
s: 'Oh, it's the amni'
(presses sample, comparlsons
appear)
s: 'And that's red, isn't it?'
(presses red comparison)
s: 'It's the green, isn't it?'
s: "Orrm.i '
(presses sample, comparlsons
appear)
s: 'and the Onni is the Green,
isn't it?'
(presses green comparison)
s: 'Delta, this is. Delta is
the Red, isn't it?'
(presses sample, comparlsons
appear) ,
S: 'Delta'
(presses red comparison)
s: 'Qrnni this is, isn't it,
because the Green is the
amni, isn't it?'
(presses sample, no effect)
S: 'Delta'
(presses sample, comparisons
appear, presses red comparison)
s: 'This is the Green isn't it?
It's the amni'
(presses sample, comparisons
appear, presses green
canparison)
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Inc
Carr
Carr
Carr
Carr
Table 4.20 Ccont'd)
Trial
17 y
Response
s: 'This is the same word, isn't
it? Orrmi'
(presses sample, comparisons
appear, presses green
comparison)
Outcane
Corr
18 Z s: "Thi s is the Red, isn't it?
Delta. ,
(presses sample, comparlsons
appear, presses red
comparison) Carr
19
20
21
22
23
y
z
z
y
Y
S: 'The other one is the
Delta isn't it. That one's
the Green isn't it. What
name shall I give to this?
.....Onni '
(presses sample, comparlsons
appear, presses green
comparison)
NB: Revert to original contingency. All
sample presses produce ca~arisons.
S: 'This is the amni one'
(presses sample)
S: 'Green'
(presses green comparison)
S: 'The other one's the Green,
isn't it?'
S: 'Orrmi, this is isn't it?'
(presses sample)
S: 'Red, isn't it?'
(presses red comparison)
S: 'Orrmi'
(presses sample)
S: 'You press Red for that,
don't you?'
(presses red comparison)
S: 'You press the Green for
this, don't you? amni,
isn't it?'
(presses sample and green
comparison)
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Carr
Inc
Carr
Inc
Corr
Table 4.20 (cont'd)
Trial Sample Response Outcorre
24 Z S: 'Delta'
(presses sample)
S: 'You press the Red this
time, don't you?'
(presses red comparison) Corr
25 Y S: 'This is the Omni'
(presses sample)
S: 'and it's the green
isn't it?'
(presses green comparison) Corr
26 Z s: 'Delta'
(presses sample)
S: 'The Delta's the Red'
(presses red comparison) Corr
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form of the verbal rule, which she expressed on several occas.ions ('1.e.
she said 'Ornni is Green' and 'Green is the Omni' on trials 13 and 15
respectively, and on trial 14 she said 'Delta is the Red'). The effect
was finally confirmed by reverting to the original contingency on trial
20, when once again the comparisons were produced even when Sara
labelled the sample incorrectly. On trial 20, Sara incorrectly said
'Omni' to the zig-zag sample and then proceeded to choose the green
comparison in accordance with her verbal rule. Now Sara probably
assumed that she had labelled the sample correctly, rather than
incorrectly, because her subsequent sample press produced the
compar1sons, and incorrect labels had prevented the sample from
appearing on previous trials. She therefore had good reason to assume
that she was wrong on trial 20 because of an incorrect choice of
oompar1son. If her incorrect comparison choice was determined by the
verbal rule 'Ornni is Green' then one wouId predict she would change the
rule yet again to ' Omni is Red', but continue to label the samples
incorrectly. This is exactly what happened on the next trial (trial
21). As predicted, Sara again lab2lled the zig-zag sample incorrectly
with the vvord 'Omni' but this tine chose the red comparison, and so, by
default, she got the trial right! On the next trial, after saying
'Omni' in the presence of the sample, and before selecting a comparison
she said, 'You press Red for that don't you?', and then chose red.
Once again she was incorrect, and once again this pranpted her to
change the rule. On trial 23 a Y sample was presented and before
pressing the sample she said:
'You press the Green for this, don't you? amni, isn't it?'
and then, after correctly choosing green she said:
'The other one 1S Red, so the other one 1S Delta. '
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On the last three trials, Sara Labe l l ed the sample correctly and
chose the correct comparison, and on the first two of these she
labelled the correct ccmpari son prior to selecting it. She ended the
session on trial 26 by announcing the correct verbal rule 'Delta is
Red' prior to ch<X>sing the red comparison.
Reading the transcript leaves one in little doubt that Sara's
verbal behavi.our , in the fonn of a rule linking sample to corresponding
comparison, was guiding her choice of comparison stimulus and that, in
addition, the rule was extremely sensitive to both the changes in, and
the effects of, the reinforcement contingencies.
In the next session, Sara's score on AB matching trials rose to
criterion levels, but she did not overtly label the samples or
verbal ise any rules. No further pranpting was given, because she was
responding correctly anyway, and further prompting at that stage may
have constrained future experbnental manipulations (e.g. if Sara failed
her subsequent synmetry test and also failed to label the samples, one
could then pranpt sample labelling to see what effect, if any, this
might have on her test performance).
'Ib recap, both Nicola and Sara learned the AB relation at this
stage, and so proceeded to stage 5 to prepare for testing. The five
other children failed to learn AB and therefore went on to the next
stage.
(3) Train B'X' Linda required 96 trials (two sessions) to learn to
Iabel green with the word 'Ornni' and red with the word 'Delta'. All
the other children learned the B'X' relation within one 48 trial
session.
(4) Combine A'X' and B'X' Canbining the A'X' and B'X' trials
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randanly within the sarre sessron did not affect the subjects' Labe l l iriq
parformances , By the end of this pericrl, all five rerraining subjects
\\ere labelling the Y-shape and green stimuli with the canrron 1ate1
'Ornni " and zig-zag and red with the comrron labe1 ' Delta ' .
(5 ) Reduce reinforcement probabil i ty Onl y one subject, Sara, was
affected by the removal of reinforcement from training trials. Her AB
score dropped slightly below criterion but recovered one session later
to 100% correct.
Summary Seven subjects followed the main training route to testing.
Five of these (Alex, Francis, Linda, Michael P. and Stephen) had
failed to learn the AB relation, but had succeeded in learning to
produce commn labels for corresponding Set-A and Set-B stimuli. The
other two (Nicola and Sara) learned AB after learning to label the Set-
A samples.
Alternative Training Route
(1) 'X'A Training Both Sara and Linda failed to learn the 'X 'A
relation despite receiving 178 and 144 trials respectively, and were
subsequently transferred to the main training route (see above).
Jessica, however, needed only 80 trials to learn to select Set-A shapes
conditional upon the words 'Omni' and 'Delta' dictated by the
experirrenter. The rapid acquisition of this auditory-visual relation
contrasts sharply with her failure to learn the AB visual-visual
relation even after more than 700 trials.
(2) AB Training (resumed) After learning 'X'A, Jessica was given a
259
further 74 AB trials, but her AB score rermined at or around chance
level.
(3) Train 'X'B Jessica required only 15 trials to learn to select
the green comparison when the experimenter said 'Omni', and to choose
the red comparison when the experirrenter said ' Delta ' . She made no
errors.
(4) Combine 'X'A and 'X'B Jessica continued to respond
appropriately when the 'X'A and 'X'B trials were combined within the
same seSSlon. After 25 trials she was ready for testing, having made
no errors in the last 12 unreinforced trials.
Overall Summary of Training
Table 4.21 shows that each subject, prlor to testing, had
received a different number of AB training trials and a different
number of training trials in total. Trials were deliberately staggered
in order to prcx1uce a multiple baseline design across subjects. At the
end of training, two of the eight subjects, Sara and Nicola, had
learned the AB relation after learning to Iabe l the Set-A samples. For
these two subjects the AB trials formed a baseline which could be
assessed for sYmmetry in subsequent test sessions. The other six
subjects had failed to learn the AB relation during training. Of these
six, five had learned to produce common Set-X larels to the Set-A and
Set-B stimuli, as depicted in Figure 4.12. The ranaining subject,
Jessica, had not learned to produce common larels but rather to select
8et-A and Set-B comparisons conditional upon common labels dictated l2Y
the exper~nenter, as depicted in Figure 4.15.
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Table 4.21 Number of trials per training task for each subject ln
Experirrent 4(a) .
Subject Training Task
AB A'X' B'X' 'X'A 'X'B 'IOTAL
ALEX 449 76 52 577
FRANCIS 192 220 34 446
JESSICA 812 92 28 932
LINDA 782 92 120 144 1138
MIQIAEL P. 492 124 96 712
NICOLA 255 56 311
SARA R. 781 72 178 1031
STEPHEN 750 60 60 870
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TEST RESULTS
The test results for the SlX subjects who had failed to learn the
AB relation are examined first, and are depicted in Figure 4. 16. Each
bar represents the overall test score for a particular trial-type. AB
trial-types appear to the left of BA. The dotted line represents an
overall criterion level of 90% correct responses per trial-type. The
shading depicts those matching-to-sample trials on which common Set-x
labels were correctly applied to the Set-A and Set-B samples. So the
four subjects at the top of Figure 4. 16 gave carnron labels to the
samples right from the start of testing. On AB trials they labelled
the Y - shape with the word ' O:mi ' and the zig-zag with the word
'Delta', and on BA trials they labelled the green sample with 'O:mi'
and the red sample with' Delta ' . However, Linda and Jessica, the two
subjects at the bottom of Figure 4. 16 did not begin by applying
comron labels to the samples, as depicted by the absence of shading.
Initially, COIllIDn labelling was absent and their performance on both AB
and BA was at or around chance level or 50% correct. So, both Linda
and Jessica, in the absence of common labelling, had failed the tests.
\Jessica had failed even though at this stage she could select Set-A
shapes and Set-B colours conditional upon common labels spoken by the
experi.Jrenter. For Jessica then, the nere experience of hearing comron
labels, distinct from producing them herself, was apparently
.
insufficient for mediating the emergence of the AB and BA relations. ~
Both Linda and Jessica did eventually join the others in prcx:1ucing
eomron labels, when in subsequent tests the two girls were prompted
with the question, , Is it Onrii or Delta?' when the. samples appeared.
This prompting is represented in Figure 4. 16 by the vertical column
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Figure 4. 16 Overall test scores (percentage of correct responses) on
AB and BA trial-types for the six subjects in· Experirrent 4(a) who
failed to learn AB matching prior to testing.
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enclosing the text 'cornman labelling intervention'. Now all six
subjects were applying cannon labels to the samples. The critical
question is what; happened to the test performance when the subjects
applied common labels to the samples? First of all, and what one will
not notice from Figure 4. 16 is that both the AB and BA relations
eventually emerged when all six subjects applied common labels. By the
end of this phase of testing, subjects were making no errors on any of
the test trial-types; in fact testing under common labelling was
continued until each subject was correct on six consecutive trials p=r
trial-typ=. So, each shape and its corresponding colour had becane
equivalent through the subjects' common Set-X labels. Common labelling
of the samples by the subjects was sufficient for mediating the
anergence of the AB and BA relations.
Although both the AB and BA relations had ccmpletel y errerged by
the end of this test phase, Figure 4.16 actually represents each
subject's performance throughout and not just at the end of each test
phase. The figure shows that, taken overall, the BA scores were better
than the AB scores for five of the six subjects. The subjects overall
scores on AB trial-typ=s tended to fall short of the 90% criterion
line, whereas their overall scores on BA trial-typ=s tended to be above
criterion. Figure 4. 17 shows each subject's performance over the
first 48 trials of testing (each bar represents the first 12 trials p=r
trial-typ=) . Inspection of Figure 4. 17 confirms that the difference
between AB and BA test p=rformance was most pronounced particularly in
the initial stages of the test phase.
So there were two main findings. Firstly, common labels produced
by the subjects resulted in the emergence of both the AB and BA
relation. Secondly, although both relations emerged as a function of
cornman labelling, BA emerged prior to AB for all subjects except
Stephen, who scored 100% correct on both.
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Figure 4.17 Initial AB and BA scores from the first 48 trials of the
common labelling phase of testing, for each of the six subjects in
Experiment 4(a) who failed to learn AB prior to testing.
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Why did BA emerge prlor to AB? To find out one must examine how
the subjects' 1abel s he 1ped them to match the stimul i . Figure 4. 18
depicts the stimuli in question, and the relations between them. To
simplify matters a little it might be best to concentrate on one pair
of stimuli, for example, the Y-shape and green stimuli depicted at the
top of Figure 4.18 (of course, all of the following explanation also
applies to the other stimulus pair).
Let us consider the BA relation first since this emerged virtually
straight away when ccmron labelling was introduced. On BA trials,
subjects matched the green sample to the Y-shape comParison. How did
their labels help them to do this? Well, two things must happen.
First, when the green sample appears the subject must say 'amniI (i.e.
B'X'). Secondly, when the subject has said 'Omni' he must choose the Y
comparison (i.e. 'X'A). Matching green to Y then becomes a two-stage
process; B'X' and 'X'A, therefore BA. During testing, all the subjects
proved capable of B'X'; they all, for example, overtly labelled green
with the word 'Ormi' - their earlier training had established this
skill. But none of them had been taught the second stage, 'X'A; none
of them (not even Jessica) had been taught to say 'Omni' and then
choose the Y-shape. So, from where did this critical second component
emerge? The answer is from the A'X' relation, which had been
established by the subjects' earlier training. Somehow, when the skill
of labelling the Y-shape with the word 'Omni' was established, so too
was the potential for its symmetrical counterpart, saying 'Omni' and
then choosing the Y-shape. The subjects' earlier training had resulted
in the formation of symmetry between the Set-A shapes and the subjects'
spoken Set-X MJrds. Had it not done, then 'X'A would have been absent
during testing and the BA relation could not have emerged as a function
of the subjects' Set-X labels.
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Figure 4.18 Relations between Set-A shapes, Set-B colours and Set-x
words (spoken by the subjects). Black arrows represent relations
established prior to testing. Shaded arrows represent relations
assessed during tests (see text).
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The same analysis rray be applied to the AB relation. Although the
AB relation eventually errerged, it did not emerge straight away when
the subjects produced cannon labels. The AB relation was at first not
fully present. On AB trials, when the Y-shape appeared the subjects
overtly said 'Omni' but then having said 'Omni' they did not
consistently choose green. In other words the 'X'B relation was not
fully present at first. Although the subjects had learned, from their
earlier training, to label green by overtly saying 'Ornni' (B'X'), they
W2re not initially capable of doing the reverse - saying 'Onni' and
then choosing Green ('X'B). For some reason, the earlier establis.brrent
of B'X' had not resulted in the immediate formation of symmetry between
the Set-B colours and the subjects' spoken Set-X words.
So, the AB and BA rratching trials therefore provided a convenient
framework within which one could determine whether the A'XI and B' X'
relations were themselves symmetrical. The test results confirmed that
for five of the subjects, and for the most part of testing, the A'X'
relation was symmetrical but the B'X' relation was not. And there are
qocd reasons for this disparity. But in order to make sense of the
data, one needs to examine the subjects' labelling skills prior to
establishing the A' X' and B' X' relations. There were two sources of
information; firstly, the subjects' spontaneous naming monitored
throughout the exPeriment and secondly, their responses during naming
tests.
All five subjects who acquired BA prior to AB also spontaneously
labelled the colours with their conventional narres , 'Green' and 'Red',
prior to the establishment of A'X' and B'X'. None of the subjects,
however , consistently labelled the shapes with any other than the Set-X
lMJrds, either sp::mtaneously or during naming tests. During narrunq
tests, Jessica was the only one of these children to label the shapes
at all, but even then she labelled them inconsistently. She responded
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to the Y-shape by first say.inq 'I don't knCM1', and then on subsequent
trials she called it 'a stick with spikes' and 'a palm tree'. On
successive trials she called the zi.q-zaq a 'worm', a 'snake' and a
'caterpillar'. Jessica never gave a consistent name to the shapes. In
fact one could argue that she was not naming the shapes at all; rather
she appeared to be saying what they looked like (and it was interesting
to note that this descriptive tendency also extended to the colours
which she called 'blocks', despite spontaneous I y naming them 'Green'
and 'Red' during AB mat.chi.nq trials).
A knowledge of the subjects' pre-existing naming skills may be
crucial for understanding why labelling of the Set-A shapes was
governed by a symmetrical relation while at the same time labelling of
the Set-B colours was not. All five subjects already had names for
the Set-B colours; they used the conventional labels, 'Green' and
'Red'. It therefore seemed likely that these conventional labels were
somehow interfering with the fOrnBtion of symmetry between the colours
and the Set-x labels 'Omni' and 'Delta', and that this in turn
interfered with the emergence of AB during testing. In contrast, BA
emerged straight away, perhaps because the subjects had no other names
for the Set-A shapes prior to labelling them with the Set-X words. The
A'X' training, free of any interference from pre-existing names, could
then resul t in the forrrat.ion of syrmetry between each shape and its
corresponding Set-X word.
Further evidence of the interfering effect of the conventional
colour names comes from a more detailed examination of each subject's
behaviour during testing. But before presenting this data it might be
worthwile reflecting upon the results presented so far.
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PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION
Although both the AB and BA relations emerged after all SlX
subjects applied common labels, BA emerged prior to AB in all but one
case. This in turn showed that the Set-X words 'ami' and 'Delta',
spoken by the subjects, were syrrmetrically related to the Set-A shapes
but not to the Set-B colours (at least not until the last fEW trials
of testing). A symmetrical relation is bi-directional, and bi-
directiopality, as was outlined in the introductory chapters, has often
been proposed as a defining property of symbolic behaviour (see Bates,
1976; Devany, Hayes and Nelson, 1986). This notion may be applied to
the results of the present experiment. Given that the relation between
the Set-X words and Set-A shapes was bi-directional, one has grounds
for claiming that the subjects were behaving symbolically when they
labelled the shapes with the words 'Omni' and 'Delta'. However,
al though the subjects applied the same words to the Set-B colours it
seemed that, in so doing, they were not behaving symbolically, because
the B'X' relation was not initially bi-directional.
The argument may be taken one step further by proposlng that
naming is itself a symbolic skill and as such may be defined in terms
of bi~irectionality. A defining characteristic of a namlng response
nay be that it is a response which is symrretrically related to its
~
controlling stimulus. Proof of naming would require the formation of
two symmetrically related components; not only must a particular
stimulus control the subject's verbal response but also the subject's
verbal response must exert control over his choice of that particular
stimulus.
Traditionally, psychologists have struggled to define the
essential characteristics of naming. Attempts have often ended up not
by defining what naming is, but rather by defining what it is not (see,
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for example, Lock, 1980). There appears to be widespread agreement
over what does not qua lify as naming. Terms 1ike paired associate,
pure performative and condi tiona 1 discrimination all refer to
discriminative responding which bears a fonral resemblance to naming
but lacks the necessary symbolic relevance normally reserved for the
term. Most of us recognise that, for example, a pigeon is not
necessarily naming a stimulus to which it is responding differentially.
Something other than this is required for naming, but when it carnes to
saying what this other property might be, talk tends to becorre vague or
circular, and often naming becomes defined in terms of other equally
elusive conceptual terms. What is needed is a definition of naming in
terms of behaviourally specifiable events. Given that naming is a
symbolic skill, and given that symbolic behaviour has been defined 1n
terms of behaviourally specifiable properties such as symmetry, it 1S
perhaps surprising that, to date, no one has explicitly defined naming
as a kind of stimulus-response symmetry.
There is a certain face-validity in adopting this definition with
respect to the current data. The words 'Orrmi' and 'Delta', spoken by
the subjects, were found to be bi-directional I y related to the Set-A
shapes. According to the above definition, the subjects weren't just
saying ,Onni' in the presence of the Y - shape and' DeI ta ' in the
presence of the zlg-zag; 1n so doing they were also naming the shapes.
The same v..Drds, however, for five of the six subjects and for the IIDSt
part of testing, were not symmetrically related to the Set-B colours.
In other words, these five subjects were not initially naming the
co l ours with the words 'Omni' and 'Delta I; they were merely saying
those words in the presence of the colours (presumably because they
already had other 'conventional' names for them). However, by the end
of testing the subjects were, according to the definition, namlng the
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colours as well as the shapes with the words 'Omni' and 'Delta', thus
enabling the stimuli to become fully equivalent.
Other evidence of an independent nature support-s, the vi.ew that the
subjects were naming the shapes but not the colours with the Set-x
words 'Ormi' and 'Delta'. This evidence will now be examined in the
context of a detailed analysis of each individual subject's test
results (including those from Sara and Nicola which have yet to be
examined) •
Francis
Francis produced what was perhaps the most revealing test data.
'Ihe left side of Figure 4. 19 shows his performance on the first 36
test trials, during which he scored above criterion on BA trials
and at chance level on AB , despite having received twice as many AB
than BA. trials. This, then, indicated that he was narru.nq the shapes
but not the colours as 'Omni' and 'Delta' (where naming is defined as
symmetry between stimuli and corresponding labels). This claim 1S
supported by the manner in which he labelled the stimuli. Francis,
unlike any other subject in this group, spontaneously labelled the
cornpari.sons as well as the samples. He began each trial by labelling
the sample and pressing it to prcx1uce the comparisons. He then moved
his finger over to one of the canparisons and labelled that too, aqam
prior to pressing it. Francis always labelled the Set-A shapes
consistently, irrespective of whether they appeared as samples on AB
trials or as comparisons on BA trials. In each case he called the Y -
shape an 'Omni' and the zig-zag a 'Delta'. However, his labelling of
the Set-B colours was far from consistent. On the BA trials, the
colours appeared as samples and he said 'Omni' to the green and 'Delta I
to the red, exactly as he had been taught to do prior to testing. But
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Figure ·4. 19 Francis's test performance. The figure depicts the
percentage of correct responses for each trial-type. The stimuli for
each trial-type are placed at the bottom of the bars. Sample stimuli
are placed above compar.isons and a line connects each sample to it's
corresponding comJ?Cl.rison. The number directly below each bar depicts
the number of trials which that bar represents. The group of bars to
the left depict Francis's performance prior to a computer malfunction
and those to the right depict his performance after testing was resumed
(see text).
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when green and red appeared as ccmperi son., on AB trials, Francis no
longer called them 'Omni' and 'Delta' but gave them their conventional
narres instead.
So, it seemed that on BA trials Francis was able to select the
correct comparison because the label he gave to the sample just
happened to correspond with his label for that comparison. This
correspondence was absent on AB trials. On AB trials the sample latel
bore no relation to the conventional labels which Francis spontaneously
assigned to the corrparison colours. His perfonnance on the AB trials
remained at chance level perhaps because the sample label did not
provide a basis for choosing any fXl-rticular comfXl-rison.
Francis's behaviour therefore supports the view that although he
was able to say 'Omni' to the green sample and ' Delta' to the red he
did not consider these words as being names for the colours. He
already had conventional names for the colours prior to B'X' training.
The data suggests that he was simply saying 'Omni' to the green sample
and 'Delta' to the red in order to satisfy the requirements imposed by
the experimenter. No such constraints were imposed upon the latelling
of the cornpa.risons, so when green and red appeared as comparisons on AB
test trials Francis was free to label them with their conventional
nanes. Indeed, this appears to be one way in which the subjects' pre-
existing colour names may interfere with the 'Omni' and 'Delta' labels
in their intended roles as common mediators of stimulus equivalence. It
also shows that although the procedures establish common labelling with
respect to stimuli in the sample position, this does not necessarily
guarantee comrron labelling of the stimuli when they later appear in
different locations, as comparisons.
However, Francis's behaviour during testing was consistent with
the notion that he considered the words ' Omni' and 'Delta' to be nanes
for the shapes. On BA trials, when the shapes appeared as compari sons ,
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he continued to label them 'Omni' and 'Delta' despite the fact that
there was nothing implicit in the trials to constrain him to do so.
Unfortunately, a computer malfunction brought his initial test
session to a premature halt. When the session was resumed, Francis
labelled both the shapes and the colours consistently with the words
'Omni' and 'Delta', and his perforrranos on the AB trials rose above the
overall criterion in line with his BA score (see the right-hand side of
Figure 4.19). Just why he began to respond correctly upon resumption
of testing will, of course, remain a matter for SPeculation. One
poss.ib.iLi.ty is that the sudden halt in testing was somehow construed by
Francis as a cue that he had been doing something wrong, which may have
in turn provoked a search for alternative forms of responding.
Linda
Linda's testing went through three distinct phases, only the last
of which was characterised by common labellirig of the samples. In the
first phase of 48 test trials, labelling of both the Set-A and Set-B
samples was absent, and both AB and BA matching was at chance level.
On the next 48 trials, when the sample apPeared the experimenter asked
her to say what it was. The effect of these pranpts on sample
labelling and subsequent comparison choice is shewn in Table 4.22.
Let us first examine the sample labels which were elicited by the
pranpting (see the left-hand column of Table 4.22). On AB trials, the
sample shapes were labelled entirely consistently; the Y - shape was
always called 'amnii and the zig-zag was always called 'Delta'.
However, on BA trials, when the colours were samples, Linda did not
always label rhem as 'ami' and 'Delta'. Instead, in the majority of
BA trials she labelled the sample colours with their conventional
names, 'Green' and 'Red'. Clearly then, there was already SDme
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Table 4.22 sample Iabe l s produced by Linda during her second AB and
PA test phase (the colwnn on the far right shows to what deq ree each
sample Iabel controlled her subsequent comparison choice (see text).
Trial-Type Sample Label Number of tiID2s
prcduced
Number of correct
comparison choices
following sample
label
Y - G Y ami 12 7
Z - R Z Delta 12 6
G - Y G Green 9 3
Onni 2 2
D2lta 1 0
R - Z R Red 9 4
D2lta 3 3
280
indication that the words 'Omni' and 'Delta' were Linda's narres for the
shapes but not the colours. These suspicions were sUpPJrted by the
degree to which her sample labels controlled her ccmpari son choices
(see the right-hand side of Table 4.22). On AB trials, Linda's 'Omni'
or 'Delta' Iabel did not control her subsequent choice of compari son
colour. So, although she occasionally labelled the colours as "Cmni '
or 'Delta' on BA trials (thus showing that the B'X' relation was to
sorre extent present), she could not, at this stage, do the reverse _
she could not choose the colours according to her 'Ormi' and 'Delta'
labels (i.e. 'X'B was absent). The words were not symmetrically
related to the colours, so, according to the definition advanced
earlier, Linda was not naming the colours with those words. A
different picture emerges from the BA trials. In the majority of BA
trials Linda labelled the sample colours with their conventional names,
'Green' and 'Red'. These conventional labels had no control over her
subsequent choice of compari son shape. However, on a few occasions
Li.ndaTabel l ed the colours with the words 'Ormi' and 'Delta' as she had
been trained to do prior to testing. On three occasions she correctly
said 'Delta' an the presence of the red sample, and on two trials she
correctly said 'Omni' in the presence of the green sample. Most
.import.ant; of all, when she said 'Omni' to the green sample and 'Delta'
to the red she always proceeded to choose the correct compa.rison shape.
Even at this stage then, the words 'Qnni' and 'Delta' appeared to be
symmetrically related to the Set-A shapes (i.e. those words were
apparently acting as names for the shapes). On AB trials the Set-A
shapes (Y and zig-zag) controlled the Set-X words ('Omni' and 'Delta'),
and on BA trials the reverse applied; the Set-X words controlled her
choice of the Set-A shapes. The only reason BA did not emerge at this
po.int; appears to be because the Set-B colours were not consistently
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labelled with the Set-X words.
'Ib recap, comrron latelling of the samples was rrostly absent during
Linda's first two phases of testing and neither the AB or BA relation
Emerged. Her scores over the first two phases were combined to produce
her left-hand group of bars in Figure 4.16.
m her final phase of testing Linda was prompted with the question
'Is it Omni or Delta?' when the sample appeared. This prompt
successfully established comrron labelling of the samples; Linda said
'Ormi' to both the Y - shape and green samples, and 'Delta' to both the
zig-zag and red samples. Consistent latelling of the colour samples
(B'X') coupled with her pre-existing ability to select the correct
shape conditional upon the latel ('X'A) resulted in above criterion
performance on BA trials. Linda's performance on the AB trials,
however, remained below criterion until the last few trials of testing.
Although she was labelling the sample shapes correctly (A'X'), those
latels did not immediately exert control over her choice of comparison
colour (i.e. 'X'B was initially absent). The absence of 'X'B therefore
prevented the irrrrrediate formation of the AB relation, and confi nred
that she was still not naming the colours with the Set-X words.
However, by the end of testing, the AB relation had fully e.rrerged.
Sanehow, .m the intervening period the Set-X words had acquired the
function of names for the colours. Future investigations may focus on
this critical transition period in order to gain a better understanding
of what might be contributing to the change from mere stimulus
latelling to actual stimulus naming.
Jessica
Jessica, like Linda, also failed to give common labels to samples
In her initial series of test sessions. Her left-hand group of bars in
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Figure 4.16 shows her overall test performance without common
labelling. These unshaded bars actually represent the combined scores
from several distinct phases, outlined below.
Jessica was the only subject not to receive A'X' and B'X' training
prior to the test. She learned the 'X'A and 'X'B relations instead, as
depicted in Figure 4. 15. When the experimenter said 'Omni' she chose
the Y - shape or green comparison, and when he said 'Delta' she chose
the zrq-zaq or red comparison. Jessica was never required by the
experirrenter to label the stimuli. Her training had provided another
route via which the AB and BA. relations could emerge. The question was
had the 'X'A and 'X'B training allowed the words to function as names
for the corresponding shapes and colours? i.e. had the training
resulted in the formation of symmetry between the Set-X words and the
Set-A and Set-B stimuli? Only appropriate testing could determine the
answer.
During her first 48 test trials Jessica was presented with only
the AB and BA trial-types. Her performance remained at chance level.
Perhaps the pre-requisite 'X' A and 'X' B relations had been of
insufficient strength to mediate AB and BA matching so, subsequently,
the AB and BA trials were presented together with 'X'A and 'X'B.
Jessica made no errors on 24 'X' A and 24 'X' B baseline trials, but
despite this her performance on AB and BA remained at chance level (48
trials each). In addition, she hardly ever spontaneously labelled the
stimuli, apart from a few occasions when she called the colours by
their conventional names. She never once labelled the stimuli as
'Ornni' or·'Delta " either spontaneousI y or during a subsequent naming
test (see above). So although Jessica had learned to select shapes and
colours conditional upon a corrm:m label spoken by the experirrenter,
there was no evidence that she used the same words to narre the stimuli,
and the mer'e experience of hearing the comrmn labels, distinct from
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producing them herself, was apparently insufficient for mediating the
energence of the AS and BA relations.
Nevertheless, it was still possible that Jessica's 'X'A and 'X'B
training had created the potential for stirnulus naming, a potential
that might be realised under appropriate environmental conditions. So
Jessica was shown each shape in turn on the centre window and was asked
'Is it Omni or Delta?' No reinforcers were given during this stage.
This then appeared to be a specific test of A'X', the syrrrretrical
counterpart of the trained X'A' relation. Jessica received 21 trials
and ITBde no errors. When the Y - shape appeared she correctI y said
'Omni' and when zig-zag appeared she correctIy said 'Delta'. The A'X'
relation had apparentIy emerged from her earlier ' X'A training. At
this stage, then, the shapes appeared to be syrrrretrically related to
the Set-X words and thus they (the words) were acting as names for the
shapes. This symmetry was apparently not present before but had itself
energed within the highly contrived context of the A'X' test.
To find out the effect of this newly established naming skill on
Jessica's AS and BA performance, a further test was given. Once again
she scored 100% on 'X'A and 'X'B trials (4 trials each) but her AS and
BA score remained at chance level (8 trials each). But then there was
also a complete absence of labelling.
Because Jessica's 'X'A and 'X'B score had been perfect throughout,
and in an attempt to increase the rate at which AB and BA trials were
presented, a decision was taken to drop the 'X'A and 'X'B trials from
the test. In addition, sample labelling was further prorroted by
prompting Jessica to 'say what it is' when the sample appear'ed , Once
again this had little effect upon her ITBtching performance; her AB and
BA score fell below chance level over the 20 test trials. The prompt,
however, did have the effect of establishing consistent sample
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labelling. On AB trials, the Y sample was called 'anni' and the zrq-
zag was called ' Del ta ' . However, on BA trial s the green and r ed
samples were given their conventional names, 'Green' and 'Red'.
Jessica never overtly labelled the colours as 'Omni
'
or 'Delta', which
suggested that, thus far, those words were not functioning as narre s for
the colours. By now Jessica had received a grand total of 92 AB and
88 Bl\ test trials. 'IWJ factors had rerrained constant throughout the
variations in testing: her AB and BA performance r'emai.ned at chance
level and common labelling of the samples neveroccurred.
'Ib recap, the data so far suggested that Jessica was naming the
shapes but not the colours with the Set-X words. However , those words
had corre to function as nanes for the shapes by virtue of very specific
conditions, conditions which had not yet been appliErl to the colours.
So, in the final phase of testing Jessica was prompted with the
question 'Is it Omni or Delta?' when the shapes and the colours
appeared as samples on matching trials. So, on the first part of any
BA test trial, Jessica was required to label the Set-B colour sample
with a Set-X word; this was itself a specific test of B'X', the
syrnrretrical counterpart of the trained 'X' B relation. Under these
conditions, Jessica never labelled the colours incorrectly; on each BA
test trial she either labelled the green sample as 'Ornni' or the red
sample as 'Delta'. It now seemed as if Jessica was namlng the colours
with the Set-X words, because the emergence of B'X' itself indicated
syrnrretry of the trained 'X 'B r e l ation , a syrnnetry which had probably
Emerged by virtue of the specific context of prompting.
IvEanwhile on AB trials Jessica was also labelling the Set-A, , .
sample shapes with the appropriate Set-X word. So, in this final test
phase (depicted by the shaded bars in Jessica's portion of Figure
4. 16), prompting had elicited common labelling of the samples.
Furthermore, the very fact that Set-X labels emerged at all suggested
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that those labels were functioning as names for both shapes and
colours. However, all was not what it seemed. In this final phase of
testing,.the BA relation emerged straightaway whereas the AB relation
did not (see Jessica's portion of Figure 4.16). This in turn indicated
that although the Set-X words were acting as narres for the shapes, the
same words were not initially functioning as names for the colours (see
the Preliminary Discussion).
Jessica's data may appear to be inconsistent, but, upon
reflection, it need not be so. It seemed that Jessica was able to name
the colours prior to the final test phase, because the B'X' relation
had previously emerged. However, on B'X' trials the Set-B colours were
confined exclusively to one position, namely the sample position.
Perhaps, then, the process of naming was also confined to colours
appearing in the sample position, and thus did not extend to the same
colours when they appeared as comparisons. This account, although
sPeculative, is entirely consistent with Jessica's initial failure to
rratch on AB trials during the final phase of testing. On AB trials the
8et-x word (spoken by Jessica in response to the Set-A sample) did not
initially control her choice of comparison colour. Perhaps this
occurred because the colours were still not being named as 'Omni' and
'Delta' when they appeared 'out of position', as comparisons. Perhaps
the comparison colours were still being named (albeit covertly) as
'Green' and 'Red', thus preventing the "Onrri ' and 'Delta' labels from
assuming their intended roles as mediators on matching trials ( c.f.
Francis's data above).
Whatever the case, further investigation was precluded because by
the end of this final test phase (i.e. after 48 AB and 48 BA trials)
Jessica's AB matching performance had become completely error-free. At
that stage the Set-X words were functioning fully as names for both the
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shapes and the colours, regardless of the positions .in which these
stimul i appeared.
Alex
Figure 4.16 shows that Alex produced cannon labels throughout
testing and acquired the BA. relation prior to AB. Further detail
appears in Figure 4.20. The BA advantage emerged alrrost imrediately
as shown on the left-hand side of the figure. Again, the failure of AB
to emerge revealed that the words 'Ormi' and 'Del ta', spoken by Alex an
response to the Set-A samples, did not exert control over his choice of
Set-B colour (i.e. he was not narning the colours with the Set-X words).
This first test block was followed by what is commonly known as a
test of verbal canprehension. The subject was given the following
instructions prior to the test:
'This time you will not see anything cane on here' (experimenter
point.s to centre window). 'When you hear the beep, get ready and
listen carefully. I will say a word. When I have said the word I want
you to press this window (experirrenter points to centre window) and
then choose the right one.'
The Set-x words 'Omni' and 'Delta' were spoken by the experimenter
and Alex had to choose between the Set-A shapes on 'X'A trials and the
Set-B colours on 'X'B trials. Alex never made an error on any of the
24 unreinforced test trials.
The comprehension test had apparently set the occasi.on for the
emergence of the very skill which had been missing from Alex's earlier
AS and BA test performance, namely, choosing Set-B colours conditional
upon the Set-X words. Apparently, this 'X'B relation had itself
emerged from its symmetrical counterpart B'X', the labelling relation
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Figure 4.20 Alex's test performance. The group of bars to the left
depict his performance on AB and BA test trials prior to an 'X'A and
'X'B test, and those to the right depict his performance after the 'X'A
and test (see text).
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established through Alex's earlier training. The presence of symmetry
suggested that Alex was now capable of naming the colours with the set-
X words. The question was why should the requisite 'X' B relation
Emerge ill the context of a comprehension test and not in the context of
the preceding AB and BA. test?
One possible answer is that under comprehension testing the context
was more obviously 'instructional' than it was during AB and BA
testing. Under comprehension testing, several factors may have made it
more obvious to the subject that the comparison colours should be
selected conditional upon the Set-X words i.e. that the words were
rreant to instruct the subject to choose a particular colour. During
comprehension testing the exper.iment.er was saying the Set-X words,
whereas on AB and BA. test trials the subject said the words himself.
Since adults are an .irrport.arrt source of instructional control over
children's behaviour, one Perhaps should not be too surprised if a
child does not react to the instructional function of the Set-x words
when he himself produces them, but does react accordingly when they are
produced by the experirrent.er . Also, not only were the Set-X words
spoken by the expcr.irrent.er during comprehension testing but, because of
this, they were not preceded by the presentation of any associated
stimuli. However, on each AB and BA test trial the Set-X word was
preceded by an associated stimulus, i. e. the sample. Furthenmre, the
word was produced as a response to the sample and so it (the word) was
perhaps less likely to also act as a stimulus, instructing the subject
to choose a particular comparison. On comprehension trials, however,
the word was produced by the exper.irrerrter and so it would seem to have
no function for the child other than as a stimulus to which one should
respond accordingly. Finally, because the comprehension trials were of
a different structure to those previously presented, the subject was
given minimal instructions prior to testing (see above). Although
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minimal, these instructions may have alerted the subject to the
instructional function of the Set-x words. In particular, the
experimenter told the subject to 'listen carefully'. In contrast, the
AS and BA test was not preceded by any experimental instructions but
was simply presented as a "normal ' session.
Sane or perhaps even all of these factors may have contributed to
the emergence of 'x' B during Alex's comprehension test. Nevertheless,
the data so far suggested that although the Set-B colours and Set-X
words had not been symrretrically related on AB and BA test trials,
Alex's former B'X' training had created the potential for syrmetry, a
potential that remained unrealised until he was placed within the
unique context of the comprehension test.
When Alex was finally returned to the AB and BA test his resulting
behaviour was consistent with his new found skill. His AB performance
immediately rose to criterion for the first time, as depicted in the
right-hand group of bars in Figure 4.20.
Michael P.
Michael was also given an 'X' A and 'X' B comprehension test after
AS (but not BA) failed to emerge in his initial block of test trials
(see Figure 4.21 ). He, like Alex, made no errors on the comprehension
test. However, unlike Alex, Michael's AS score did not imrediately
improve after the comprehension test. The AB relation did finally
f t.i h 'X'A and 'X'B trials wereenerge in his last phase 0 tes r.nq w en
interspersed with the AB and BA trials. This suggests (but by no rreans
proves) that the emergence of AB may have been a consequence of the
interspersed comprehension trials.
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Figure 4.21 Michael P.' s test performance during three phases of
testing. The left-hand group of mrs depict his AB and BA score on the
first test phase, prior to an 'X'A and 'X'B test. The ~ddle group of
mrs depi.ct; his AB and BA scores from the second test phase following
an 'X'A and 'X'B test. The group of mrs to the far right depict his
AB and BA scores in the final test phase, when 'X'A and 'X'B test
trials were interspersed amongst the AB and BA test trials (see text).
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stephen R.
Of the SlX subjects under consideration, Stephen was the only one
to acqui.re AB and BA relations at the same rate. In fact, Figure 4. 16
sh<:JNS that he never once lffide an error during testing.
Stephen's behaviour was fundarrent.al Iy d!fferent from the others on
two additional counts. Firstly, he was the only subject to
spontaneously and consistently label the shapes prior to the
.int.rcduct.i.on of the words "Cmni ' and 'Delta'. On several occasions he
called the Y - shape a 'Y' and the zig-zag a 'Spring' as well as
calling the colours 'Green' and 'Red'. Spontaneous labelling lS of
parti.cular interest because it was central to understanding why
the five other subjects initially failed AB but passed EA. Their
data suggests that they failed AB because they already had names for
the Set-B colours, and that these names interfered with the formation
of symmetry between those colours and the Set-X words 'Ornni' and
'Delta'. The subsequent absence of the 'X'B relation prevented AB from
emerging via mediation of the 'Omni' and 'Delta' labels. Now, given
that Stephen had his <:JNI1 names for roth the colours and the shapes, and
qr.ven that test failure was associated with the prior existence of
names for the test stimuli, one would have perhaps predicted that
Stephen might fail the AB and BA tests. Instead, he passed.
The fact that he passed roth AB and BA may have been a consequence
of the way in which he labellErl the stimuli during A'X' and B'X'
training. Stephen, unl i.ke any other subject, spontaneously applied his
own labels to the stimuli as well as those required by the
exPerinenter. On A'X' trials he said 'Y - Om.i ' in the presence of the
Y _ shape, and 'spring - Delta' in the presence of the zig-zag. On
B'X' trials green was labelled 'Green - Omi ' and red was called 'Red -
Del ta ' . Stephen continued to label in this manner right the way
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through testing. It therefore seems that Stephen's data is not
inconsistent with that of the other subjects. His own labels seemed to
enhance rather than interfere with the mediating effects of the Set-x
labels. On AB and BA test trials, he always gave his own narre to the
sample first, followed by the corresponding Set-X label. If his own
labels pl.ayed a key role in the production of the mediating Set-x
labels then it is difficult to see how, at the' sane time, the forner
could interfere with the effects of the latter.
Sara and Nicola
Unlike the other children, both Sara and Nicola learned the AB
relation prior to testing. The BA trials therefore tested for
symmetry of the AB relation. Figure 4.22 shows that Sara passed the
symmetry test. Her perforrrance on the AB baseline trials and the BA
symmetry test trials was uniformly excellent throughout. She never
once spontaneously labelled any of the stimuli. However, ln a
subsequent naming test she gave common labels to the corresponding set-
A and Set-B stimuli; the Y - shape and the green were called 'Onni ' and
the zig-zag and red were called 'Delta'. This was rather surpr.rsinq
because, in sessions prior to testing, she had always called the
colours by their conventional nanes, while apparently reserving the
words 'Omni' and 'Delta' for the shapes. Furthermore, earlier
evidence suggested that her AB performance prior to testing was
governed by the verbal rules 'Ornni is Green' and 'Delta is Red'.
There are two alternative explanations for Sara's success on the
symmetry test, as illustrated in Figure 4.23 (N. B. this figure only
depicts one stimulus pair, namely the Y-shape and green stimuli,
although the following discussion applies equally to the other stimulus
[air, zig-zag and red). One possibility is depicted on the left-hand
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Figure 4.22 Sara R' s test performa.nce on AB baseline and BA test
trials. (each bar represents 24 trials).
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Figure 4.23 possible relations between Set-A shapes, Set-B colours
and Set-X words during Sara Rls test sessions (see text).
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side of Figure 4.23 ; if Sara had covertly labelled the Set-B colours
with the Set-X words then it would have been possible for common
labelling to bring about the emergence of the BA relation (B'X' and
'X'A producing BA). The other possibility is depicted on the right-
hand side of Figure 4 .23 . If the. AS training had directly resulted in
the fonnation of a syrnretry relation, then BA. would have anerged first.
The BA relation could then bring about labelling of the Set-B colours
with the 8et-x words (BA. and A'X' prcducing B'X' ). So the question is,
did common labelling bring about the emergence of symmetry or did
syrnnetry bring about the emergence of comron labelling? Sara's silence
during the syrnretry test prevents one fran answering this question.
Fortunately, finner conclusions may be drawn from Nicola's test
data presented in Figure 4.24. In her first test sera.es (depicted by
the left-hand group of bars) Nicola's response to the AB baseline
trials was exactly the same as it had been prior to testing. She
continued to respond correctly on the AS baseline trials, and she also
continued to label the Set-A samples with the words "Orm.i ' and 'Delta'.
However Nicola failed the syrnrretry test; her BA score was poor. At
this stage then, the corresponding Set-A and Set-B stimuli were not
equivalent and the AS training alone was clearly not sufficient for
syrnnetry.
In the following session (depicted by the middle group of bars in
Figure 4.24) additional prompting was given on BA. trials; when the red
or green sample appeared, Nicola was asked to 'say what it is t • She
responded by labelling the colours by their conventional names. This
additional labelling, however', had no effect upon her test parformance i
she still failed the BA test despite scoring 100% on the AS baseline
trials.
Further testing was preceded by the establishment of common
labelling. Nicola was first trained to label the 8et-B colours with
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Figure 4.24 Nicola's test perfonnance on AB baseline and BA test
trials during her three test phases (see text). Each bar represents 24
trials. The table below each set of bars depicts Nicola's overt sample
labels from that phase of testing.
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Nicola made
the Set-X words , 'Orrmi I and 'Delta I. She required only 24 trials to
learn to say 'Omni ' in the presence of green and 'Delta' in the
presence of red. Finally, Set-A and Set-B trials were canbined, and
Nicola continued to label than appropriately with the Set-X words.
In the final test session (depicted by the shaded bars to the far
right of Figure 4.24), additiona1 pranpting was given; when the samples
tt.ere presented, Nicola was asked 'Is it Ornni or Delta?'. This prompt
had the desired effect; Nicola continued to Labe l the 8et-A and 8et-B
samples with the corresponding Set-X labels. Furthermore, this cammon
labelling had a dramatic effect on her test performance.
no errors whatsoever on the BA test trials.
These data provide additional evidence for the effects of
common labelling on the formation of stimulus equivalence. Of course,
one could argue that the BA relation errerged Lndependent.Iy of cammon
Iabe11ing, perhaps rrerely as a function of repeated testing. Hcwever ,
this possibility is highly unlikely. The BA relation never errerged in
the absence of ccrnron labelling, despite the fact that the subject
received a total of 96 BA test trials. Although relations have been
known to emerge as a function of repeated testing, when this has
occurred it has tended to be a gradua1 emergence over the course of
several test sessions (Devany, Hayes and Nelson, 1986; Sidman, Kirk and
Willson-Morris, 1985). In contrast, Nicola's BA performance
linrrediately becarre error-free when COIllITDn Iabel l inq was intrcrluced.
DISCUSSION
This experiment produced some noteworthy results. Prior to
testing, six subjects failed to learn AB matching. These subjects
weren't just left to interact with the basic matching-to-sample
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contingency; every effort was made to get them to acquire the task
through several standard intervention procedures, none of which proved
effective. Placed against this background, the subjects' performances
during testing were all the more astonishing. All six later proved
capable of not only AB but also BA ma.tching, in the complete absence of
differential reinforcenent or feedback of any kind. The AB and BA
relations emerged, not spontaneously, but as a function of learning
comron labels for the corresponding Set-A and Set-B stimuli. Clearly,
common labelling greatly facilitated the arbitrary matChing of two sets
of visual stimuli.
One should not lose sight of the practical significance of this
finding. Others working in this area have ascribed a level of causal
impotency to the role of comron labelling in equivalence fonnation
(Lazar, Davis-Lang and Sanchez, 1984; Sidma.n, Willson-Morris and Kirk,
1986). The adoption of such a stance provides a major justification
for the teaching of conditional discriminations (such as those involved
in reading) by automated methods, which involve only the presentation
of stimuli, and do not require the subject to name the stimuli orally.
The present data suggests that those who advocate the use of teaching
machines through their theoretical formulations of equivalence may have
been a little premature in overshadowing the role of comron labelling.
None of the subjects in this particular experiment benefited from
direct contact with fully automated matching procedures, even when that
translated into hundreds of reinforced trials. This initial teaching
problem, though at times seemingly insoluble, simply ceased to exist
once the exper.irrent.er took the relatively simple step of getting the
SUbjects to apply common labels to the stimuli which they had earlier
failed to ma.tch.
Jessica's Performance In her initial stages of testing took on
special significance, because she failed both the AB and BA tests
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despite making no errors on her 'X'A and 'X'B baseline trials.
Previous experiments have shown that two sets of . IV1Sua stimul i may
become equivalent if the same word, spoken by the experimenter,
controls the subject's choice of corresponding stimuli from each set
(see Lazar et aI, 1984, for a review). This has prompted Sidman and
colleagues to claim that conrron naming may be successful in bringing
about equivalence not through naming per se, but simply because the two
stimuli have both become associated with the product of the name i.e.
its sound. (Sidman, Willson-Morris and Kirk, 1986). Jessica's results,
however, contradict this supposition. Although she had learned to
select a shape and a colour conditional upon hearing a comrron sound
(the Set-X word 'Ornni' or 'Delta' spoken by the experirrenter), this
exper1ence was not sufficient for mediating the emergence of the AB and
BA relations. These relations emerged only in later tests, when
Jessica was prompted to produce the sounds herself through common
labelling.
But the rrost noteworthy feature of the present experiment was that
although both AB and BA emerged when each of SlX subjects were taught
COIIlIIDn labelling, BA emerged prior to AB r.n all but one case. This
finding seems to elude explanation in terms of present theoretical
accounts of stimulus equivalence, especially those that deny the role
of naming. Prior to this experiment there appeared to be two possible
outcomes of an equivalence test. A subject either passed or failed the
test with respect to a given set of stimuli. To these we must add a
third possibility, for some of the subjects in the present experiment
did both; they passed and failed a test with the same set of stimuli.
This is precisely what happened when Alex, Francis, Linda, Michael P.
and Jessica were initially tested under ccxrnron labelling conditions.
The point may be best illustrated by considering what may have been
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concluded had these subjects been tested on only a sl'n I t hig e rna c ng task
rather than two. If these subjects had been given a 24-trial test of
AB only, then we nay have concluded that the Set-A and Set-B stimuli
had not beCOIlE equivalent, because the AB relation had failed to emerge
after this number of trials (see Figure 4.17). Conversely, if one had
instead presented the same number of BA test trials then totally the
opposite conclusion may have been drawn (i.e. that the stimuli were
equivalent after all, a conclusion which is forced by the emergence of
FA) •
These data, then, appear to present something of a dilemrra. But if
one acknowledges narning, and particularly the definition of naming
advanced in this thesis, then the 'dilemma' ceases to exist. Instead,
the data begins to make sense, and what may otherwise have been
troublesome variability ends up as an interesting phenomenon in its own
right.
Final I y, we must consider the significance of both Nicola's and
Sara's results. These two differed from the others by learning the AB
relation prior to testing. Their AB trials forrneda baseline which was
tested for symmetry by the inclusion of the BA trials.
Nicola's test data is particularly significant because it extends
the role of common labelling to beyond the mere facilitative. In her
initial test phase, her Performance on the AB baseline trials was good
but she failed the symmetry test; at this stage, then, the
corresponding Set-A and Set-B stimuli were not equivalent, and the AB
training alone was clearly not sufficient for symrretry. symretry also
failed to emerge when Nicola applied unique labels to each of the
samples, thus demonstrating that labellin~ per se was not sufficient
for equivalence. However, when comron labelling of the samples was
introduced the BA relation at last emerged. The Set-A and Set-B
stimuli became equivalent not directly through the AB relation, but
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indirectly through the mediation of the Set-x labels.
This is not the first time a labelling intervention has been
necessary for the fonnation of equivalence. Beasty and Lowe (1985)
have shown that children (younger than four years of age) who initially
failed equivalence tests later passed when they were taught to narre the
sample-comparison pairings whilst responding to baseline training
trials (see Figure 4.25). For example, on some baseline trials
subjects were required to match a vertical line sample to a green
compari.son (AB) and a vertical line sample to a triangle comparison
(AC). Equivalence tests then assessed whether the subjects could match
green to triangle (BC) and triangle to green (CB). After failing these
tests the subjects were taught to say 'Up - Green' on AB baseline
trials and 'Up - Triangle' on AC baseline trials. This intervention
resulted in the immediate emergence of the Be and CB test relations.
Perhaps cornnon naming was the active ingredient in the verbal
intervention used in the Beasty and Lowe experirrent. The word 'Up',
which was spoken by the subjects in the presence of both the triangle
and the green stimulus, may have functioned as a comron name through
which stimulus equivalence emerged.
But comnon naming need not be the only way an which language
nay promote stimulus equivalence. In Experirrent 3 it was suggested
that equivalence may Emerge if the subject labels not only the stimuli
but also the relation between the stimuli. This possibility is
supported by Sara's data from the current experiment. Sara's AB
natching prior to testing appeared to be governed by the rules 'Green
is Onni' and 'Red is Delta', which she verbalised on several occasions.
sara had linked the stimuli verbally via the relational word 'is', and
this alone may have been sufficient for her subsequent success on the
symmetry test (although camnon naming too cannot be ruled out; see
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Figure 4.25 stimulus relations from the experirrent by Beasty and Lowe
(1985). Arrows point from samples to corresponding comparisons. Black
arrows depict trained relations and shaded arrows depict relations
assessed during testing.
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Resul ts) . In similar manner, subjects from other experiments have
apparently formed equivalence on the verbal plane prior to any formal
test of equivalence. In studies by Bird and Lowe (1985), several
mentally retarded subjects linked stimuli with relational terms such as
'is the same as' or 'goes with' after having learned to match those
stimuli on baseline training trials (see also Beasty, 1987). This
tactic appears to be a deal more sophisticated than carmon naming, but
no less verbal in origin.
Nevertheless, cammon naming may represent the simplest means
by which two or more stimuli may become equivalent, and as such it
deserves further examination.
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EXPERlMENI' 4 (b)
In Experirrent 4(a) it was shown that two unidentical stimul i, a
shape and a colour, could becorre equivalent, provided:
(a) The subject applied a COll1IlDn label to the shape and colour and
(b) That in so doing the subject was naming the shape and colour with
the cammon label (where narrdng is defined as a bi-directional relation
.,
between the labelling response and its referent stimulus).
In the initial stages of testing, most of the subjects 1n
Experiment 4(a) were, according to the definition above, naming the
shapes but not the colours with the words "Cmn.i ' and 'Delta'. The
initial absence of bi-directionality (or symmetry) between the colours
and the subjects' labels in turn led to an initial performance
decrement on one of the test relations, AB. It was hypothesised that
the colours and spoken words 'Omni' and 'Delta' were not initially bi-
directionally related (ie the words 'Omni' and 'Delta' were not
initially acting as names for the colours) because the subjects already
had other narnes for these stimuli; they all called the colours by their
conventional names, 'Green' and 'Red'. It seemed that these
conventional names somehow interfered with the attempt to establ ish
eomron naming with the Set-X labels, 'Omni' and 'Delta'.
If the interference occurred because the subjects were already
capable of naming the colours with words other than those used as
common Set-X labels, then one would anticipate no interference if the
subjects have no other narnes for the colours prior to the experiment.
Given that a subject is unable to consistently label both the Set-A
shapes and the Set-B colours prior to the establishment of common
labelling with Set-X words, then one v.uuld predict no interference; the
8et-x words should be free to act as true names for the stimuli, thus
3 11
enabling the AB and BA relations to emerge at the
testing. Experirrent 4(b) tested this prediction.
MErHOD
SUBJEl:TS
same rate during
Of the 4 - 5 year old children available, only two were unable to
consistently name not only the Set-A shapes, but also the Set-B
colours. These two subjects, Gareth and Peter, were otherwise judged
to be of nonnal ability by their teacher, and this is supported by
their above average scores on the expressive language cornponent; of the
ReYne11 language test (see Table 4.23).
Assessment of namlng skills
Both subjects were glven extensive namlng tests after their
teacher had indicated that, in her opinion, they were unable to
consistently name any colour. Both Set-A shapes and Set-B colours
appeared one at a time in the centre window of the five key panel, and
verbal responses were elicited from the child in accordance with the
procedures outlined in the previous experiment. Table 4.24 lists the
subjects' verbal responses and the number of times each response
occurred. Neither child differentially labelled the shapes. The
colours were also labelled indiscriminately. For example, Gareth said
'Red' and 'Blue' with equal frequency to the green stimulus. Although
he occasionally labelled the red stimulus correctly, on the major.i.ty of
trials he said 'Blue' when red was presented. On all but five of the
24 colournarning trials, Peter said 'Blue' to both the green and red
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Table 4.23 Chronological age (in years-months) and equivalent
language age (from the Reynell Developrrental Language Scale) for the
tw subjects in Experinent 4 (b) •
SUBJOCT CHRONOLOGICAL EQUIVALENT IANGUAGE AGE
AGE
VERBAL EXPRESSIVE
CCMPREHENSION IANGUAGE
GARETH 4 - 2 3 - 8 5 - 11
PETER 4 - 3 3 - 9 5 - 6
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Table 4.24 Verbal responses elicited from Gareth and Peter during
their naming tests.
Stimulus Verbal Response Frequency
GARETH Y - Shape 'Don't know' 6
N::> response 6
Zig-Zag 'Don't know' 7
N::> response 5
Green 'Red' 6
'Blue' 6
Red 'Blue' 7
'Red' 5
- - - - - - - - - --- - - -- -
- - - -
PRrER Y - Shape 'Don't know' 9
Shakes head 3
Zig-Zag 'Don't know' 7
Shakes head 5
Green 'Blue' 9
'Red' 3
Red 'Blue' 10
'Red' 2
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hues. Both subjects' patterns of verbal responses therefore indicated
that they had learned t\\D colour words , 'Blue' and 'Red', but they had
not yet learned which colours those words signified.
The subjects' difficulty with colour terms appeared to be present
throughout the experirrent. Both children, like the others, were given
a ReYnell language test at the end of the experinent. On comprehension
iteTIs, the child was required to respond to a question or instruction
from the experimenter. In nine of these items, a colour name
constituted a critical part of the question or instruction put to the
child. Both Gareth and Peter had particular difficulty with these
items and thus their verbal comprehension scores were relatively poor.
For example, one section involved coloured pencils - two long pencils
(one red and one blue) and three sbort; pencil s (one red, one yellow,
and one blue ) . When Peter was instructed to 'Find a yellow penci1 " he
minted to a red pencil. When the experimenter asked 'Give me the
longest red pencil', Peter selected the long blue one! After he had
put the short pencils into a box, Gareth was asked 'Which red Pencil
has not been put away?'. He pointed to the long blue penci.l . Of the
nine commands involving colour names, Peter never once responded
correctly to any of then, and Gareth only responded correctly to two of
them. 'Iwo weeks after the experiment, Gareth's and Peter's teacher
confirmed that they had still not learned any colour names.
APPARAWS (see General Method section).
PROCEDURE
The procedures for training and testing were identical to those
used in Experiment 4(a)i both subjects followed the main route to
testing (see Figure 4.8).
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RESULTS
TRAINING RESULTS
AB Training
Both subjects failed to learn the AB relation. Their scores on
the AS task remained at or around chance levels throughout this phase.
Gareth received 292 AB trials (158 of which were subjected to the
fading prograrrme described earlier), and Peter received 265 AB trials
(all of which involved fading). Neither subject learned to colournatch
on fading trials. At no stage did either subject overtly label the Set-
A or Set-B stimuli.
Train A'X'
The A'X'. relation was learned relatively quickly. Gareth and
Peter needed 80 and 120 trials resPectively to learn to say 'amni' in
the presence of the Y-shape and 'Delta' in the presence of the zig-zag.
AB Training (resumed)
Both subjects were returned to the AB natching task for 96 trials.
They continued to label each sample shape spontaneously with the
appropriate Set-X word but their scores on the AB matching task
remained at chance level.
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Train B'X'
Both subjects quickly learned to say "Onrri ' to the green hue and
'Delta' to the red.
required 69 trials.
Combine A'X' and B'X'
Gareth required only 28 trials, whilst Peter
Combining the A'X' and B'X' trials randomly within the same
session did not affect either subject's labelling performance. After
36 trials, the reinforcerrent probability was reduced in accordance with
the procedure described in the General Method section. At the end of
this 48-trial session both Gareth and Peter were labelling the Y-shape
and green stimuli with the COIlllTDn label "Cmrii.", and zig-zag and red
with the COITIrOn label 'Delta', without any differential reinforcerrent.
Both subjects were now ready for testing. By the end of training,
Gareth and Peter had received a total of 544 and 598 training trials
respectively. Again, trials were staggered to produce a multiple
baseline across subjects.
TEST RESULTS
Figure 4.26 depicts the two subjects' scores on AB and BA test
trials. Both subjects gave COITll1Dn label s to the samples throughout the
96-trial test. Once aqai.n ccmron labelling had a dramatic effect on
•
natching perforrrance; both AB and BA emerged straight away and at the
same rate. Gareth scored 100% correct on all test trial-types,
whereas Peter scored 92% correct.
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Figure 4.26 Overall test scores (percentage of correct responses) on
AB and BA trial-types for the two subjects in Experiment 4(b) • Each
bar represents 24 trials.
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DISCUSSION
The results from this experiment are entirely consistent with the
interference hyPOthesis stated earlier. From the outset of testing,
both subjects were not merely labelling the shapes and colours
appropriately with the words 'Qnni' and 'Delta' but, in so doing, they
were also naming the shapes and. the colours with those words. The
words "Onni ' and 'Delta' were syrrmetrically related to the stiffiuli
right from the start of testing, thus enabling both the AB and BA
relations to immediately emerge. There was no evidence of any
interference in equivalence formation like that found in Experiment
4(a) . After the same amount of testing, IIDSt of Gareth's and Peter's
counterparts in Experiment 4(a) had not yet acquired AB matching,
which, as was shown earlier, indicated that unlike Gareth and Peter
they ~re not initially narning the colours with the 'Omni' and 'Delta'
words , But then, unlike Gareth and Peter, the subjects in Experiment
4(a) were already capabl,e of narning the colours with other words, the
conventional labels 'Green' and 'Red'. These conventional labels were
a potential source of interference; it was possible that they initially
prevented the 'Ornni' and 'Delta' labels fran acting as names for the
colours and thus from acting as effective mediators for stimulus
equivalence. This possibility is considerably strengthened by Gareth's
and Peter's data; neither child was caPable of consistently narning the
colours prior to learning the Set-X labels. In addition, neither child
spontaneously labelled the colours with any other than the Set-X words .
According to the interference hypothesis, because Gareth and Peter had
no other narres for the colours there was nothing to interfere with or
prevent their Set-X labels fram acting as names for the colours, and
therefore nothing to prevent AB from emerging straight away, alongside
EA.
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There is still plenty of scope for further confirnation of the
interference hypothesis. The data so far suggests that the subjects ill
ExPerirrent 4(a) did not perfonn AB matching in the initial stages of
testing simply because the labels chosen as ccrmon mediators ('anni'
and 'Delta') were different from those the subjects normally applied to
one of the stimulus sets ('Green' and 'Red'). In Experiment 4(b)
interference was prevented by ensuring the subjects had no other nanes
for the stimuli. Another way of preventing interference is to
deliberately adopt as conunon labels those names which the subject
already spontaneously applies to one of the stimulus sets. Using the
same stimuli as before, one could teach the subjects to apply their
pre-existing colour names to the shapes, for which they have no other
names prlor to the experiment. If, for example, a subject is taught to
say 'Green' to the previous1y un-named Y-shape then one would expect no
interference in the subsequent matching of green to Y and Y to green.
On the contrary, this approach should be perhaps one of the most
effective ways of making two stimuli become equivalent to each other.
Experirrent 5 assessed this possibility.
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EXPERIMENr 5
Two changes were made r.n this experirrent. Firstly, the Set-X
I bel h d ' Omn.i. , Ia s were c ange ; was rep aced with 'Green' and ' Delta' was
replaced with ' Red ' . The second change was a procedural one - this
tine the training involved one less step than before. In order to
establish the potential for common labelling, the subjects only needed
to be taught to label the Set-A shapes with the Set-x words, 'Green'
and 'Red', because they had already learned, prior to the experi.rrent,
to assign those words to the Set-B colours. Consequently, all the
subjects (except Donna : see below) were taken straight on to AB and BA
testing i.rnrediately after learning the A'X' relation. Other than this,
the procedure was identical to that of the previous experirrent.
MErHOD
SUBJECTS
The seven 4-5 year old children are listed in Table 4.25, which
includes their chronological ages and their equivalent language ages
from the ReYne11 language test. All subjects were given a 24-trial
naming test prior to the experirnent; to ensure that:
(a) , I labels 'Green' and 'ROO' tothey could all assign the conventlona
the corresponding Set-B colours, and
(b) that they were unable to consistently label the Set-A shapes.
APPARAWS (See General Method Section)
PROCEDURE (see above)
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Table 4.25 Chronological age (in years-months) and equivalent
language age (from the Reynell Developrrental Language Scale) for the
seven subjects in Experirrent. 5.
323
RESULTS
TRAINING RESULTS
AB Training
The AB training again proved ineffective. Each subject's
performance remained at or around chance level throughout. The number
of AB trials each child received was as follows: Billy Joe, 96;
Richard, 144; Nick, 240; Donna, 252; Steve, 312; Sara L., 360; and
Melissa, 432. Billy Joe was given instructions (see Experiment 3 for
details) but other than this the fading programme was the only
intervention used, and this was administered to Donna, Sara L. and
steve, but without effect. steve received 168 fading trials but never
even began to ool.ourmat.ch, All of Donna's AB trials involved fading;
she ma.tched the colours from the start of her first fading session.
Sara L. was given 264 fading trials and she began colournatching in her
second fading session. Both Donna and Sara L. continued to ma.tch
correctly up until the last fading step, at which point their
responding fell to chance levels.
Train A'X'
The subjects very quickly learned to say 'Green' in the presence
of the Y- shape and 'Red' in the presence of the zig-zag. All the
subjects except Donna and Steve needed only 24 trials to learn the A'X'
relation; Donna required 48 trials, and Steve required 72 trials before
reaching criterion.
All the subjects were now capable of labelling the Y-shape and
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green stimuli with the corrmon Iabsl 'Green' and zi.q d ed .
, -zag an r Wlth
the conmon label 'Red', and so they were ready for t t.i .
es rnq , Si.nce
testing was to be conducted in the absence of differential
reinforCEment, all the subjects (except Donna) were given 12 additional
A'X' trials without reinforcement (the reinforcerrent probability was
reduced to zero in accordance with the procedure described in the
General Method section). None of these subjects made any errors on the
12 unreinforced A'X' trials. Meanwhile, Donna proceeded along one
further training stage (see below).
AS Training (resumed)
Donna was returned to the AB matching task for two 48-trial
sess.ions , When the Set-A samples appeared, she continued to label them
with the appropriate Set-X words. Furthermore, her AB matching
performance imrrediately rose to criterion; her overall AB score was
87.5% in the first session with Label l i.nq and 93.75% in the second.
Although correct responses were reinforced during these sessions,
Donna '.s AB score improved so rapidly that sample labelling alone may
have been responsible for the .irnprovernent; (see Test Results).
Prior to the last 12 trials of the second AB session, the
probability of reinforcement was reduced to zero without affecting
Donna's matching Performance, and she therefore proceeded to the test
phase, to join the other subjects.
Summary of Training
The total number of trials each subject received during training
was as follows: Billy Joe, 132; Richard, 180; Nick, 276; Donna, 396;
Steve, 396; Sara L., 396; and Melissa, 468.
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TEST RESULTS
The test resul ts for all seven sub]'ects d'are epi.ct.ed in Figure
4.27. The shaded bars depict those matching-to-sample trials on which
carrmon Set-X labels ('Green' and 'Red') were correctly applied to the
8et-A and Set-B samples. The figure shows that when cornnon labelling
occurred both the AB and BA relations emerged imrrediately for all seven
subjects. Ccrrrron labelling, then, was once again apparentIy sufficient
for the formation of stimulus equivalence.
Donna; the subject at the bottan of the figure, rrerits particular
attention. In her initial test phase she did not give ccmron labels to
the samples and she did not completely pass the tests (see the unshaded
bars) . In the absence of common labelling, Donna scored above
criterion on AB trials and below criterion on BA. This pattern was
exactly the opposite of that initially produced by many of the subjects
in Experirrent 4(a). Although Donna was capable of AB rrat.chi.nq it was
clear that the Set-A and Set-B stimuli had not become equivalent
because she was unable to match the symrretrically related BA trials.
At this stage, then, Donna had failed a syrnnetry test, which showed yet
again that equivalence in humans is not a 'given', as Sidman has
claimed (Sidman, 1988).
In order to understand why Donna had failed BA, one needs to refer
once again to the labels she produced. Al though cornrron labelling was
absent fran Donna's initial test performance, labelling ~r se was not.
Furthennore, the difference in her AB and BA performance appeared to be
linked to the way in which she labelled the stimuli. On AB trials,
h 'Green' and 'Red' 1nDonna overtly labelled the sample s apes
, t " Then, when the green and
accordance with her earlier A'X ra1nlng.
red compari.sons subsequently appeared, she selected the canparison
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Figure 4.27 Overall test scores (perc~ltage of correct responses) on
AB and BA trial-types for the seven subjects in ExperiJrent 5. Each bar
represents 24 trials.
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which corresponded with the colour label she had just given to the
sample shape , Donna's AB rrat.chinq was apparently rrediated by her Set-x
labels, 'Green' and 'Red'. This labelling" appeared to be sufficient
for establishing the very relation which she had earlier failed to
acquire through reinforced training trials, and in the apparent absence
of any such labelling.
However, this labelling, which seemed to form a vital link ln the
rrediated emergence of AB, was apparently absent on BA trials. On BA
trials, Donna never once overt1y labelled the Set-B colour samples. It
was therefore possible that Donna had failed BA simply because she had
not labelled the colour samples either overtly or covertly with the
Set-x words 'Green' and 'Red', despite being cap~ble of so doing.
Additional testing confirrred this possibility. Jn subsequent tests,
Donna was pranpted to label the samples on BA trials; when the green or
red sample appeared she was instructed to 'Say what it is'. This
pranpting was successful; Donna immediately began to label the colours
appropriate1y with the words ' Green' and ' Red ' . Since she was already
applying the Sffine labels to the Set-A sample shapes on AB trials, the
pranpting had actually established common labelling of the samples, and
thus is represented in Figure 4.27 by the column entitled 'common
labelling intervention'. Once common labelling was established, the BA
relation emerged to join AB, confinning for the first t.irre that the
set-A shapes and Set-B colours had become fully equivalent.
DISCUSSION
Prior to this experirnerrt , the subjects were already capable of
labelling the Set-B colours appropriately with the words 'Green' and
'Red' . These subjects were then taught to apply the same labels to
corresponding Set-A shapes. This tactic proved extremely effective rn
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there was ru
Each shape am
its corresponding colour became equivalent via mediation of the Cammol
.
colour labels, provided those labels were produced by the subjec1
during equivalence testing. The immediate emergence of both AB and ru
conditionaI upon production of the cornrron IabeIs'Green' and ' Red' I
promoting stimul us equival ence ; as predicted earlier,
evidence of any interference in equivalence formation.
showed that those labels were also acting as names for the stimuL
(i.e. that each label and its corresponding stimulus had beco~
symmetrically related).
These results have obvious implications for anyone faced with thE
practical problem of establishing classes of equivalent stimuli withir
a subject's r'epet.oire , Much time and effort could be saved by .first
identifying whether the subject can already name any of the stimuli ir
question. If the subject only has names for one of the stimulus set~
then, provided they are 'acceptable' to the language community, thOSE
names could be incorporated into the experimental regime as ccrmor
mediators for stimulus equivalence. The advantages would be two-fold.
Firstly, less training would be required because the subject hac
already learned one of the component naming relations. secondly, (
positive outcome would be more likely because, when used in this way
the subject's pre-existing names for the stimul i cannot become a SOurCE
of interference in equivalence formation. Compare this to what mig~
happen if the teacher is ignorant of the subject's pre-existin~
stimulus names. If other labels are chosen as potential mediators foi
equivalence then they may be less than fully effective in t.he i.i
intended rol es . The subject's pre-existing stimulus names ma
interfere with the process by which the chosen Iabel s become CCXT1IfOl
names for the stimuli. Furthennore, the problem may be more seven
than the resul ts of Experimerrt 4(a) suggest. In Experiment 4(a), thE
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interference was manifested as an initial absence of the AS relation,
but in two cases (i.e. with Linda and Jessica) the AB relation
eventually emerged after a short period of uninterrupted testing.
However, Experiment 4(a) involved only two sets of stimul .i , If one is
attempting to instill equivalence amongst a larger network (as would
surely be the case in an applied setting) then any interference may be
correspondingly magnified.
So far, interference has been avoided by making two changes to
Experinent 4(a) . Experirrent 4(b) involved a change in the subject
variables of Experiment 4(a) . Unlike their count.erpart.s in 4(a), the
4(b) subjects had no names for the stimuli prior to the experiIrent.
Experirrent 5, however, involved a change in the response variables of
Experirrent 4(a) (see above). For the sake of completeness, the final
experirrent of this series involves a change in the stimulus variables
of Experirrent 4(a). The Set-B colours are replaced with a set of
shapes for which the subjects apparently have no names. Given that the
subjects have no names for either the Set-A or the Set-B shapes prior
to learning the comron labels 'Ornni' and 'Delta', then there should be
nothing to prevent those labels from becoming cmmon names for the
stimuli; consequently, equivalence should emerge immediately, without
any interference.
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EXPERlMENr 6
In this 'experiment, two new shapes were introduced as Set-B
stimuli (see Figure 4.28). These shapes, hereafter referred to as
Shape 1 and Shape 2, were delieerately designed to be obscure, so that
the children would probably not have any consistent names for then.
The procedure in this experiment was identical to the main route
procedure of Experirrent 4 (a), except that Shape 1 replaced t.be green
stimulus and Shape 2 replaced the red.
MErHOD
SUBJECTS
Five 4-5 year old children took part., Their chronological ages
are listed in Table 4.26, along with their equivalent language ages
from the Reynell language test. Each subject was given a 24-trial
naming test prior to the experiment. This consisted of four trials
each of the Y-shape, zig-zag, shape 1, shape 2, and the green and red
hues from the previous experiments. The two hues were included as a
control measure, to ensure that the children understood the questions
posed by the experirrenter. Al though each child consistently assigned
the conventional labels 'Green' and 'Red' to the corresponding colours,
none of then consistently narred the shapes. In fact, the subjects'
reactions to the shapes fell into two broad categories; they either
attempted to descri.be each shape in general tenns or they renained
silent. Further prompting only elicited negative r'esponses such as
'Don't know'.
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Figure 4.28 Shapes employed as Set-B stimuli in Experiment 6.
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Table 4.26 Chronological age (in years-months) and equivalent
language age (from the Reynell Developrrental Language Scale) for the
five subjects in Experiment 6.
SUBJOCT CHRONOIDGlCAL EYJUlVALENT LANGUAGE AGE
AGE
VERBAL EXPRESSIVE
m1PREHENSlON LANGUAGE
QIERYL 4 - 3 4 - 10 4 - 8
LAURA· 4 - 3 4 - 6 7 - 0
lOAN 4 - 7 4 - 10 6 - 5
SANDRA 4 - 4 5 - 1 4 - 0
WILLIN-l 4 - 11 5 - 2 6 - 2
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APPARA'lUS (see G€neral Method)
PROCEDURE (see above)
RESULTS
TRAINING RESULTS
AB Training
On AB trials, reinforcers were available for matching the Y-shape
sample to shape 1, and the zig-zag sample to shape 2. Four of the
subjects, Cheryl, William, Laura and loan failed to learn this task.
After 96, 150, 192 and 353 trials respectively, their scores were still
at or around chance level. Furthermore, these children never overtly
labelled the Set-A or Set-B stimuli. Neither did Sandra, but she
reached criterion on AB after only two 48-trial sessions (her overall
score in the second session was 91.7% correct). To prepare her for
testing, the reinforcenent probability was reduced to zero (see General
Methcrl) • Sandra made no errors on 12 unreinforced AB trials, and
therefore proceeded to testing. MeanwhiIe , the others were taken to
the next stage.
Train A'X'
All the subjects (except Sandra) learned to label the v-shape with
the word 'OImi' and zig-zag with the word 'Delta'. No subject t.ook
more than one 48-trial session to reach the criterion of six
consecutive correct responses per trial-ty~; loan r'equi.red 36 trials,
William 38; Laura, 42; and Cheryl, 44.
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All
ABTraining (resumed)
AB training was resumed for two 48-trial sessions but each
subject's matching performance remained at or around chance level.
four subjects, ho.vever, continued to label the Y-shape nd .a zlg-zag
samples with the words 'Ornni' and 'Delta' r'espectively.
Train B'X'
Next, the four subjects were taught to say 'Orm.i ' in the presence
of shape 1 and 'Delta' in the presence of shape 2. Learning progressed
extremeI y rapidly. William reached criterion after only 18 trials,
whereas Cheryl required 26, Laura 33 and loan 48.
Combine A'X' and B'X'
When the A'X' and B'X' trial-types \'.Bre presented randomly within
the same session, loan, Laura and William continued to respond
correctly, each making no errors on the 12 A'X' and 12 B'X' trials. In
contrast, Cheryl began to label the shar::es incorrectly. In her first
combinEd session, and despite making no errors on B'X', her labelling
performance fell to 66.7% correct for the Y-shape and 83.3% correct for
the zig-zag. The following session consistEd of A'X' trials only.
Rerroving the B'X' trials apparent.ly helped because Cheryl required only
34 trials to return to criterion on A'X'. Then, when A'X' and B'X'
were once again combined she scored 100% oorrect on both.
By the end of this stage, all four children had learned to apply
comrron 8et-x labels to the Set-A and 8et-B shapes. They were each able
to say 'Ornni' to both the Y-shape and shape 1, and 'Delta' to both the
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zlg-zag and shape 2. When the probability of reinforcement was reduced
to zero, each subject continued to label the shapes correctly (12 A'X'
and 12 B' X' trials were presented without reinforcement). All four
were ready for testing.
The total number of training trials for each subject was as
follows: sandra, 108; William, 360; Cheryl, 396; Laura, 417; and loan,
593.
TEST RESULTS
Figure 4.29 shows the overall scores on AB and BA test trials for
the four subjects who had learned comrron labels. Each bar represents
24 trials. All four children gave comrron 8et-x labels to the samples
throughout testing (as depicted by the shading), and both AB and BA
emerged virtually straight away.
sandra had learned AB prior to the intrcrluction of label training
procedures. Her symrretry test perfornance is depicted in Figure 4.30.
sandra failed the symretry test during her first phase of testing (see
the left-hand set of bars in Figure 4.30). Although her AB perfonnance
was excellent, she selected the zig-zag canparison on all but two of
the BA symmetry test trials. The Set-B samples did not appear to be
exerting any control over her choice of Set-A comparison. Furtherrmre ,
Sandra remained silent throughout this first test phase; she never once
overtly labelled any of the stimuli.
Further testing was preceded by the intrcrluction of A'X' training
trials. Sandra required only 68 trials to learn to say 'Ornni' to the
Y-shape and ' Delta' to the zig-zag. However, this training alone did
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Figure 4.29 Overall test scores (percentage of correct responses) on
AS and BA trial-types for the four subjects in Experiment 6 who failed
to learn AS matching prior to testing. Each bar represents 24 trials.
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not affect her subsequent symmetry test performance. When re-tested,
Sandra nade no errors on AB baseline trials, but her performance on BA
renained the same as before i.e. she continued to select the zig-zag
comp3.rison on all but a few trials, as can be seen from the middle
group of bars in Figure 4.30. During this second test phase, sandra
continued to overtly label the Set-A shapes correctly as "Orn.i ' or
'Delta', but only wren those shapes appeared as samples on AB trials.
Overt labelling of the Set-B shapes was completely absent.
Testing was interrupted once rrore so that further training could
establish cammon labelling. Sandra needed the absolute minimum of 12
trials to learn the B'X' relation. One more 48-trial session followed,
in which the A'X' and B'X' trial-types were combined and the
reinforcenent probability was reduced to zero. At t.be end of this
sessa.on , sandra was labelling both the Y-shape and shape 1 as "Onni '
and the zig-zag and shape 2 as 'Delta', in the complete absence of
differential reinforcement.
In her final test session (depicted by the shaded bars in Figure
4.30), Sandra continued to label the 8et-A and Set-B samples overtly
with the corresponding Set-X labels. Furthermore, this common
labelling appeared to result in the irmediate emergence of BAi only one
error was made in 48 unreinforced BA test trials.
DISCUSSION
The results from this experiment are in complete agreerrent with
the theoretical notions derived from the preceding experiments of this
chapter. Once again, stimulus equivalence emerged when the subjects
applied common labels to the stimuli during rratching-to-sample trials.
As ant.i.ci.pated, there was no interference in equivalence fornation.
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Figure 4.30 Sandra's test perforwance on AB baseline and BA test
trials during her three test phases (see text). Each bar represents
24 trials. The stimuli for each trial-type are placed at the bottom of
the bars (Y=Y-shaPe, Z=zig-zag, l=shapel, 2=shape2). The table below
each set of bars depicts Sandra's overt sample 1abeIs from that phase
of testing.
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The subjects apparently had no pre-existing names for either the 5et-A
or Set-B shaPe stimuli so, in later training, each shape was free to
becorre symnetrically related to its corresponding Set-X label. The
5et-x words thus acted as corrmon names for the stimuli, and when cormon
naming was subsequently produced during testing, the relations
indicative of stimulus equivalence (i.e. AB and BA) emerged. Sandra's
results revealed yet again that equivalence does not autanatically
follow from the direct training of a relation via conditional
discrimination procedures. These training procedures are not
necessarily effective but the evidence above indicates that they can
be , provided the subject names the stimuli (as defined), and in a
wanner which allows those names to mediate t.he . subject's test-trial
watching-to-sample performance.
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GENERAL DISClJSSlOO
Perhaps it would be best to begin by retracing the steps along
which the experirrents in this chapter have taken us. ExperiIre.nt 1.
indicated that, as a potential rrediator of stimulus equivalence, common
naming might prove worthy of further investigation. Experirrent 4(a)
not only confi.rmed the expectations of Experiment 3, but also suggested
that naming was itself a kind of stimulus-response symmetry.
Experirrent 4 (a) also indicated that our understanding of equivalence
nay be incomplete should we fail to acknowledge the subjects' pre-
existing names for the stimuli. In Experirrent 4(a), these pre-existing
names appeared to be potentially incompatible with the mediating
function of the 8et-x labels. This was confirmed in Experirrent 4(b),
which directly replicated 4(a) but prevented the incanpatibility by
using subjects who had no pre-existing names for the stimuli. Then, ill
Experirrent 2, conmon labelling was established with, rather than an
cpposit.i.on to, the subjects' pre-existing stimulus names. So, rather
than teing a potential source of interference in the rrediated emergence
of stimulus equivalence, the subjects' pre-existing names played a key
role in the errergent process. Finally, the experirrents culminated an
Experirrent ~, which again dennnstrated the role of cannon naming an
stimulus equivalence, but this time by substituting the 'pre-narreable'
stimuli from the earlier experiments with others for which the subjects
had no pre-existing names.
There are various ways ln which common namlng could be
investigated further within the framework established in this chapter.
One virtue of the present theoretical f rarrework is that it enables the
prediction of very specific effects, and thus it is cpen to empirical
validation. For example, one could replicate Experirrent 4(a) but with
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Ule wee-A ana ~eL-.Jj stimuli interchanged. In Experiment 4(a), the BA
relation often emerged prior to AS and never vice versa. However, if
the Set-A and Set-B stimuli are interchanged then AB should emerge
prior to BA and never vice versa (i.e. reversing the stimulus sets
should reverse the relative rates of Emergence). Alternatively, one
could find subjects who have no consistent narres for the set-A or set-B
stimul i and then teach them to name the st.irnul i from one of the sets
before introducing other labels as potential common mediators of
stimulus equivalence. This should also result in the differential
emergence of AB and BA, because the mediating labels would be
potentially incompatible with the stimulus names the subjects had
previously learned. This time, though, the latter would be established
within rather than outside the experimental context. If the subject is
taught to name the set-A stimuli prior to learning cannon labels with
different words, then AS should Emerge before but never after BA .(and
vlce versa if the subject is initially taught to name the Set-B
stimuli) .
Perhaps other experiments could replicate the studies an this
chapter but with younger children. It remains to be seen whether the
same corrmon Iabe l I inq procedure will prcrluce cannon naming as readily
wi th children under 4 years as it did with the 4-5 year olds.
In concl.us ion, the experiments in this chapter appear to paint a
consistent picture of the effects of naming in general and of cannon
naming in particular on the formation of stimulus equivalence. But the
picture is far fran complete; only a small part of the 'canvas' has
'II follow,' l'f so, thesebeen filled. Hopefully, further experiIrents Wl
will undoubtedly rrodify and add to the current perspective. But, In
the rreantirre, the final part; of this thesis wi.l l att.enpt to fill In
a fraction rrore of the canvas by discussing general points arising from
what has already been port.rayed.
346
aIAPI'ER 5
CCNTIlSIONS
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COOCLUSIONS
The findings from previous· equiva lence experirrents (Chapter 1),
together with tte data yielded by the current research programme
(Chapters 2, 3 and 4), represent a seemingly formidable amount of
evidence for the critical role of naming in the emergence of
equivalence. There are, however, always exceptions to the rule.
Currently there are two experiments which appear to have demonstrated
equivalence in animals. The question is: what status should we afford
to these aberrant studies? Each presents the outward appearance of
equivalence, but looks can be deceiving. We must be prepared to probe
beyond the surface to discover their true nature.
The first experiment to go 'under the microscope' does, in a
sense, support the definition of naming proposed in this thesis, but
not without producing some seriously misleading side effects. In a
recent study, McIntire, Cleary and Thompson (1987) began by
acknowledging the role of naming in equivalence formation in humans and
then proceeded to explain procedures for teaching animals (in this case
two cynormlqous rronkeys) skills analagous to COITlIlDn naming. Figure 5.1
is a schematic representation of their paradigm. They aimed to
establish two classes of equivalent stimuli. One class, designated
EVEN, consisted of stimulus numbers 2, 4 and 6 (corresponding to
violet, green and orange), while the other class, designated ODD,
consisted of stimul us numbers 1, 3 and 5 (corresponding to red, yellow
and blue). The monkeys were trained to criterion on the relations
depicted by the arrows in Figure 5.1, after which tests evaluated the
emergence of all the other sample-comparison combinations. What made
this experiment different from others on equivalence in animals was
that the subjects were required to respond differentially to the two
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Figure 5.1 Scherratic representation of the stimul us relations
established in the experiment by McIntire, Cleary and Thompson (1987)
(see text).
349
EVEN
350
sets of stimuli whilst performing the matching tasks. The rronkeys were
required to press each EVEN stimul us eight times and to press and
continuous I y hold down each ODD stimulus for at least 3.5 seconds .
Each trial began with the sample; if the subject 'narned' it correctly
(i.e. produced the EVEN response to even numbered stimuli and the ODD
response to odd numbered stimuli) then the comparisons appeared. The
subjects could then secure reinforcers by selecting the correct
comparison and by producing the appropriate ODD or EVEN response. If
the subjects produced the incorrect response pattern at any stage
during the trial then the stimuli disappeared, no reinforcers were
delivered, and the next trial began approximately 4 seconds later.
After learning the tasks depicted by the arrows in Figure 5. 1,
both monkeys were able to match all other combinations without
differential reinforcement. The authors concluded that the monkeys had
formed two classes of equivalent stimuli through learning and using a
'simple two-word naming system' (p.281).
But there are two problems with this conclusion. The first
concerns the extent to which these data constitute satisfactory
evidence for stimulus equivalence. There is little doubt that the
experiment; looks like it demonstrated equivalence, but that is not the
.lssue. Equivalence is defined by functional, and not formal,
properties (cf. Chapter 1 of this thesis). Equivalence requires the
emergence of untrained relations, but when one closely examines the
McIntire et al study, one discovers that nothing has emerged during
testing. Each subject's test performance merely reflects an elaborate
stimulus-response chain, in which the relations both within and between
each successive link of the chain were already highly trained through
differential reinforcement.
Before going into detail, sane extra information is required.
351
Several studies have shown that when for exam I .
, p e, plgeons are trained
to respond differentially to samples presented during matching trials,
the differential responses, as well as the sample stimuli, may readily
exert control over the subjects' comparison choices (Urcuioli and
Honig, 1980,· Urcuioli, 1985). Anyone anted with this knowledge can
easily re-interpret McIntire et aI's results. Th' nkelr rna eys' training
could result in the learning of two relations per stimulus (to simplify
matters we will concentrate on only one of the stimulus sets, say, the
EVENS) • For example, during 2 - 2 training, the subject learns the
chain 2 - E - 2 - E (where this represents sample 2 - even response _
comparison 2 - even response). This may give rise to two relations, 2
- E and E - 2, because, during training, the differential E response
may gain control over the subject's choice of the comparison, 2.
Similarly, the E - 4 and 4 - E relations may be learned during 2 - 4
training (2 - E - 4 - E producing E - 4 and 4 - E). Finally, the E -
6 and 6 - E relations may arise from 4 - 6 training (4 - E - 6 - E
producing E - 6 and 6 - E). So, after training, each even numbered
stimulus controls an EVEN response, and the EVEN response controls each
subject's choice of any even numbered stimulus. The same analysis may
be applied to the odd numbered stimuli. One would now expect the
subjects to match any EVEN sample to any EVEN comparison (and likewise
for the ODDS), not because of the emergence of equivalence, but merely
because all the necessary component; skills were explicitly taught by
reinforcement contingencies present throughout training.
The second probl em concerns the authors' imp} ication that the
monkeys were naming the stimuli. This implication seems dangerously
misleading. The data produced from experiments in the present thesis
are consistent with the view that naming, like equivalence, is
functionally, and not formally, defined. According to the present
thesis, we may only speak of namlng with respect to stimulus-response
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relations which are themselves bidirectionally
or symmetrically
related. Naming, too, involves emergent behaviour. NCM, the children
To recap, the above study derronstrates neither equivalence nor
naming in animals. The study is, however, not without utility inasmuch
as it provides an insight into the kinds of skills that normally need
to emerge so as to bring about stimulus equivalence.
'Simulation'
studies such as this will continue to playa useful role in the
experiment.al analysis of behaviour, but only to the extent that the
dangers of the formalistic fallacy are avoided (cf Savage-Rumbaugh and
Rumbaugh, 1980).
The McIntire et al (1987) experiment is not, however, the only
equivalence study of its kind; an experiment by Edwards, Jagielo,
Zentall and Hogan (1982) on acquired equivalence in pigeons makes the
same kind of error. This time the procedure was quite different, but
the results were equally misleading. The study was interested in the
effects of differential reinforcers rather than differential responses.
The pigeons were trained on identity matching with two sets of stimuli,
two forms (a plus and a circle), and two colours (red and green).
Correct choices on identity trials with the plus and red stimuli were
reinforced with peas, whereas correct choices on circle and green
identity trial s were reinforced with wheat. After learning identity
matching, the birds were tested on their ability to match non-identical
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stimuli previously associated with common reinforcers (i.e. match red
to plus, and plus to red (peas); and match green to circle, and circle
to green (wheat)). The birds learned these arbitrary tasks faster than
other birds in each of two control groups, one receiving pea and wheat
reinforcers in an uncorrelated fashion, and the other receiving
reinforcers comprising of an equal rrax of peas and wheat. The effect
was essential I y replicated in an additional experiment. The authors
concluded that the experimental birds had formed equivalences between
hues and forms based upon mediation by common food ' expectancies' .
t
\
.
However, a different analysis can be given, based not upon
unspecified differential expectancies but upon differential responses
induced by classical conditioning. Several studies have shown that
peas.
differential reinforcers can act as unconditioned stimuli (UCS's) for
eliciting differential responses (Brodigan and Peterson, 1976; Jenkins
and Moore, 1973). For example, when Jenkins and Moore (1973) presented
water as a reinforcer during autoshaping trials, pigeons' key pecks
came to resemble the form of pecking normally produced when they drank
water. However, when grain was presented as a reinforcer, the birds'
key pecks came to resemble the natural pecking elicited by grain.
Sirni.larIy , in the Edwards et al study, peas may act as a Des for
eliciting 'pea pecking' responses, and wheat may act as a Des for
'wheat pecking'. During identity matching trials, peas were delivered
whenever the birds chose either the plus or the red comparison. In
other words, the plus or red reliably preceded presentation of the
These pairings would, through the usual process of classical
conditioning, eventually establish the plus and the red as conditional
stimul i (es ' s ) for 'pea responding' (in the interests of curtai ling
embarrassment and preventing confusion the author will avoid using the
more vulgar term for this particular differential response). The
elicited 'pea responses' could then interact with the identity matching
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procedure (i.e. intervene between sample presses and comparison
choices), thus creating the necessary conditions for mediated matching.
For example, during plus-plus identity trials, the 'pea response'
elicited by the plus sample may gain control over the pigeon's choice
of the plus comParison. The red stimulus may become similarly related
with 'pea responses' during red-red identity trials. Consequently,
both pIus and red may e I icit 'pea responses' and ' pea responses' may
control the bird' s choice of either plus or red. The pigeons would
then be able to match plus to red and red to plus, even without the
emergence of equivalence, because each would have learned the necessary
mediating relations through their exposure to the prevailing
reinforcement contingencies. The same analysis can be applied to the
'wheat' stimuli. The procedures may appear quite different to those
adopted by McIntire et al (1987), but the outcome seems the same. If
the birds were taught what to do on the test trials, then there is no
need to invoke stimulus equivalence.
This interpretation is consistent with a body of data supporting a
classical mediation model of 'expectancy' (see Peterson, Wheeler and
Annstrong (1978) for a review) and it also has the virtue of being open
to empirical test. What would happen, for example, if stimuli were
Paired with their differential reinforcers via a simple autoshaping
procedure? This should still result in the formation of differential
'expectancies' (i.e. differential responses controlled by the stimuli)
so according to Edwards et aI, the birds should still form equivalences
between non-identical stimulus pairs. According to the present
account, however, there should be no such evidence because the
procedures would not allow differential responses to gain control over
the birds' comParison choices.
Experiments 1 and 2 in the present thesis add considerably to the
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current weight of evidence for human-animal differences in equivalence
formation. Experiment 1 was particularly significant in providing no
evidence for equivalence in the matching-to-sample performance of the
two language-trained chirnpanzees , Sherman and Lana. The data from
Experiment 1 leaves one wondering: if these chimps are linguistically
accomplished then why did they fail a standard symret.ry test? There
seems little doubt that these chimps, for all their language training,
did not satisfy standard criteria for stimulus equivalence. However,
just because they did not it does not I'TEan that they cannot. Some of
the children in Chapter 4 also failed standard tests for equivalence
(but always, one should note, in the absence of reinforcement). But
these children then went on to confirm that they were as linguistically
accomplished as one might expect. These children later proved capable
of equivalence after having applied common labels to each prospective
corresponding stimulus. Their subsequent success in turn confi.rrred
that their verbal behaviour was indeed symbolic; that, as has been
argued, in giving common labels the children were actually narrung the
stimuli as defined.
We must ask the questions 'Can the chimps name in the sense
described earlier?' 'Are the chimps' lexigram responses functionally
equivalent to childrens' naming?' Perhaps we may begin to answer these
questions by capitalising on the potential of the ccrmon labelling
paradigm as a diagnostic indicator of true naming. If the chimps still
fail equivalence tests after learning to apply cammon lexigrams to the
stimuli on matching-to-sample trials then perhaps we may suspect that
their training had not established the skill of naming, at least not
according to the sense of the term adopted here.
But at some point we must ask: to what extent does the present
account of naming and stimulus equivalence help to make sense of other
equivalence data produced elsewhere? Any theoretical account 'VvDrth
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its salt' should be capable of enlisting external support and of
throwing light on data which has hitherto escaped prediction and eluded
adequate explanation.
In a review of various transfer procedures, Spradlin and
VanBiervliet (1980) drew attention to two unpubl ished studies which
produced incomplete equivalence of the kind found in Experiment 4(a) of
the present thesis. The first study was by Friedman (1974). Three of
the 4-5 year old children in Friedman's study passed equivalence tests
involving printed numeral s, printed number words and spoken number
worda, The fourth child, however, did not completely pass the tests.
Proir to testing, the child could label numerals (AX), select numerals
conditional upon spoken word samples (XA) and select printed number
v-Drds conditional upon spoken word samples (XB). Test were given for
the relations AB (matching numerals to number words), BA (matching
number words to numerals) and BX (labelling number words). The child
was able to perfonn AB and BX, but not BA.
Neither Friedman (1974) nor Spradlin and VanViervliet (1980) could
understand why AB emerged but BA did not. But now, in the 1ight of the
present thesis, we may give a straightforward explanation; perhaps BA
did not emerge because the subject failed to spontaneously name the
Set-B samples during BA matching. The subject, according to the'
present definition, was capable of naming the B-stimuli, because BX
emerged after XB training. However, BX only emerged in the highly
contrived context of a naming test. If the subject had been prompted
to name the B-stimuli during BA matching trials, then perhaps BA would
have emerged. This possibil ity, however, was overlooked by Friedman,
despite the fact that he noted the following with respect to two of the
subjects who passed:
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"Both of these subjects did something
that the other two subjects did not do
Bo~h subjects named the sample stimulus:
ThlS type of verbal response may have
pla~ed an important role for both
sU?Jects. The subjects were never
relnforced for their verbalization nor
were they told not to do it when it did
occ,ur. Pace (1970) reported that
subJ~cts made fewer errors when they were
requlred to name the sample stimulus than
when they were not required to name the
sample" (Friedman, 1974, p.42).
(N.B. - the Pace study was not available at the time of
writing) •
At 1 east Friedman reported his subjects' spontaneous
verbalisations. One \\Dnders how much has gone unreported elsewhere.
Spradlin and VanBiervliet (1980) also reported a study by James
Halle and Spradlin (no reference supplied) which used Friedman's
procedures with two severel y retarded adolescents. One adolescent
Passed all three tests (AS, BA and EX) but the other failed all but the
AB test. Once again, Spradlin and VanBiervliet had no idea why AB
emerged but BA did not. This subject may have failed the BA test
because of being unable to name the B-stimuli at all. The subject had
learned to choose printed number words conditional upon spoken number
words (XB) but he seemed unable to do the reverse i.e . I abe I the
printed number words (BX). Moreover, this resul t again confirms that
learning to select stimuli conditional upon hearing a common sound is
not suff icient for the emergence of equival ence (cf. Jessica,
Experiment 4 (a) ) . It seems that the subjects must produce the sounds
themselves during equivalence tests.
Chapter 4 suggested that the subjects' pre-existing stimulus names
may interfere with equivalence fornation via other, less familiar,
labels. One study appears to provide data consistent with this notion,
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and with the va.ew that naming 1S fornecessary equivalence. It is
somewhat ironical, then, that the experiment was conducted by Sidman,
Kirk and Willson-Morris (1985) who, as we saw in Chapter 1, vehemently
deny that narrdng is essential for equivalence.
Their paradigm is shown in Figure 5.2. The subjects were taught
all the relations depicted by the solid arrows. The exact order of
training differed among the subjects, but EC was always the last
relation to be taught. This meant that prior to EC training it was
possible for two seperate sets of equivalence classes to form, one set
consisting of ABC (upper 'triangle') and the other consisting of DEF
(lower 'triangle'). However, the two sets of classes could merge into
one when EX: was added.
In fact, the emergence of equivalences were far from autanatic.
There.was a great deal of variability in the subjects' performances.
However, at no point did the authors ask whether the variability was
due to how the subjects named the stimuli. Perhaps we can rrake up for
this amuss1on.
Let us begin by considering subject ER, a normal five year old
child. In tests (depicted by the dotted I ines in Figure 5.2), she
These names were
began by f ailing FB, BY, DB, AF and BD (in that order). However, the
turning point carre when EB was tested. The emergence of EB was quickly
followed by all the other test relations. In naming tests, the subject
named all the left-hand stimuli as 'Delta', all the middle stimuli as
'Sigma', and all the right-hand stimuli as 'XI'.
derived from the Set-A words, spoken by the experimenter.
How may we account for the fact that the subject only began to
pass the tests after being tested on EB. Was this mere coincidence?
Perhaps not; there 1S another possibility which goes like this (and
what follows is of course entireI y specul ative) : even before testing
began, the B and C stimuli had become equivalent through corrrron Set-A
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Figure 5.2 Equivalence paradigm from the study by Sidman, Kirk and
Willson-Morris (1985). Arrows point fran samples to compar.isons , The
stimuli are arranged, for expository purposes, so that auditory "delta"
is rratched to the letter on the left in each box, "signa" to the centre
letter and "XI" to the letter on the right; in all other instances
letters are matched to each other according to their relative
positions in the boxes (see text).
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names spoken by the subject. However, the D, E and F stimuli had not
become equivalent because the subject had thus far failed to name them.
All of the initial tests involved matching samples from one of the
'triangles' to comparisons from the other; the subject could not pass
these tests because she had no names for D, E and F. However, this all
changed when EB was tested. Inspection of Figure 5.2 shows that the
corresponding stimuli from sets E and B are quite similar in
appearance. For example, the left-hand Band E stimuli both look like
triangles, and the similarity of the centre B and C stimuli becooes
IIDre obvious when one or other is rotated appropriately through 90
degrees. Perhaps then, during EB testing, these perceptual
similarities caused the subject to name the Set-E stimuli with the Set-
A names for the very first time. The subject's new found Set-E names
could then spread through to the D and F stimul i via the DE and DF
baselines presented during testing. The subject would then end up
applying common Set-A names to all the stimuli in the network, and so
all the test relations could subsequently emerge.
The above analysis gains support from data produced by subject
N.D. (a normal 5 year old child). She began by f ai ling FB and DB.
Once again this may have been because the A, Band C stimuli were
equivalent through comron Set-A narres , whereas D, E and F were not.
Now, subject N.D. failed the EB test which seemed to mark the turning
point for subject E.H. above. Why didn't the EB test also help N.D.?
A close analysis of N.D's EB test data reveals that all but one of her
ten errors came from matching the centre E stimulus in Figure 5.2 to
the left-hand B stimulus. Perhaps, then, subject N.D. failed to notice
the similarity of the centre Band E stimuli because of failing to
employ the simple trick of rotation mentioned earlier.
Subject N.D. eventually passed every test, and she also gave
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cormron Set-A names to all of the stimuli in the network. How did
common names spread through the network, if not via the EB test link?
Well, after failing EB, subject N.O. passed the CB and Be tests, thus
confirming the presence of the ABC equivalence classes which the
current analysis suspected were present fran the start. Despite the
fact th~t BC and CB emerged when first tested, Sidman et al repeated
the CB and Be tests three more times each. In addition, the FB and DB
tests were repeated without success. By now, subject N.O. had received
a total of 14 tests. Each of these contained 45 baseline trials, which
in turn included the EC trials which were the only baseline link
between the ABC equivalence classes and the D, E and F stimuli. It is
possible, then, that through repeated testing, the subject received
enough additional EC trials so that her Set-A names for the C-stimuli
could be applied first to the corresponding E-stimuli and then to the D
and F-stimuli via the DE and DF baselines. The result would be common
naming, and therefore equivalence, throughout the network, but this
time via a different route than the one taken by Subject E.H.
Next we examine the data from Subject F .M. This subject failed
FB, DB, and EB, but then passed CE. This success, however, did not
herald the turning point for the emergence of the remaining test
relations. The subject continued by failing EB, CB, and Be several
times each. The turning point came when the EC baseline trials were
removed from the test sessions, thus severing the only link between the
upper and lower triangles in Figure 5.2. After the EC trials were
removed, the subject passed CB. Then, when the EC trials were restored
she maintained her CB perfonnance and went on to pass all the other
tests.
Sidman et al ackncwledged the possibility that the EC baseline
trials had somehow interfered with the formation of ABC equivalences.
What they did not appear to consider was whether this interference had
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anything to do with the way the subject was naming the stimuli. They
noted, however, that subject F.M. (a normal 9 year old child) was old
enough to have already _l_e_a_r_n~e~d names for the Set-D stimull' hi h h
-----__ ,w c se
called by the English names 'L', '0', and 'G' (corresponding to the
left, centre, and right-hand D-stimuli in Figure 5.2). When F.M. was
given a naming test after equivalence testing, she applied her English
names as well as the Set-A Greek names to all of the corresponding
stimuli in the network.
The results from experiments ln Chapter 4 of this thesis may help
to suggest a plausible account of what happened during F.M's tests.
Perhaps F.M' s pre-existing English names for the Set-D stimuli also
became linked to the E, the F and (IIDst importantly) the C stimuli
during the course of basel ine training sessions. If so, then two
things could happen, First, the C, 0, E and F stimuli could becane
equivalent through their control of common English names. This would
explain why the subject was able to pass the CE test at the same time
as failing FB, DB and EB. Secondly, the English names may have
interfered with the formation of equivalences between the Band C
stimuli. Ordinarily, one would eXPect the subject to apply the Greek
names from Set-A to the corresponding Set-C stimuli. But this subject
had other names for the C stimuli. Perhaps, to use a metaphor, the
English names from the lower triangle in Figure 5.2 were crossing over
to 'Greek territory' (the upper triangle) via the EC baseline trials
which were bridging the gap. If the Set-e stimuli were given English
names by the subject, then the Band C stimuli could not become
equivalent via cormron Greek names. Perhaps this is the reason why F.M.
failed Be and CB in the presence of the EC baseline. Why then did she
pass BC and CB when the EC trials were removed? Well, according to
the present account, when the EC bridge was removed then so too was the
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interference. The C stimuli, isolated fran the interfering English
names, could then be given the same Greek names as the B stDnuli, thus
allowing the subject to pass the Be and CB tests via cammon naming.
Perhaps by the time the EC trials were restored, the Greek names
for the C stimuli were sufficiently well established that they could
not be ousted in fa~our of the English names from the lower 'triangle'.
If so, then F.M. would end up with two sets of names for the C-stDnuli
l.e. English and Greek. In other words, restoring the EC bridge may
have allowed the newly famed Greek names to became linked with the
fanner English names. The subject could thereby end up with corrron
Greek and English names for all the stimuli in the network, and the
full set of equivalences could subsequently emerge.
Essentially the same account may be applied to the data from
Subject P.M., a 21 year old Down's sYndrome male with a mental age of 4
years. Subject P.M's results were very similar to F.M's above. Just
as was the case with F.M., P.M. at first was only able to pass CE; he
initially failed on FB, DB, EB, CB and BC. However, when the EC trials
were removed from the test sessions then CB and BC errerged. These
events are entirely consistent with the interference hyPOthesis derived
from the present thesis. Furthenrore, the same effects were noted with
two other children, although precise details were not given by Sidman
et ale Perhaps these subjects, too, had pre-existing English names for
the Set-o stimuli which spread to, and wreaked havoc upon, particular
parts of the stimulus network. Unfortunately, Sidman et al gave no
naming test to any of the three subjects referred to above. Had they
done so, or, better still, had they taken note of any spontaneous
verbal behaviour, then perhaps they, too, would have identified naming
as a potential source of variability in their subjects' equivalence
test performances.
Of course, all of the above analysis lS necessarily speculative,
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and post-hoc analysis is never a substitute for functional analysis.
Nevertheless, there are occasions when post-hoc analyses are not
unwarranted, and this appears to be such an occasion. The above
analyses have produced a plausible account of data which have
previously eluded any kind of adequate explanation. Furthermore, the
analyses are not without substance in that -they are based upon the
empirical data derived from this thesis. And, perhaps most
importantly, the analyses are not designed to 'explain away' the
behaviour in question. On the contrary, it is hoped that these
analyses provoke future investigations along the lines suggested at the
end of Chapter 4. It seems that nam1ng can no longer be ignored as a
potential antecedent of equivalence.
This thesis has suggested that naming may be defined, in part, as
a kind of stimulus-response symnetry. One problem with this is that it
may appear rather trivial. After all, right the way back in Chapter 1
it was noted that symrretry 1S a defining property of equivalence. It
might seem, then, as if this thesis has made no progress whatsoever,
and that it simply represents a kind of conceptual 'running on the
spot'. But such an impression misses the point entirely, as is perhaps
best illustrated by reconsidering Experiments 4(a) to 6. The children
in these experiments were confronted with a task which required them to
select a co~parison stimulus, B, conditional upon a sample stimulus, A.
later, they were required to do the reverse i.e. match B to A. In
other words, they were responding to the same stimulus presentations
that occur during a standard symmetry test. Furthermore, the only way
they could match the stimuli spontaneously, without direct matching-to-
sample training, was by naming them. The chi ldren had to name the
stimuli in order to produce the matching-to-sample performance required
for passing a standard symmetry test. These data therefore support the
366
view that naming 1S necessary not J'ust for 'equ1valence, but also for
passing standard s\mrrPtry tests. Th1'S v1'ew' I
.I ......... 1S a so support.ed by the
data fran Experiments 1 and 2, in which an.irra l s 'once aqaan seemed
unable to cope with sample-canparison reversals.
So, inasmuch as this thesis has uncovered new data leading to a
new perspective, it cannot be fair I y accused of 'running on the spot'.
But, doesn't it now look as if it is running 1n circles? If naming 1S
necessary for symmetry, and naming is defined by symmetry, then are we
not left with the absurd position that sYmmetry is necessary for
symmetry? The answer, quite simply, is no. The above argurrent misses
the point by equating what appears to be (according to all the
empirical evidence) two fundamentally different kinds of symmetry. All
that is being said here is that stimulus-response symmetry is necessary
for stimulus-stimulus symmetry. This onl y becanes circular if one
ignores the elements of the equation.
Although the present formula escapes circularity, it does beg
other questions. The most fundamental question of all is: where does
stimulus-response symmetry, or naming, come fran? What conditions are
necessary for naming in the first place?
Figure 5.3 represents an attempt to address this question by
suggesting where to look for an answer. The suggestion is that
stimulus-response symmetry somehow arises from an extensive reinforced
history of correct responding to exemplars of stimulus-response
symmetry. This exempl ar training occurs naturally within the
developing child's linguistic environment (cf. Catania, 1984; Hayes, in
press). Figure 5.3 schematically represents the linguistic
interactions between the child and, say, the child's mother. It
attempts to map out the relations between a word and its corresponding
stimulus, taking into account who is saying the word and who 1S
singling out the stimulus. We may be sure of one thing, and that 1S
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Figure 5.3 Schematic representation of the linguistic interactions
between a rrother (M) and her child (C), showing how the developing
child's linguistic environment may support exemplar training for
stimulus-response symmetry.
/
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that Figure 5.3 is an oversimplification of what really happens, but,
nevertheless, it represents the proposed beginnings of a functional
analysis of the origins of naming.
For explanatory purposes, Figure 5.3 depicts the relationships
between a toy ball and the word 'ball I, although, of course, it could
equally be any other object of interest. The capital 'M' is for rrother
and IC' is for child, and these appear below objects or words in
accordance with who is singling out the object or saying the word. The
process begins with the mother, who exposes the child to exemplars of
symmetry even before the one word stage (see Phase A). The mother may
show the child the ball and then label it (1). Or she may do the
symmetrical counterpart of this, for example, she may label the ball
first and then show it to the child (2). These skills are ones which
the mother wants the child to learn. Eventually,the child begins to
take an active role in the proceedings as depicted in phase B. The
child has still not learned to say anything yet, but he may be doing
things with respect to interesting objects. For example the child may
pick up the ball, or indicate it in sorre other way, and the mother may
tell the child what it is (3). Sh~ may do this because she interprets
the childs action as a request for the object's name, (see Bruner,
1981; Lock, 1980). The SYmmetrical counterpart occurs when, for
example, the rrother asks for the ball and the child complies by finding
it (4).
The nature of the game changes when the child learns to speak
(Phase C). The child says 'ball' and the mother then shows it to him,
perhaps because she interprets his utterance as a request (5 ) . The
symmetrical version of this involves the mother singling out an object
and encouraging the child to say the corresponding word (6).
Eventually, out of all of this errerges a child who can label
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things spontaneously (Phase D). The child may see the ball and say
what it is (7). Or he may do the symmetrical counterpart of this i.e.
say what it is and then, for example, point to it (8).
Perhaps one might question the status of this exemplar training.
Does the exemplar training have to involve stimulus-response relations?
Would a history of symrretry exemplar training with stimulus-stimulus
relations suffice? Would such training result directly in the
emergence of stimulus-stimulus symmetries, without recourse to
rredi.at.i.on by naming? The answer favoured at present 1S I no I, because
if the above scenario were true then it would be a simple matter to
demonstrate that subjects could succeed on symmetry tests without
naming the stimuli. The evidence examined in this thesis strongly
indicates that sYmmetry exemplar training with stimulus-stimulus
relations (which surely must also occur incidentally in the natural
environment) is unlikely to be effective even with humans. If so, then
it is Perhaps no surprise that such training did not seem to work with
the pigeons in Experiment 2 (Chapter 3).
Many accounts of language developIIEnt note the occurrence of same
kind of transition from pure association to naming. Lock (1980), for
example, puts it thus:
"The learning of words presents two
probl ems: the first ,?oncerns the
establishment by the Ch1ld of sound-
object associations........ The second
problem is the more d1ff1cult one to
tackle; when does the child pass beyond
simple association and co~ to.us~ so~ds
to name objects? The rrajor di.f f icul t.i.es
presented by this problem are conceptual:
What are the characteristics of the act
of naming, and what criteria are there
that can be used to judge the status of
some noise the child makes?" (Lock, 1980,
p.113).
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Lock continues by 'describing the course of events that lead to
the child apparently being able to name objects' (p.113). He does this
by analysing the transcripts of a number of corrmunicative episodes
involving mother and child. These episodes are replete with the
object-word relations depicted in Figure 5.3. Although Lock is able to
indicate behaviour which he believes is indicative of naming, he has
notable difficulty defining what it is about naming which
differentiates it from simple associations. As he states, 'The
impression that ar i ses fran looking at the child's use of his words
suggests that there has occurred a change in his knowledge, such that it
now admits an understanding that objects have names' (p , 118) . Lock
goes further by saying that we may have evidence for naming when:
"words begin to be acquired in a
different way: the laborious game of
building up an association between a
sound and an object recedes, and the
child increases his vocabulary in some
other, and as yet bare1y understood, way.
This again impl ies that the basis of his
ability is more than being able to
associate a particular sound with a
particular object, but that he has 'gone
beyond the information given' towards
knowing some principle" (Lock, 1980,
p.120).
Here, Lock recognises that narnlng has emergent properties, which
is precisely what the present thesis suggests. His difficulty with
defining naming probably stemmed from an over-reliance on observational
Naml' ng as defined in the present thesis cannot betechniques.
identified from its surface characteristics. An identification of
nanung requires a functional analysis. What we have now that Lock
didn't have then is a way of identifying narning through behaviourally
spec.i f i.able procedures.
'Where d-oes stimul us equivalence corre from?'We began by asking
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The author's position is put rrost succintly by Jackson Brawn, who slngs
'I nay not have the answer but I think I've got a plan'. If we wish to
proceed in our quest, then the evidence seemingly compels us to attempt
a functional analysis of the language development of children.
Skinner's book 'Verbal Behavior' set the occasion for such an analysis
over thirty years ago (Skinner, 1957). Now, with the advent of
stimulus equivalence research, behaviour analysis has never been in a
stronger position to attempt to make up for lost time.
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